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MANUAL - COUNTER.INSURGENCY OPERATIONS → CANADA

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO COUNTER.INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

lnsurgency is rooted in squalor, and fear and suffering are its flowers.

Sir Frank Kitson

-General

101. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to define and introduce the concepts of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and secondly, to provide a general overview for the conduct of a

counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign within the wider concepts of land operations and doctrine. It will provide the reader a contextual understanding within which to view the details regarding

insurgency and COIN.

A COIN campaign is conducted using the same means as any other campaign: through

the application of a military force's fighting power.l lt is set within the continuum of operations and is executed through a combination of tactical level activities and tasks. However, it is a

distinct campaign with its own philosophy and set of principles that provide guidance forthe application of fighting power and the conduct of activities.

A number of concepts are discussed within this chapter that have been drawn from

B GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operafions. Fuller discussions of those concepts, as they apply across the spectrum of conflict, will be found therein.

sEcTtoN 1

DEFINITIONS

102. INSURGENCY

lnsurgency is part of a wider set of irregular activities and threats to a secure and stable environment, lrregular activity may be defined as: "behaviour that attempts to effect or prevent

change through the illegal use, or threat, of violence, conducted by ideologically or criminally motivated non-regular forces, groups or individuals, as a challenge to authority."2

This broader set of irregular activities that threaten authority and stability beyond the

capabilities of normal law enforcement includes criminality, disorder, insurgency, terrorism and irregular military forces (e.9., private or sectarian militias). lnsurgency is distinct from other

forms of threats in that it seeks a desired political effect, namely a desired change or re-ordering

of affairs.

A number of definitions exist for the term insurgency, and although many have been developed over the years, most have contained the same key elements: violence, or at least the

threat of violence, subversion, intimidation of the broad population mass, propaganda and a political aim. Again, it is the last element, a political aim, that distinguishes an insurgency from

other forms of conflict or threats to security and stability.

Fighting power is comprised of three components: moral, intellectual and physical. Combat power refers to the application of physical elements. See B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

Draft definition submitted to Army Terminology Panel (ATP) June 2007. For a more detailed discussion of irregular activities, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

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An insurgency has been defined as follows: "A competition involving at least one non- state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve

political change."3 ln this definition, the following can be noted:

lnsurgency is not a movement or people. lt is a competition, struggle or conflict involving different groups of people. As a manifestation of war, it is a competition

of wills.

lt must include at least one non-state movement to differentiate it from wars

between states.

The established authority need not necessarily be the government of the nation subject to an insurgency. lt could be a local authority, a temporary military

authority or a government of a third party.

lnsurgencies seek political change like all wars. But the political nature of insurgency is so important, it should be emphasized in the definition. The

change sought could be government collapse (typically an objective of 1950-60s communist insurgencies) or a lesser objective such as self-determination,

regional autonomy or the release of political prisoners.

Because of the focus on attaining political change, insurgencies are political problems and are not solely military problems. They require political solutions, with the military playing a

largely supporting role.

The key to any insurgency is gaining at the very least an indifferent attitude, if not the outright support, of the population. Hence, many insurgencies have sought to persuade through

propaganda and subversion and to intimidate through violence large sectors of a population in order to gain support for insurgent aims and undermine support for those countering the

insurgency. lnsurgents live and operate amongst the population, thus those forces and agencies countering the insurgency must separate, physically and morally, the insurgent from

the population base. A hostile populace will create hostile conditions for any side in an insurgency. Therefore, gaining the support of the people is paramount to any COIN campaign.

At the basis of an insurgency will be a narrative, a story. Central to this narrative is the idea that motivates the insurgents and is formalized into an ideology. lt empowers the

insurgents and lends them legitimacy and provides justification for their ends and means.

lnsurgencies have political aims stemming from a number of sources and a guiding ideology. Regardless of their origins and ideology, all insurgencies will have to some extent,

legitimate grievances at their root. These grievances may be wide ranging and include

political, social or economic characteristics. They will be exploited by the insurgent forces in order to gain additional support and undermine the authority and legitimacy of the official

government and supporting forces. Thus, in order to solve an insurgency and create enduring

solutions to conflict in the environment, COIN forces must address these grievances.

A key to the eventual defeat of an insurgency is that the outbreak of an insurgency must be properly identified as such. The classification or dismissal of a nascent insurgency as a

criminal or some other movement will only fuel the insurgency through inappropriate responses,

justify

the insurgent narrative of systemic injustice and subjugation and provide political and military leaders with the excuse to ignore the root, often legitimate, grievances of the insurgent

movement.

Definition as developed by a counter-insurgency study group during United States Marine Corps (USMC)

JOINT URBAN WARRIOR 2005.

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103. COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Counter-insurgency is defined as follows:

Ihose military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to

defeat an insurgency.a

Since an insurgency is a political problem, the military plays a largely supporting role to other agencies and government departments in countering an insurgency. As indicated in the

definition, a wide range of agencies, elements of power and capabilities, in addition to the military, must come together in a unity of purpose to defeat an insurgency.

A COIN campaign is conducted through a specific philosophy and a set of specific principles that guide the application of combat power. lt is distinctly different from the conduct of

an insurgency itself, and the lines of operation within the COIN campaign must counter the lines of operation of the insurgents. Within the guiding principles, each COIN campaign must be a

custom approach to the insurgency at hand. The constant is the fact that insurgency and counter-insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support both at

home and in the theatre of operations. lf the strategic focal point is public opinion in the local, domestic and international arenas, most initial military tactical efforts will be focused on breaking

the link between the insurgent and the people. This is not only a physical link, but the psychological linkof moralsupport. Theformerwill entail physical activities,whilstthelatterwill

entail influence activities that undermine and attack the insurgent ideology, narrative and claims to authority and legitimacy. This will include measures to address and resolve grievances that

lend support and credibility to the insurgency. lf the insurgent can be isolated, it is then theoretically a relatively simple matter to eliminate him and his cause.

ln order to reach this point, a COIN campaign will involve more than military engagement. Defeating an insurgency requires not only the neutralization of insurgent military

capabilities but also the resolution of the root causes of the political and socioeconomic grievances that enabled its occurrence in the first instance. Therefore, it requires a

comprehensive approach, with multiple agencies and other government departments, often enabled through a coalition effort. The mere attrition of insurgents is highly unlikely to result in

the defeat of the insurgency. lndeed, any attempt to win an insurgency through attrition may only help fuel that insurgency. Only a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes

of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy and authority of the insurgents will obtain an

enduring solution.

SECTION 2

COIN CAMPAIGN AS PART OF THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS

104. GENERAL

Campaigns and subordinate operations often require military forces to operate

effectively across the spectrum of conflict, conduct a wide range of military activities simultaneously and transition quickly from one type of operation to another in rapidly changing

operational circumstances. Commanders must be able to visualize how a campaign or operation will likely evolve over time in light of changing circumstances.

NATO Allied Administrative Publication (MP) 6 NAfO G/ossary of Terms and Definitions.

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105. THE GONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS FRAMEWORKs

The concept of a continuum of operations identifies a number of campaign themes and provides a framework for commanders to understand the complexity of the operational

environment and the manner in which missions contribute to a lasting peace or, at least, to an environment in which conflict is diminished. The continuum of operations consists of four

aspects:

a. b.

c. d.

the spectrum of conflict;

predominant (operational level) campaign themes, including counter-insurgency;

types of tactical activities (offensive, defensive and stability); and

the simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical activities, termed

full-spectrum operations.

106. PREDOMINANT CAMPAIGN THEMES

Military operations may be described through a series of predominant campaign themes plotted at appropriate and relative locations on the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1-1).

Figure 1-l : Predominant Gampaign Themes

Campaign themes consist of the following: major combat, counter-insurgency, peace support (which entails a range of peacekeeping and peacemaking campaigns) and peacetime

military engagement.6 The location of these themes along the spectrum of conflict is not fixed

See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 I Land Operations for a fuller discussion of the continuum of operations.

Peacetime military engagement is defined as: "planned military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. Note: it includes programmes and exercises that nations conduct

with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding with other countries and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners" (submitted to Army Terminology Panel

June 2007).

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but generally reflects the relative level of violence that can be expected within the campaign. A limited intervention, such as a non-combatant evacuation or emergency humanitarian aid

mission, may occur at any point along the spectrum of conflict.T As well, there may be elements of different campaign themes within a campaign theatre. For example, one region of a nation

may require peace support, while another is enduring an insurgency,

,107.

FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

All campaigns are conducted through the combined and simultaneous conduct of tactical-level operations: offensive, defensive and stability operations.t They are linked through

enabling operations.e Each of these types of operations consists of a set of tactical activities that are realized through tacticaltasks (see Figure 1-2).

Figure 1-2: The Continuum of Operations and Full€pectrum Operations

Campaigns and operational plans are realized at the tactical level through the simultaneous and sequential conduct of these tactical operations and their constituent activities.

The simultaneous conduct of tactical activities is termed full-spectrum operations.

As campaigns progress, efforts and resources ebb and flow between these different tactical activities, and their balance reflects the nature of the campaign, the principles by which

the campaign should be conducted and the situation at hand.

Each of these tactical classifications consists of a number of tactical activities, which in turn are realized through the conduct of tacticaltasks. These tactical level activities and their

simultaneous conduct are termed full-spectrum operations (see Figure 1-3).

Limited intervention is defined as: "a military operation limited in objective, scope and timeframe. Note: not considered a campaign, but may involve cooperation with other agencies and government departments" (approved

by Army Terminology Panel, May 2007).

Stability operations are defined as: "tactical activities conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and

progress can be achieved" (Army Terminology Panel).

Enabling operations include those tactical activities that enable others. They include withdrawal, relief in place and advance to contact. For more details, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

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Attack

Security and Control

Raid Ambush

Support to Demobilization,

Disarmament and

Exploitation

Reintegration (DDR)

Pursuit

Support to Security Sector

Reform (SSR)

Tactical Activities

Break-out

Support to Civilian

Feint and

lnfrastructure and

Demonstration

Governance

Reconnaissance in

Assistance to Other Agencies

Force

Destroy

Block

Cordon and Search

Seize

Occupy

Observe/Monitor

Tactical Tasks and Effects (Not

an all-inclusive list)

Secure

Counter-attack

Vehicle Checkpoint (VCP)

Support by Fire

Framework Patrols

Guard

Fix

Humanitarian Aid Delivery

Train lndigenous Security

Retain

Forces

Crowd Confrontation

Notes:

1. Mission statements will be written with both the activity and the task or immediate effect, further described by the purpose, or secondary effect. The activity is not always stated in the mission statement, such as "...(attack to) seize

(object) in order to..."

2. Mission statements relating to stability activities and tasks will use the transient verb "conduct" to assign the activity,suchas,"...will conductsecurityandcontrol inorderto..." Thiswouldthenbeallocatedastactical tasks

and effects to subordinates, such as VCPs, framework patrols, etc. At the lower tactical levels, only the tactical

tasks may appear in the mission statement, but again continue to use the verb "conduct," such as, "...will conduct framework patrols in order to..." or "...will conduct humanitarian aid delivery in order to..." ln this manner, they are

similar to mission statements for enabling operations. See B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Sfaf Dufies for Land aperations for further details.

Figure 1-3: TacticalActivities and Tasks

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These types of tactical-level operations, together with tactical tasks, describe the total tactical activity undertaken by a military force within a campaign. Each type is guided by a set

of principles.to Note that each subordinate type constitutes individual tactical tasks. An attack may consist of a support-by-fire task and clearing task, while humanitarian assistance may see

one sub-unit distributing food and another one conducting a medical clinic. Again, it is important to note that in any type of campaign theme, these tactical tasks may be conducted

simultaneously. For example, one sub-unit may be conducting an attack, another may be

conducting security of an area through vehicle checkpoints, and another may be distributing emergency water and rations to refugees.

Full-Spectrum Operations during the lraq War-March 2003

Within a 48-hour period, between 22 and 24 March 2003, ZCoy, 1't Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (RRF) conducted full-spectrum operations at the sub-unit level.

passage

rrd

Following a forward passage of lines with in-place US forc

of lines with in-place US forces en route to Basra, Z Company Combat Team conducted the following operations:

r r

r .

an attack on the near side of a bridge leading to the city of Basra;

an attack, on their flank, to clear a small lraqi Army barracks;

an attack, following nightfall, to seize the far side of the bridge;

a hasty defensive position in their bridgehead;

at first light, 23 Mar 03, the combat team had to undertake crowd control operations within their defensive position for civilians attempting to flee Basra but refused

passage at the bridge for fear of enemy ex-filtration;

. .

the combat team defeated an enemy armoured counter-attack;

whilst maintaining the defensive position, part of the combat team (one platoon, company HQ and a fire team of tanks) conducted a penetration into the city of

Basra, destroying five T-55s and a number of infantry detachments in the process, withdrawing after the contact and returning to the defensive position;

maintained the defensive position the night of 23124 Mar 03;

conducted a relief in place the morning of 24 Mar 03; and

moved to the battle group's rear areas and conducted a series of stability activities, including the delivery of aid, area security and route control, fire fighting and tasks

to stop looting and other criminal behaviour.

Whilst the combat team was conducting these activities, other sub-units of the 1 RRF Battle Group were conducting other activities and tasks.

Source: Memoirs of OC Z Coy, 1 RRF, Major Duncan McSporan, RRF.

The conduct of tactical-level activities should not violate the guiding principles by which the overall campaign should be conducted. For example, the pursuit of fleeing insurgents that

will gain a tactical success should not be conducted if it will break the overarching philosophy and principles of a COIN campaign.

1 Land Operations

See B-GL-300-001/FP-00

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The conduct of campaigns should always seek to reach operational objectives and reduce the level of conflict. When operating at any point along the continuum of operations,

commanders and staffs should consider how to prevent the escalation of violence by the adversary. During peace support, for example, operations must be conducted with a view to

preventing escalation to an insurgency or to major combat. Force must be used discriminately

because the undue application of force, lethal or otherwise, can undermine the overall campaign

and, in fact, cause an escalation of conflict if secondary effects are not fully considered.

Recognizing changing circumstances or conditions, especially ones that require a

change to the major theme of a campaign, is both an intellectual as well as an intelligence challenge. This is part of the art of war. The intelligence system must be attuned to, and look

for, indications of changes in the environment, and commanders and staffs must be able to interpret the key indicators that demonstrate a shift is taking place. Commanders and staffs

must then react to the changing environment, either to prevent escalation of violence or facilitate a shift to a lower level of violence, in such a way that the situation is manageable by the forces

at hand.

ln situations of political instability or disaffection, an insurgency may erupt. lnsurgencies are complex and may have several significant factors, including intra- or inter-state violence as

well as factional violence between different insurgent groups. Although some models of insurgency, such as the Maoist model, forecast a progression to conventional operations,

insurgencies, as defined above, will fall short of large-scale, conventional operations inherent to

a major combat campaign.

10. The military role in COIN is to create a security framework that precludes the ability of

insurgents to undertake offensive operations. The military will work in co-operation with other agencies addressing the non-military aspects of the security environment in order to solve the

root causes and grievances that lead to conflict and insurgency. This will include many of the tactical activities grouped under stability operations. Thus the military's role is one of supporting

other agencies by creating manoeuvre space for them through the provision of security and protection and the neutralization of the insurgent threat. lt is these other agencies that will bring

the enduring political solutions to an insurgency.

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Elements of different campaign themes may occur within the same theatre of operations. ln 1967, the US Marine Corps was simultaneously conducting conventional

and counter-insurgency specific operations in I Corps, the USMC area of operations.

While fighting a conventional war against elements of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) along the Laotian and North Vietnamese borders, the Marines were

concomitantly trying to support the Combined Action Program (CAP) that had been slowly but successfully combating the influence of Viet Cong (VC) insurgents. The CAP

embedded Marine rifle sections with South Vietnamese militia to live and operate in hamlets and villages throughout I Corps, which, in effect, implemented a form of

Lyautey's tache d'huile method of COIN. Despite the small size of the CAP at the time (approximately 1 ,200 Marines and 2,100 Vietnamese militia), the manpower demands

of attrition wadare in the border regions hindered an expansion of the CAP,

undermining the overall COIN campaign.

The coordination of NVA conventionalwarfare operations and VC insurgent activities was not a coincidence. North Vietnam's GeneralVo Nguyen Giap specifically created

and implemented a stratagem that sought to draw the bulk of US forces to the peripheral areas of South Vietnam to be engaged in costly and demoralizing battles of

attrition in order to create physical and psychological manoeuvre space for insurgents in

population centres.

Commanders must be aware that a transition across campaign themes may occur over time and space within a theatre, and a balance must be rirrri between competing

demands and principles. The main effort may shift between operational objectivei, dependent upon the situation and threat. At all times, commanders must focus on

acirieving the operational objectives that will create conditions for enduring success.

Source: Michaet Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: the Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), pp.l28-132.

108. COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONSll

ln order to realize operational objectives, military forces create supporting effects

through the conduct of tactical activities, using a range of capabilities. This range of capabilities and activities is classified as fires or influence activities. They are enabled in a simultaneous

and complementary manner through manoeuvre and battlespace management and are together known as comprehensive operations (see Figure 1-4).

For a more detailed discussion on comprehensive operations and other related concepts, see

B-GL-300-001 /FP-001 Land Operations.

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Figure 14: Gomprehensive Operations

The construct is defined as follows:

Gomprehensive Operations. The deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects.

Fires. The physical means deliberately used to create or support the realization

of physical effects as first order effects.

NOTE

Fires include lethal and non-lethal systems. They also include electronic counter-control measures of EW.

lnfluence Activities. An activity designed to affect the character or behaviour of

a person or a group as a first order effect.

NOTE

lnfluence activities affect understanding, perceptions and willwith the aim of affecting behaviour in a desired manner.

Although a wide array of activities will create influences, influence activities are primarily realized through psychological operations (PSYOPS), public affairs (PA), civil-military

cooperation (ClMlC), deception and the posture, profile and presence of forces.

Fires and influence activities are planned in a comprehensive and complementary manner. For example, PSYOPS may be used to convince enemy conscripts to flee prior to an

attack, and CIMIC projects may repairdamages caused by offensive operations in orderto maintain the support of affected populaces. ln accordance with the manoeuvrist approach,

fires, although creating first order effects on the physical plane, should be conducted with a view

to the effects on the psychological plane-the resulting effects on will and cohesion. Likewise,

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although influence activities may have first order effects on the psychological plane, they may

have subsequent effects on the physical plane. For example, PSYOPS that convince conscripts

to desert reduce the overall combat power of the enemy commander.

Many of the influence activities will be activities under the category of stability operations. They will seek to build lasting solutions to the root causes of conflict and crisis.

The balance that a commander will strike between fires and influence activities will depend upon the type of campaign, its guiding principles, the situation at hand and the desired

effects. ln campaigns that require the support of a population and the redress of grievances and civil strife, a large portion of capabilities will be dedicated to influence activities, likely in

conjunction with other agencies.

sEcTtoN 3

AN OVERVIEW OF INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER.INSURGENCIES

109. DEVELOPMENT OF AN INSURGENCY

lnsurgencies are not a new phenomenon. For example, the Greek historian Herodotus chronicled an insurgency by the Scythians against the rule of the Persian warrior-king

Darius in 512 B.C. which ultimately succeeded in forcing a Persian withdrawal. The forces of Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.) and the Mongols also each suffered

significantly at the hands of insurgents. Similarly, terrorism has long been used as an effective tactic. An early example of this is the use of terrorism as "propaganda of the

deed" by the Assassins in Persia in an effort to subvert the rule of the Seljuk Turks in the

1 1th and 12th centuries.

Sources: Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: the Guerilla in History (New York, NY: Morrow, 1994); Brig'd (ret'd) Maurice Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures," PhD. Diss. (London:

Kng's College, 1979) (with permission).

At its most basic, an insurgency is an uprising or insurrection against an established form of authority, normally a government, occupying authority or social structure. Various

situations may give rise to an insurgency, and a single insurgency may have several root and contributing causes. ln general, insurgencies spring from dissatisfaction with a social structure

or government policies. However, recent history has shown that criminal groups can foment a form of insurgency by destabilizing a government to create conditions favourable to the pursuit

of criminal activity. This occurs in a number of ways, including the subversion of police and security forces, the control of territory and the intimidation of the populace.

lnsurgencies develop in stages and often the government will only recognize the severity of the threat after violence has begun to occur on a regular basis. ldeally, the government will

recognize a threat and act to preclude its development prior to the outbreak of widespread

violence.

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A recent example of early recognition of an insurgency was the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon lslands (RAMSI), which successfully halted a growing criminal

insurgency. The government of the Solomon lslands, hampered by corruption at many levels, was no longer able to provide even basic services by the summer of 2003 and

requested international assistance. RAMSI, led by Australia, was able to successfully dislocate, disrupt and disarm the major criminalgroups, help reorganize the police

forces and assist in the resumption of the provision of basic public services, all priorto the onset of major violence.

Source: Russe/l Glenn, COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon lslands (Santa Monica: RAND,2007).

lnsurgencies are a method used by disaffected groups or those whose best interests are served by destabilizing the existing government. By their very nature, insurgents quickly

become involved with other destabilizing elements within a society such as criminal entities. Each exploits the other for their own benefits.

Each insurgency will have its own set of causes, aims and desired end-state. Some insurgencies will stem from a political, social and/or religious ideology that envisions an

improved (even utopian) state of affairs. Other insurgencies will stem from unresolved real or perceived grievances, while others will be conducted by a particular group that simply wishes to

gain power but cannot do so through legitimate means or conventional use of military power.

Still others will stem from nationalist desires for independence or autonomy. ln all cases,

are supported by propaganda that justifies

the use of subversion and violence.

insurgencies

lnsurgencies are more likely to occur in states where there are inherent racial, cultural, religious or ideological divisions that lead to a lack of national cohesion and weak, inefficient,

unstable or unpopular governments. Additional factors, such as corruption and external agitation, may facilitate an insurgency.

ln other words, many insurgencies will develop in failed or failing states where governments have failed to address or satisfy the basic needs of their populace. These needs

will differ depending upon the region and culture involved, but in generalwill include the basic essentials of a stable life, responsible government, religious freedom and economic viability. lt

is from such fertile environments that insurgencies will often grow.

7 .

The aim or desired end-state of the insurgency may be quite extreme, such as the creation of a new state or social construct. Others may simply seek to seize power, expel a

foreign power or acquire specific but limited political advantages or control. Whatever the aim, the insurgents themselves feel that their causes and aim justify the use of violence and

subversion and even, in some cases, the use of terrorism against the civilian populace.

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History holds several examples of Canadian involvement in insurgencies conducted on various scales with differing aims. Some examples are as follows:

r United Empire Loyalists and the American Revolution (-1774-1783)

. '

Fenian Raids (1866, 1870)

Northwest Rebellion (1S85)

Siberia (1918*1919)

Haiti (2004)

Afghanistan campaign

The tactics used by insurgents will vary with each campaign and situation. They will certainly include violence or at the very least the threat of violence. Subversion and

propaganda have traditionally been used to great effect. lnsurgent capabilities in this regard have exponentially increased with the availability of sophisticated but inexpensive information

technologies that enable the exploitation of mass media to convey their message, propaganda, threat and capabilities to a large audience. lnsurgents seek support internally and externally,

and they often conceal fund raising campaigns behind facades of charitable or political organizations. Dense urban terrain will be exploited in order to attack high value targets, inflict

mass casualties and hide their own presence. Unfortunately, many insurgencies resort to the tactic of terrorism as a means to realize their operational and strategic end. lnsurgents will also

exploit the inherent weaknesses of the society under attack, particularly liberal democracies and

states where religious or ideological tensions are high in order to support their operations. Their words and deeds will continually paint themselves as the victims of an unjust social or power

structure, and their actions will often seek to provoke an overreaction from government forces which will thereby support their themes and messages of persecution and victim hood.

lnsurgencies can cross international borders. lnsurgents may establish bases in a sympathetic country or in states with weak governments. They may also have pan-national

aims and therefore conduct their attacks in more than one geographic area in order to create results there or in other areas. During the Cold War, communist expansion followed this model,

and some radical religious/cultural-based terrorist groups have recently undertaken similar

measures.

10.

lnsurgencies seekto gain the supportof a portion of the populace large enough to achieve their goals. ln some cases, this will require support by the majority; in others, this may

only require the support of a powerful portion of the populace (tribe, business class, ethnic minority). ln all cases, an insurgency requires only the indifference of a populace to operate, to

give it manoeuvre space that allows the development and expansion of an insurgency. As an insurgency grows, those who do not rally to the cause are intimidated into silence, killed or

forced to flee. lnsurgencies usually gain their greatest success amongst that segment of the population that is disaffected or disadvantaged-those who have gained the least from the

current social organization. Even if the majority of the population fails to eventually rally to the side of the insurgents, the insurgents simply have to make defending the status quo too

expensive or difficult for the security forces, the governments concerned and the general populace. An insurgency is, therefore, like all conflict: a battle of wills.

110. DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCT OF A GOIN CAMPAIGN

Operations conducted within a COIN campaign aim to defeat an insurgency through military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions. An overarching

demand of counter-insurgency operations is that military forces play a key but supporting role in

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the campaign. The military role is to create the security framework to permit the legal and

initiatives required for a long term solution to the root causes of grievances. Although

combat may occur, the primary strategic centre of gravity is the civilian populace. Only by drawing the civilian population to the government side and therefore creating a hostile

environmentforthe insurgents can an insurgency be defeated. ln otherwords, the military

plays but one part of a COIN campaign that will involve a wide variety

non-government agencies. lt is these other elements of power that will bring about the enduring

political

of other government and

solutions to the situation.

The overall effect sought in a counter-insurgency is not the death or capture of insurgents but, more importantly, the provision of security to the population and the reduction of

popular support for the insurgency through reform. Although the military's role is limited, the

manner in which it conducts its responsibilities will influence the overall environment and success in all facets of the campaign. For example, a heavy-handed response to insurgent

activities will be exploited by the insurgents' propaganda and thereby undermine the trust of the local populace in the security forces.

A government facing an insurgency in its own territory is under direct threat and can therefore be expected to bear a higher risk and accept higher casualties than a coalition partner

assisting it.

Although not specifically designed for such commitments, military forces have often been used to conduct COIN campaigns. This is generally due to the levelof violence offered

the insurgents and the resulting requirement for large numbers of well-armed troops to protect high value targets, the populace and government and to engage and destroy the insurgents

when necessary.

Although combat may be intense at the start of a COIN campaign, there is typically a lower prevalence of combat than expected in conventional major combat campaigns.l2 This

combat occurs primarily at the small-unit level-i.e., section, platoon, or company-although

larger organizations may sometimes be involved. The rate of resource consumption is

lower than in major combat, although the campaign as a whole is likely to last much longer,

several years being typical. Thus the overall resource requirement is usually higher. Certainly the political and moral commitment of the government and people supporting the COIN

campaign in another nation must be prepared for a longterm commitment.

also

with

lnsurgencies have ambiguous start-dates, and COIN campaigns have ambiguous end- dates. lt is unlikely that the conflict will be suddenly ended with a major military victory against

the insurgents, who will rarely offer the opportunity for decisive military engagement and are typically organized into small clandestine cells. Although there are examples of insurgencies

and counter-insurgencies that have resulted in decisive military successes-e.g., Castro's Cuban revolution in the former case, and the defeat of the North West Rebellion in the latter

case-the long-term solutions still require political and economic measures. ln short, military forces do not defeat insurgencies; instead, they create the security conditions necessary for the

political resolution of the conflict.

lnsurgencies can only be effectively fought with consideration of diverse factors such as

politics, economics, police capability, social structure, culture and psychology along with

military

This is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Maoist model envisions a final phase of major conventional combat, and the insurgencies in China, Vietnam and Cuba involved significant conventional combat. Similarly, lhe Front de Liberation

Nationale (FLN) in Algeria attempted to build a conventional army wlth which to challenge French conventional

military superiority.

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power. Hence, any counter-insurgency must consist of a multi-pronged, multi-agency approach at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The causes and symptoms, such as the

insurgents themselves and their popular support, must be addressed through comprehensive operations-through a combination of fires and their physical effects as well as influence

activities and their psychological effects. lt is the latter of these two, influence activities, that will

create enduring solutions to a COIN campaign by addressing root causes.

The COIN campaign will be realized through a thematic lines of operation that group

similar operational objectives together that build to the desired end-state. Some lines of operation may be lead by the military as a supported element. Other lines of operation will see

the military in a supporting role with most activities conducted by other agencies. Here the supporting role will utilize unique military capabilities such as strategic lift, medical support,

security provision, military training capabilities and/or intelligence collection, collation and

analysis. Some lines of operation may be conducted by other agencies entirely within the overall security provided by police and military forces.

The multi-agency approach is termed the comprehensive approach.l3 lt sees the military working in a unity of purpose and ideally in a unity of effort in order to create enduring

solutions to the root causes of the insurgency and reach the desired operational end-state. ln all cases, successful COIN requires this comprehensive approach facilitated through a unity of

purpose.

10. The comprehensive approach may be illustrated by way of an example: while police and

military are cooperating in the search for insurgent bases and are providing security to

population centres and along lines of communication, international and non-governmental aid organizations (along with military support) may be developing physical infrastructure in

disadvantaged urban areas. Concomitantly, the government, with international support, may be reforming election laws and political structures.

11. Conventional armies may not necessarily be routinely structured to conduct a COIN

campaign. However, such campaigns are not the purview of special or elite military or para- military forces (although they may have roles to play as well). History has demonstrated that

the most successful COIN operations have been conducted by ingenious, resourceful, non- doctrinaire conventional (even conscript) armies that have deployed with simply a guiding set of

principles, developing their tactics as the situation became understood. Paramount to the success of the military portion of the campaign has been firm, clearly articulated political and

strategic goals and the ability of officers to exercise command with freedom, flexibility and confidence down to the lowest levels, using ingenuity and resourcefulness to take the battle to

the insurgents on one hand, whilst attempting to resolve the root causes on the other. lndeed, those attributes of a regimental system-confidence afforded the commander in remote

situations, familiarity among comrades and across ranks and reliance on small unit actions-

have proven most effective in COIN campaigns.to

12. The commitment of western democracies and alliances to the stabilization of failed or

failing states and the desire to limit global effects of insurgencies in an era of weapons of mass destruction means that governments will deploy both military forces and civilian agencies

together in order to address these threats to regional and global stability. Not only must

For more details regarding a comprehensive approach including guiding principles, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001

Land Operations.

Armies in Low-lntensity Conflict-A Comparative Anatysis, edited by David Charters and Maurice Tugwell (Toronto: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989).

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commanders understand the military's role in a COIN campaign, but they must be able to understand the key role played by other agencies and how all agencies work together in a unity

of purpose to defeat insurgencies and their causes.

sEcTroN 4

CONTRASTS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN INSURGENCIES

AND COUNTER{NSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS15

,I'11.

GENERAL

Conventional wars and battles pit two relatively similar forces against one another with the winner being able to exercise political control over the other. The forces involved focus on

military actions in similar timeframes and use comparable capabilities and methods to attempt to dominate the other. Although the constituent elements of each force's fighting power may be in

different balance, there is a certain amount of symmetry within this competition.

This symmetry does not exist between an insurgency and counter-insurgency elements. The nature of the environment, aims of each force, relative demands and the elements of

fighting power of each force-the moral, physical and intellectual-demand that the conduct of a

COIN campaign be distinctly different from the conduct of the insurgency itself.

112. INITIATIVE

1 .

Within an insurgency situation, the initiative at all levels lies with the insurgent. The insurgent will pick the moment at which to begin his campaign and at which moment to initiate

the use of violence. At the tactical level, the insurgent will continuously be in a position to accept or decline engagement, and most tactical engagements will be a time and place of his

choosing.

The insurgent's use of propaganda and other means to influence audiences-activities to create first order effects on the psychological plane-will often take an offensive nature that

will seek to undermine the credibility of the government and COIN elements and increase his own legitimacy. Despite the lack of formal doctrine for information operations, the insurgent will

have honed propaganda skills and will quickly master skills in the manipulation of international media. Knowing what activities and engagements will occur, the insurgent will have his

propaganda and media messages ready for immediate implementation. Furthermore, the eagerness of international media to be obtain inside, exclusive stories will allow insurgents to

control messages and present images and stories that support their narrative, their grievances

and representation of victim hood.

Counter-insurgent forces will often be forced into a position of reaction. ln realizing this, leaders must understand that insurgent forces will conduct activities, mostly atrocities, in the

hope of provoking a heavy handed reaction from COIN forces that will ultimately undermine their own credibility and legitimacy.

lnsightful political and military leaders will ideally foresee the development of an insurgency before the insurgencies gain significant support and/or resort to open violence. ln

such cases, they should, in addition to increasing intelligence collection and analysis, initiate

The basis for this section has been drawn from: David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praegar Security lnternational,2006), pp. 3-10.

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actions that will address any legitimate grievances being exploited by the insurgent leadership and undertake measures to counter the insurgent narrative and ideology.

Attempts by government and COIN forces to seize the initiative must be carefully considered. The use of physical attacks must be viewed from the perspective of long term

effects. Although physical attacks may result in short-term tactical success against an element of the insurgent forces, they may cause secondary and tertiary effects, such as the death of

civilians or collateral damage, that hurt, perhaps irreparably, the long-term success of the

campaign.

lnitiative by COIN forces may seek to gain considerable success in terms of information operations, specifically influence activities.l6 The ability to underlake effective psychological

operations amongst the local populace, the ability to quickly explain actions through public affairs means and the ability to use CIMIC and other resources to address grievances and other

potential causes of the insurgency will seize a sense of moral initiative for the COIN forces and wrestle much of the initiative from the insurgent.

113. FOCUS ON POPULATION

Because of the political aims of an insurgency and the lack of material resources in comparison to the government forces, the insurgent will focus on gaining support of the

population. He will attempt, by whatever means deemed effective, to dissociate and isolate the populace from the counterinsurgent and to gain its physical and moral support. As a minimum

the insurgent will seek to break the will of the population to resist. ldeally, the insurgent will reach a point at which he can control the population through a combination of force and

intimidation or the populace willingly submits to the insurgent. Eventually, this will result in

success for the insurgent, for in the final equation, the exercise of political power depends upon the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at least, on its submissiveness.

The COIN forces and government agencies must actively work to counter the insurgent attempts to coerce or persuade the population. A careful analysis must be made of the

population and its culture in order to comprehend its grievances, motivations and the ways in which the insurgent will target it and influence it. At the very least, the population must be

protected from security threats. But this will not be enough for enduring success. The population must be persuaded to reject the insurgent narrative and ideology, which lends the

insurgency cred ibility and justification.

ln addition to the populace in the theatre of operations, the insurgent will attempt to

undermine the support and will of the domestic populace of any nation contributing forces to the campaign, such as those in a coalition. This will be a strategic centre of gravity and must be

considered in the planning by COIN forces and governments.

1'14. ROLE OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL LEAD

ln a conventional conflict, military activities are foremost, and their planning and execution focuses on effects against the military forces of the other side. Politics takes a

supporting role.

See B-GL-300-001/FP-00 1 Land Qperations. Within land operations, the concept of information operations has been refined to consist of influence activities only, that is, those activities that seek first order effects on the

psychological plane.

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The focus of insurgent and counterinsurgent actions on the populace and its support brings politics to the fore in a COIN campaign. The military will take, for the most part, a

supporting role. Whilst the insurgent will be unencumbered by rules of engagement and the

laws of war and will seek through any means to intimidate the populace and to exhaust its will, counterinsurgents must consider all their military actions in light of the secondary political and

social effects, which will have the enduring influence in a successful campaign.

With the population and its support and will as a centre of gravity in the campaign, most actions become political. Thus, political action becomes foremost in the campaign to the point

that politics or political action is an instrument of the campaign. lt must be so, for only political action will address the circumstances that lead to the insurgency. The military may only be

required to provide a security framework in which other agencies and government organizations

may manoeuvre and work.

115. TRANSITION TO CONFLICT AND CAMPAIGN DURATION

During an insurgency, the transition from peace to open conflict will be gradual when compared to the sudden eruption of high levels of violence in a conventional war. The insurgent

will generally have no desire for a quick transition to open levels of conflict. He will wish to build

up resources and to shape the environment through propaganda and other activities in order to eventually justify the use of violence. He will wish to avoid an early reaction by government

counterinsurgent forces that could undermine preparations. Additionally, the insurgent will hope to gain significant strength and influence before the population realizes the true danger posed.

Once initiated, an insurgency will be a protracted affair. lt will take time to build up forces and resources, to gain support from the populace, to undermine the legitimacy and

credibility of the counterinsurgent forces and to defeat them, either militadly or through a lack of support by the population. Additionally, the lack of a localized, obvious target against which to

apply combat power will preclude a rapid defeat of the insurgent's forces.

This works to the insurgent's advantage, as a protracted conflict will serve to wear down the will of the populace to resist and the will of the domestic populations of any forces

contributing to the COIN campaign. The insurgent must simply continue to sow disorder and insecurity, whilst the COIN forces and government must fight to provide security and maintain

the commitment of the populace.

The only means to quickly end an insurgency is to come to a political resolution that resolves motivating grievances and eliminates the vast majority of public support for the

insurgent.

116. RELATIVE COSTS

Simply put, an insurgency is cheap, a COIN campaign is expensive. lt takes little for the insurgent to sow disorder, undermine the credibility of the government and attack the will of the

population. Disorder will create insecurity and economic disruption and thus hardship

for the

population.

Government and COIN forces have the responsibility to counter this disorder. Failure to do so will loose the support of the population. Security measures to prevent disorder are hugely

expensive in terms of resources, particularly manpower. Routes must be secured, vital points protected and damaged infrastructure rebuilt. This responsibility to provide security to a

populace creates an incredibly high ratio of forces to insurgents, as many as 20 to one or

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higher.l7 However, failure to provide security will force the populace to seek it from elsewhere, perhaps the insurgents themselves.

Paradoxically, security measures themselves that seek to protect the populace also tend to frustrate the populace and may inadvertently undermine their support. They cost the public

inconveniences and invasions of privacy. Thus, they must be applied carefully with the aim of limiting disruption to the local populace. Additionally, the necessity of such security measures

must be carefully explained to the public, and they must be reduced at the earliest opportunity. ldeally, they are conducted by a nation's regular constabulary forces. Where this is not possible

and military forces must provide the security, they should be passed to constabulary forces as the security situation improves and the latter's capabilities increase.

For counterinsurgent forces, particularly those from supporting third nations, the cost in manpower from deaths may have an exponential effect. Although the relative cost in manpower

from deaths will be relatively low compared to losses typical of major combat, the political costs will be high in terms of undermining nationalwill.

The relative costs in an insurgency situation allow and encourages the insurgent to conduct a protracted campaign. This fact must be clearly articulated to all populations

supporting the COIN campaign,

1''7. FLUIDITY AND RIGIDITY

An insurgent has few if any responsibilities. He may hide amongst the populace and

represent himself as part of it. His line of operations are therefore fluid, and his capabilities and activities will ebb and flow over time. lnsurgents have no rules of engagement and no

expectations of moral limits to the application of their combat power. They may use whatever means, including overt propaganda, to influence and intimidate populations.

COIN forces on the other have rigid limits to the conduct of operations. They have onerous responsibilities to secure the populace and their infrastructure. They must abide by

rules of engagement and conduct activities with a view to maintaining their legitimacy and the moral high ground. They must carefully coordinate the activities of a wide range of agencies.

Furthermore, COIN forces must refrain from using any forms of propaganda and must ensure that their PSYOPS and public affairs activities portray only truthful messages in order to

maintain credibility and avoid being irrevocably discredited in the eyes of the populace.

118. IDEOLOGY

At the basis of an insurgency is a narrative that contains an idea and founding cause for the insurgency. This core idea becomes formalized as an ideology. lt is a highly motivational

tool that exploits grievances, culture and beliefs in order to further the insurgent aims and justify

their actions.

Although the ideology and narrative may be powerful motivators for the insurgent core and for new recruits, they will unlikely attract and hold the vast majority of a populace who

simply seek the basic requirements of security and well-being. ln the long run, it may be the side that provides the best security and standard of living that wins the support of the populace.

There is generally an upper limit to this ratio. Once pervasive security is required beyond the ordinary capabilities of a constabulary, subsequent increases In insurgent numbers do not require an equal increase in counterinsurgent

forces.

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lt is unlikely that the counterinsurgent forces will have a central ideology as a rallying point. However, two key issues must be kept in mind. Regardless of the ideology touted by the

insurgents, COIN operations must be conducted in keeping with the cultural and societal norms of the theatre population. Not to do so will undermine the credibility of, and support for, the

COIN forces.rs Secondly, the influence activities of COIN forces must seek to solve legitimate grievances from which the narrative and ideology draw strength, advertise those solutions and

indicate and exploit inconsistencies in the ideology, particularly any false attempt by the

insurgents to claim a moral superiority.

119. ENDURING IRREGULAR NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY

lnsurgencies can, in the end, only be quelled with a political solution. Lahcen Daoudi, the leader of a moderate lslamist North African political party noted that, "if you let a cat into

the house, you can caress it. lf you leave it in the mountains, it becomes savage." ln essence, this articulates that if the host nation political leadership engages in some

political dialogue with potential or existing insurgent elements, there is a reasonable chance that the legitimate grievances underlying the insurgent cause can be addressed in

a non-violent manner and progress made towards an enduring solution.

Moderate lslamist PJD Party poised to win parliamentary control, The Globe and Mail, 19 May

2007, p. A18.

Throughout the life of an insurgency, the insurgent will likely remain unconventional. Even if the insurgent comes to the point of mustering regular formations, he will continue to

exploit his flexibility of population support, guerrilla tactics and lack of rules of engagement. He

will not surrender this advantage.

COIN forces for their part must avoid becoming frustrated by the irregular nature of insurgent forces. lndeed, the insurgent will seek to exploit such frustration in order to cause the

COIN forces to over-react and create undesired effects amongst a populace.

The only true means of turning an insurgent into a conventional force is to engage the insurgent and bring him into the conventional political process.

Having said this, the idea of cultural respect or sensitivity cannot allow the practice of moral relativism. The sanction of obvious morally wrong practices by local security forces and government leaders will only exacerbate the

security situation, undermine credibility and fuel support for the insurgents, particularly if they claim moral superiority.

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CHAPTER 2

DESCRIBING AN INSURGENCY

SECTION 1

UNDERSTANDING AN INSURGENCY

201. INTRODUCTION

ln order to successfully combat an insurgency, it is vital to understand the term, why they occur and the various forms that they may take. Additionally, it is just as important to

understand the particular situation and culture in which an insurgency occurs. Without comprehension of the causes and characteristics unique to each insurgency, there will be little

hope of successfully countering it.

As discussed in Chapter 1, an insurgency may be described as follows: "a competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an

established authority to achieve political change."le ln addition to the characteristic of violence, or at least the threat of violence, insurgencies usually share a number of other characteristics,

including propaganda, subversion and links to criminal activities and organizations.

Rarely will insurgents seek to, or believe that they can, defeat a government and its conventional military forces through military pressure alone. lnstead, they seek to outlast the

will of the other side and to influence and persuade the mass of the population to either support their aims or to at least cease supporting the established government or recognized authority.

202. CAUSES OF AN INSURGENCY

An insurgency may spring from many causes; however, the classic insurgency usually begins with the perception of oppression due to political, societal and economic grievances.

When these perceptions become sufficiently emotive, leaders may emerge who are able to organize violent protest or resistance and influence people to risk imprisonment and even death

in order to combat the established order.

lt must be remembered by those at all levels of command that at the root of most insurgencies are legitimate grievances. lndeed, a certain amount of empathy may be justified in

dealing with insurgents. These grievances will often be of a political, social, historic and/or economic nature, and therefore their enduring resolution will require more than the application

of military capabilities: they will demand the involvement of other agencies in a comprehensive approach. The failure to resolve these grievances will likely lead to support for an insurgency.

Thus, commanders at all levels, particularly the strategic and operational, must understand that a successful outcome to a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign will demand upon achieving

enduring solutions to the grievances at the root of the insurgency.

203. THE AIM OF AN INSURGENCY

An insurgency will aim to gain the advantage of power within a given political context in order to realize socio-economic, cultural, religious and geographic goals or some combination of

these. lt seeks to realize a change or re-order to the extant political structure and/or

relationships.

Definition as developed by a counter-insurgency study group during United States Marine Corps (USMC)

JOINT URBAN WARRIOR 2005.

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ln terms of overarching concepts, it is a competition between two political options. This is, however, a simplification of insurgencies as they develop within a society. There will always

be root causes that drive individuals, groups and their leaders to take up arms to seek change. Whilst a core leadership may share the same grievances, they will exploit a wide array of local

injustices or grievances in order to recruit a wide body of support.

By their very nature of being illegal, secretive and disadvantaged, insurgencies will become quickly tied to other groups and irregular activities within a society. Not only will

insurgencies undertake criminal activities to raise funds and disrupt society, they may well be infiltrated and/or exploited by criminal groups who see the numbers and military power of an

insurgent force as a means of meeting criminal objectives. Additionally, social and religious leaders will see the insurgency as a means of spreading their own ideologies, with which the

ordinary follower of the insurgency may have little knowledge or may not support.

All of these complicating factors must not be allowed to mask the fact insurgencies and their supporters have political and social grievances, perceived but often real, at their root.

They may be national, regional or local grievances or a combination thereof. Leaders at all levels must understand this and the fact that an insurgency will only be solved through enduring

solutions to those grievances.

204. COMPETITIVE ELEMENTS OVER POPULATIONS_STRATEGIC CENTRES

OF GRAVITY

Within a society, there exists an inter-related trilogy, consisting of the government, its military and its population. Each element of the trilogy affects the other elements. During an

insurgency, a competition occurs over control of and support from the population. This can be represented in the figure below. Both the established, legitimate, recognized government and

the insurgent leadership, offering an alternate form of government or political arrangement, compete for the support of the populace or at least control over it.

ln influencing the populace, the insurgent elements have the advantage of being able to directly influence the populace through its guerrilla or military forces. Due to the lack of

requirement to follow any law of armed conflict, the guerrilla forces can directly target and intimidate the populace. The government's military forces will ideally follow the law of armed

conflict and can only indirectly influence the populace in a positive manner. They can best serve the populace by providing security and by being seen as a legitimate, lawful and moral

military force supporting the rule of law and good governance. The government must provide the long-term solutions to any cause of the insurgency in order to gain and maintain the suppod

of the populace.

ln such a situation of insurgency, the populace is a strategic centre of gravity. Success is impossible without the support of the populace or at least the willingness to combat the

insurgency.

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Describing an lnsurgency

Insurgent Leadership - Alternate Authority

Government

Military

Guerrilla Forces

Figure 2-1: Competition over the Populace as a Strategic Gentre of Gravity2o

ln accordance with the elements of campaign planning, lines of operation must be developed that approach this centre of gravity. Those elements of the populace that support the

COIN campaign must be treated as a friendly centre of gravity and thus defended. Those elements of the populace that are neutral or support the insurgency must be engaged and

convinced to support the COIN campaign.

Should the government combating the insurgency receive support from another nation (or coalition), then another populace-that of the contributing nation(s)-becomes a strategic

centre of gravity. There will be added competition to influence the will of the domestic population of the supporting nation(s). Those fighting the insurgency will wish to maintain

support amongst the domestic populations forwhat will likely be a lengthy campaign. The insurgents will seek to undermine the will of the domestic population of the supporting nation(s)

and in turn force a withdrawal of those nations from the campaign. The insurgents will do this through directly targeting the forces of the contributing nation(s) or even the domestic

populace(s) themselves in order to undermine a significant proportion of national will. ln order to counter this threat to the domestic population's will, the supporting government(s) must work

to explain the legitimacy of, and requirement for, the COIN campaign. This competition is represented in figure 2-2.

This construct was adopted from a briefing by LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC ret'd during the USMC JOINT URBAN WARRIOR EXERCISE 2005 given to the COIN study group.

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Supporting Nation(s)

lnsurgent Leadership - Alternate Authority

Government

lnsurgents seeking to undermine the will of the supporting

populace.

Figure 2-2: Competition over the Strategic Centres of Gravity-Populations

Whilst this model has best application to traditional forms of state government combating an insurgency, it must be applied with some flexibility to various situations. ln many of the

remote regions of the world where insurgencies occur, elements of the populace will be unlikely to recognize a central government authority beyond that of their own village or clan elder. Their

support for the insurgency may wax and wane depending upon the situation at any given time. For example, they may take up arms against the government or coalition forces in order to

avenge recent collateral damages or the death of a village member. Once their need for retribution is satisfied, they may no longer actively support the insurgency. Notwithstanding the

complex nature of such circumstances, the model still indicates that the support of the overall populace will be a strategic centre of gravity vital for long term success of the campaign.

Additionally, the insurgents, or at least the hardcore leadership, will continue to attack the will of any supporting nation's populace in order to force that nation from the campaign.

7 .

lt is fundamental that military and political leaders understand that a key aim of the

insurgency will be to attack the will of any population(s) supporting the counter-insurgency, both domestically and internationally.

205. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN INSURGENCY_UNIQUE AND LOCAL ASPECTS

OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Each insurgency is unique and will therefore have its own set of characteristics. Although insurgencies may share similar characteristics, each will have exceptional features.

For this reason, intelligence and planning templates suitable for major combat or conventional campaigns have reduced utility during a COIN campaign.

ln conventional manoeuvre warfare, the known structure of military formations, evident pattern of troop concentration in specific terrain and known doctrine often give very good

indication of intent. For example, the concentration of army-level bridging assets in a mechanized division's area of responsibility fronting on a river, with two armoured divisions

moving into assembly areas, are very good indications of a deliberate assault river crossing. Contrasting to this, an insurgent movement may well organize and initiate activities using a

cellular structure within which the cells do not conform to a pattern amongst or within themselves. Their combat indicators of forthcoming action will differ greatly throughout the

organization and will continually alter. Nonetheless, although much more complex, the intent of

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Describing an lnsurgency

insurgents based on structures and planned actions can be determined. For example, sustained observation may reveal certain cells linked with specific activities such as information

operations, kidnapping or bank robbery. As a security measure, insurgents may alter or transform cells for specific operations in a random manner.

The one key attribute that distinguishes insurgency from most other forms of conflict is the insurgent's aim of forcing political change. Not all followers of an insurgency will necessarily

adhere to or even comprehend the political agenda of the insurgency. A good number of participants may simply join through family, clan or other social links. Others may simply join to

seek retribution for other grievances on a personal level. Therefore, even the motivations and ideology of insurgents will be difficult to view in a monolithic or holistic sense. The

characteristics of an insurgency will vary at the local level and must be viewed and assessed

from this context.

Although there will be no escaping the need to address the root causes and legitimate grievances of the overarching insurgency, much can be gained through operations and activities

at the local level. These must firstly avoid driving more individuals to resort to violence (e.9., the avoidance of collateral damages in offensive activities) and secondly address local concerns

and grievances that will influence local leaderships and their groups to at least not support the insurgency but ideally support the established authority.

ln order to understand the context of the insurgency, intelligence collection and assessment must include all elements of the environment and the commander's specific

battlespace rather than just a focus on the insurgent forces themselves. The establishment of a broad knowledge base will include understanding of the political, military, economic, social

(including religion), informational and infrastructure (PMESll systems) aspects of the environment. Historical and cultural aspects of environment must be understood, for they

influence all the aspects and local power structures. This knowledge base will allow the commander to better understand the context, power structures, influences and motivations of

the insurgency as well as how best to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgency and its

goals.

206. TRANSITIONAL NATURE OF INSURGENCIES

lnsurgencies are more likely to occur in states with inherent social boundaries, whose racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences disrupt national cohesion. lnsurgencies thrive

in states lacking efficient, stable or popular governments, conditions that are aggravated by economic weakness, corruption orforeign agitation. Although various insurgency models exist,

few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification such as rural or urban, Leninist or Maoist. lnstead, effective insurgents will take previous campaigns' lessons and adapt them to their own

particular needs. For example, in the 1990s, Hamas profited by the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO's) loss due to Arafat's alignment with Saddam Hussein and his relatively

moderate policies toward lsrael. The Saudis cut off money to the PLO, which caused them to lose influence. While not lessening its anti-lsrael stance, Hamas avoided supporting the lraqi

dictator. Palestinians began looking to Hamas for leadership. By the end of the 1990s, Hamas was carrying out most of the terror activity in lsrael. lsraeli sources claimed that in the 16

months before May 2002, Hamas received $135 million (US) from Saudi Arabia to meet expenses."

Loretta Napoleoni, Terror lncorporated Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Nefworks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), pp.72-73 passlm.

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207. ASSESSING THE INSURGENCY

Examining the complete range of characteristics will assist a commander and staff in predicting the insurgents' campaign plan. Previous experience and historical research may

provide valuable guidance, however, the key to an appropriate response remains

military estimate. Essentially, to support operational planning, the estimate will identify the insurgency's causes, the extent of its internal and external support-including the basis of the

insurgents' appeal to the target population-the motivation and depth of local commitment and

an objective

the likely weapons and tactics COIN forces may face.

208. FORMS OF AN INSURGENCY

As established above, it is vital to military success for commanders and staffs to fully understand the nature of the insurgency. Tothis end, six mainforms of insurgency have been

defined, which are listed in Figure 2-3:

lntent is to destroy the system. There are normally no plans to replace any form of government with

another system. The most potentially dangerous form of insurrection is that of the anarchist group

which sets out to eliminate all political structures and the social fabric associated with them.

Being very secretive, such groups remain small and lacking public support. Given the

rising threat of terrorism based on weapons of mass destruction, their

potential destructiveness to society cannot

be overlooked."

Seeks to impose centrally controlled structures and institutions by mobilizing the people (masses) to

provide equality in the distribution of all state

This has been seen recently in two variants: Communist (Malaya, Vietnam)

and contained in Ba'athist ideology.

resources.

Seeks to revert back to national/original values

This type of insurgency often incites similar

movements elsewhere. Seen recently lslamic Jihad (Egypt) or Hezbollah

rooted in the previous, often mythologized, history of

the region.

(Lebanon).

Seeks to remove themselves, and the area in which they live, from the control of the remainder of the

The form of political system adopted by successful insurgents varies enormously.

Amongst the examples are the Tamils (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

state.

This form of insurgency is similar to the separatist type but more moderate, in that insurgent groups

fight for political, economic or social reforms and possibly some form of autonomy, without

dramatically altering the political status quo.

Some insurgencies in Central and South America that have sought reforms to

corrupt governments.

Figure 2-3: Forms of an lnsurgency

For example, The US Senate Nuclear Proliferation Survey assesses a 70 percent chance of nuclear/radiological terrorism within the decade. Online http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf. Accessed 16 July 2005.

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sEcTroN 2

SCOPE, CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS OF AN INSURGENCY

209. INSURGENTSTRATEGIES

lnsurgent leaders are generallywell informed, astute and will probably studythe lessons of previous campaigns of insurgency. Globally, because popular insurgent strategies continue

to provide inspiration and assistance to diverse groups, the professional development of intelligence and operations staff should include study in this area. The study and analysis of an

insurgent's strategic approach has practical application, including the production of doctrinal COIN guidance. Five broad strategic approaches are suggested below, the elements of which

may be combined by the insurgents:

Conspiratorial Strategy. The oldest and least complicated of the strategies features small cells attempting to release the energy of a disaffected society,

generating a "spontaneous" uprising by means of bold armed action. Designed

to operate in an urban environment where information may be quickly passed and key installations exist, this was the strategy used by the Bolsheviks in 1917.

Typically, key points are seized before a decisive strike is made against the governing regime. ln its modern variant, insurgents seek to garner control over

and exploit media coverage.

Protracted Popular War. This Maoist strategy sees three "phases": strategic defence (organization), strategic equilibrium (guerrilla warfare), and strategic

offensive (open battle) culminating in the seizure of political power. lts tactics involve a mix of political activity, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, with the former

always predominating. Most applicable in rural, peasant-based environments where government control is weak or non-existent, this strategy assumes that the

cause will attract ever-increasing numbers of supporters, allowing the insurgent to expand outwardly from base areas. Favourable terrain in which to hide and

trade for time is essential for a protracted campaign, and therefore urbanization may provide a suitable space to foster such insurrections.

Urban lnsurgency. ln its

organized crime and terrorism in a systematic and ruthless manner as a catalyst for political change. The urban environment provides a dense populace for

exploitation and intimidation. This strategy, more than the others, aims to

pure form, this strategy

involves the application of

provoke a repressive military response that will alienate a volatile mass of the urban poor and move them to revolt. lt relies primarily upon ruthless terror

tactics augmented by media manipulation to generate an air of panic, erode the morale of the politicians, the administrators and the judiciary and the police and

the army with the aim of inducing a climate of collapse. The insurgency anticipates that the government will then capitulate or be provoked into adopting

repressive measures and, above all, causing bloodshed. Against such repression, the insurgent appears as the peoples' protector.

Military Focus. Also known as the foco theory, this strategy places political action second to military victory, assuming the population willflock to the winning

side. Ascribed to the Cuban leadership (Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara), this strategy works only when the government is weak, discredited and

lacks reliable, effective, armed forces. Conventional military operations are not the only option undertaken within this strategy. When a sharp asymmetric

balance of military force favours the establishment forces, immediate action may

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occur in the form of terrorism or guerrilla warfare. lt should be noted that other types of insurgent groups will initiate their campaign with a well-publicized

military success so as to gain popular support but then undertake a different, more political, strategy.

Liberation Strategy. Whilst many insurgencies may be focused on national aims and the creation of a new state, some insurgencies may simply aim at the

expulsion of what is viewed as an occupying authority ornation(s). ln peace support or stabilizing operations conducted by a coalition, even with an

internationally sanctioned mandate, a disaffected element (often one that has lost power) may resort to an insurgency strategy in order to disrupt the efforts to

stabilize or cement the new political order.

lt must be remembered that insurgencies will adopt a number of strategies in order to achieve their aims. They will combine the concepts listed above in order to best meet the

demands of the situation and to progress their goals.

210. BASIC TENETS OF AN INSURGENCY

All successful insurgents adhere to certain basic tenets. Naturally, such principles must be applied rationally within the existing social and political circumstances when assessing an

insurgency. These tenets are:

a. b.

c. d.

a suitable cause;

leadership;

popular support;

organization and actors; and

a narrative.

211. MOTIVATING CENTRAL CAUSE

ln most insurgencies there will be legitimate grievances that may result in a central, motivating cause to the insurgency or may be exploited by the insurgent leaders so that a lack

of grievance resolution suppofts the cited cause. As mentioned previously, the definition of "the cause" is crucial as a rallying point. The cause must appeal to all levels, from supporting the

philosophic ideals of the strategic leadership to the tactical motivation of the rank and file. The cause is articulated in the motivating idea and resulting narrative (see below). The sooner that

legitimate grievances are addressed by the authorities, the better will be the ability to influence the populace to not support the insurgency.

212. LEADERSHIP

An insurrection often gives rise to a charismatic leader, who inspires followers, converts

the uncommitted and commands the respect or fear of those who normally support the government. Often throughout history, such leaders have become cult figures whose very

name becomes a rallying point. Examples include Lenin, General Franco and Che Guevara.

They may even become moral centres of gravity.

lnsurgencies require leaders able to determine political/strategic aims as well as the enabling tactics. While a strong leader is required in the early stages of an insurgency, when it

is necessary to enforce one's leadership against contending rivals or if the cause seems weak or divisive, when the cause is sound, the leader need not be so charismatic.

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The value to removing or killing an insurgent leader must be carefully considered. The costs involved and the undesired secondary effects (collateral damages, etc.) may outweigh the

tactical and operational advantages gained. lndeed, a powerful and charismatic leader open to

a negotiated settlement may be of more value alive, in terms of reaching an enduring end-state.

2''3. POPULAR SUPPORT

The cause and the leader must appeal to as wide an audience as possible. Those who are uncommitted or hostile to the cause must be persuaded or coerced to join the cause. Some

may have to be killed to persuade the others. Popular support is important from a political point of view and essential to the provision of intelligence, logistics and to support a protective

security screen around the insurgents' clandestine organization. The need to garner a decisive level of popular support, or at least pervasive acquiescence, is necessary for eventual success.

214. ORGANIZATION AND ACTORS

lnsurgent groups often possess a cellular organization that both enhances force protection and enables decentralized command and control. The cellular organization will limit

the numbers of personnel who know the actual names and locations of key actors of the insurgency but still allows directives to be carried out. Thus if one or even multiple cells are

compromised, the threat to the overall organization is limited. The cell structure will extend to all of the active supporters of an insurgency, including facilitators outside of the actual geographic

region where the insurgency is occurring. Although the cell structure is a very old method of organization, modern information technologies increase its effectiveness by facilitating

networking and enhancing command and control in high risk environments.

Within an insurgent organization, the primary classes of actors are the top leaders, lieutenants, foot soldiers and recruiters.23 Ancillary classes of actors include external suppliers

and facilitators, financiers, heads of supportive states, supportive population segments and sources of moral and religious support.'o The most important of these are the committed actors

and the sympathizers that may reside in either the primary or ancillary classes of actors.2s

Alongside the primary and ancillary actors are people who play a more ephemeral or transient role. There is much evidence from recent conflicts, including lraq and Afghanistan,

that insurgent and terrorist groups have paid, non-ideologically committed civilians to support operations. ln particular, this has included substantial remuneration for such things as sniping,

placing improvised explosive devices and other booby traps, launching rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and conducting suicide attacks. lnsurgent groups will exploit unemployed or

disaffected members of the populace by offering remuneration that may in fact represent the only viable means of supporting families. As well, the old maxim of "the enemy of my enemy is

my friend" will likely hold true in any conflict where multiple, disparate actors are involved, particularly in societies where tribal affiliations are stronger than any national identity. The

support of all of these actors is transitory because of the lack of ideological ties to the

Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, Deterrence & lnfluence in Counterterrodsm (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002),

p" 13-15, figure 3.3.

Loc cit.

Fred Burton, "The Psychological Battlefield," Stratfor Intettigence Repoft,10 August 2005. http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyld=253467 . Accessed 13 June 2006.

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insurgency. As such they represent an ideal target for influence activities to dissuade behaviour at odds with host nation government and campaign objectives.

Many, particularly the younger members, willjoin an insurgency out of peer pressure, a willingness to gain a sense of belonging or a sense of adventure. lnsurgents will actively recruit

based on these desires. The popularity of such choices is increased when unemployment rates are high. Again, such non-ideologically committed individuals are key targets for influence

activities that seek to dissuade support for the insurgency.

215. NARRATIVE

At the basis of an insurgency is a narrative that contains an idea and founding cause for the insurgency. lt motivates the primary and ancillary actors and allows the idea to be

formalized as an ideology. The narrative will be a plausible story that illustrates real or perceived historical or extant injustices and grievances. The narrative will present a vision,

mission, strategy and goals that purport to resolve and redress those injustices. lt is a highly motivational tool that exploits grievances, culture and beliefs in order to further the insurgent

aims.

ln combination with actions, the narrative is used to attract devotees and supporters,26 The narrative willjustify insurgent actions and may advocate for the use of violence to achieve

political goals and eventually justify actions, even atrocities. Furthermore, it will be used to paint the existing authority and power structures as the logical result of the injustices that are

described through the narrative. Similar to propaganda, most narratives will possess, at the very least, a kernel of truth but may also include substantial amounts of mythology and may

illustrate a utopian ideal as an ultimate goal. The narrative may be published as a manifesto,

religious edict or in some other form, or it may simply be passed verbally.

Narratives underpin much of human thought. Narratives (or stories) influence the ability to recall and understand history, motivate people to act, temper emotional reactions to events,

cue certain heuristics and biases, structure problem-solving capabilities and ultimately perhaps even constitute individual identity.2T Narratives form not only the basis of insurgent

organizations but also of terrorist groups, national identities, culture, society and a host of other

things to which humans often cling in order to develop feelings of inclusiveness and identity.2s

Sub-narratives also form a substantial part of the overall narrative. This is true for all individuals and groups. A further broad example is religion. All religions possess substantial

narratives and, indeed, the devotion of followers is predicated on faith in what is in essence a story and, for branches and sects, the belief in sub-narratives that are offshoots of the primary

story. A narrative is not necessarily untrue, but neither can it be unquestioningly accepted as

completely factual.

Brigadier (ret'd) Maurice Tugwell, "Revolutionary

(London: King's College, University of London, March 1979), p.307. Brigadier Tugwell, who continues to hold complete copyright on his dissertation, graciously granted permission to quote from his work during a telephone

Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measure," PhD. Diss.

conversation on 13 February 2007.

William Casebeer and James Russell, "storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 'Counter-Narrative Strategy,"' Strategic /nsrghfs, Volume lV, No,3, March 2005 (Monterey CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict,

US Naval Postgraduate School). http://www.ccc.nps.navy.millsil2}l5lmarlcasebeerMar05.pdf

Accessed

November 2006.

Walid Phares, The War of tdeas (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. xiii.

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Narratives exist in all situations and cultures. For example, Canadian narratives and sub-narratives include, true or not, such notions as hockey as Canada's national sport,

Canada as a nation of peacekeepers, and the dollar "loonle" coin embedded in the ice at the Salt Lake City Olympics.

The power of the narrative cannot be underestimated. lnformation operations (influence activities) must work to counter the insurgent narrative and its supporting propaganda.

Countering the narrative will require the symbiotic use of words and deeds that seek to redress the grievances exploited by the insurgent narrative while promoting the desired narrative of the

host-nation government and coalition.

216. CONTEXT OF AN INSURGENCY

Beyond the five basic tenets listed above, it is essentialfor a COIN campaign to consider and comprehend the insurgency's context. Circumstances will often dictate what an insurgent

can and cannot do. For example, several uprisings that slavishly copied revolts in Russia or Cuba were dismalfailures. The Spartacist revolts in Germany (1919)and Che Guevarra's

attempts in Bolivia (1967)failed given that ideologically based campaign plans did notfitthe socio-political context of either environment. Nonetheless, a population that is dissatisfied with

its conditions in general and holds the perception of a weak government can provide fertile soil for a skilled insurrectionary leader with a popular cause and competent organizational support.

A well led and organized insurrection may, if the government commands a wide measure of suppotl and can rely on its security forces, devolve into a protracted competition of

attrition. Such an attrition campaign may still succeed if the insurgency can gradually erode the will of the government's supporters at home and persuade public opinion amongst its foreign

allies that the government's cause is hopeless or too expensive to support.

217. FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSURGENCY

The factors affecting an insurgency can be as important as the tenets of the insurgency itself and will contribute significantly to the end results if carefully applied. The factors are:

Protracted War. Although a weak government may fall quite quickly to a well- organized rebellion, or even overnight to a coup d'6tat, a strong government may

only be defeated by a war of attrition. Time is on the side of the insurgent. ln a rural-based insurgency, the territory supports a gradual occupation of a country,

as demonstrated by Mao Tse-tung in China. While the urban guerrilla's operating environment is not so permissive, its inability to occupy territory can be

partially overcome by establishing "no-go" areas within cities. Here the strategy is based not on an outright overall military victory but upon creating war-

weariness, emphasizing economic privation and demonstrating the inability of the government to provide security.

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Ghoice of Terrain. Given the relative weakness, in relation to the government's

standing army, an insurgent force is compelled to make best use of terrain. Without the ability to seize and hold ground or to quickly achieve victory, space

and time became weapons rather than goals for the insurgent,2e As such, insurgents utilize the terrain to their advantage. This terrain will include

populations in which to take cover. They will make best strategic use of space and attack their enemy in their rear or echelon areas.

...the guerrilla's greafesf advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants." To tum this

defeat into a victory, the counter-insurgent must recognize that "this total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerrilla's weak point.

Source: Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of COIN (New York: Praeger, 1964), cited in Robeft R.

Tomes, "Relearning CO\N Warfare,"Parameters (Spring 2004), pp. 18-19.

lntelligence. The insurgency threat picture is vastly more complicated than most other forms of conflict given the wide range of elements, influences and factors

involved in an insurgency. Unlike conventionalwarfare, where mass fires and manoeuvre may potentially substitute for comprehensive intelligence and

planning, neither the insurgency nor COIN can afford that luxury. For the

insurgent, the best source of intelligence is a sympathiser working for the government, preferably in security-related employment. The media may also

contri bute to the insu rgent's information-gatheri ng process.

Establishment of an Alternative Society. The aim of imposing an alternative view of society is common to all insurgent organizations. These viewpoints may

be motivated by nationalist, religious or political beliefs. While nationalism presents an emotive call of patriotism to replace a government portrayed as

ruling against the country's interests, religious viewpoints promote a remoulding of society along religious, dogmatic lines. Political motivations, regardless of the

supporting ideologies, are enhanced by a simple desire for power. Support for these alternative perspectives will not be solely internal, as external support may

be received from sympathetic nations.

External Support^ lnsurgencies are seldom successful at obtaining their goals without external assistance. As such, outside support of both foreign populations

and governments is enlisted for the insurgency. Sympathetic governments may assist the insurgent openly, through providing diplomatic support, or

clandestinely, by supplying weapons and training assistance. Even if a government is unwilling to lend support to the insurgents, groups may appeal

directly to the foreign populace, notably ex-patriot communities, through the use of propaganda aimed to appeal to popular sentiment. The resulting sympathetic

population may pressure their home government, engage in protests or sign petitions, all increasing the insurgent support base. The insurgent can then use

these overseas actions as propaganda to increase local support. Sympathetic external populations often also prove to be a good source of financial support.

John Shy and Thomas W Collier, "Revolutionary \Nar," (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pg.839.

Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, ed.

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Concurrent Activity. The leadership will attempt to wage the insurgency on political, economic, propaganda and military fronts simultaneously. This ability to

simultaneously conduct its range of activities enhances the effectiveness of the insurgents' overall operations, thus creating a synergy. This has the additional

effect of heightening the public's perception of its cohesion and capability. As such, the insurgency that looks and acts like a competent parallel state,

increases its ability to become the state.

218. WEAKNESSES AND ASPECTS OF INSURGENT VULNERABILITY

There are usually many potential weak points within an insurgency. These are particularly apparent in the early days of a campaign, when the insurgency is vulnerable to

some form of pre-emption, dislocation and disruption by COIN forces:

Secrecy. Any group planning to use force and violence to prosecute its aims must adopt a secretive, conspiratorial approach to its planning and actions.

While such discretion may add a degree of glamour and attractiveness to potential recruits, this secrecy can quickly become counterproductive. Adverse

implications include affecting the necessary freedom of action, lowering confidence in similar insurgent groups and readily lead to serious

misunderstanding within the organization. Consequently, a balance must be struck between a too secretive and clandestine approach to insurgency actions

and the need to avoid undue attention from the authorities or rival groups. Some insurgencies have attempted to minimize this difficulty by creating a more public,

political arm. For example, there is the lrish Republican Army's (lRA's) associated political arm, Sinn Fein.

Gaining Support. Gaining popular support for the cause can be a difficult and sensitive stage in the evolution of an insurgency. lf the publicly accepted reason

for rising against the government has appeal, it would seem that the insurgency would therefore thrive. Unfortunately, various groupings and factions may hold

varying opinions, requiring different techniques, including possible compromises and/or intimidation, to gain their support. lndifference, antipathy and likely fear of

government reprisal also have to be overcome. Publicity dramatically improves the prospect of gaining popular support, as even bad publicity can advertise that

a group is resisting, consequently expanding recruitment.

Secure Operating Base. lnsurgents require a secure base from which to operate. Selecting a location distant from activity centres may be potentially

more secure for the insurgents but may also put them out of touch with the population and make them vulnerable to isolation. Alternatively, close proximity

likely eases the security force tasks of surveillance, infiltration and destruction.

Establishing an operating base in a border region can often provide temporary, or perhaps permanent, headquarters beyond the reach and authority of the state.

Funding. All insurgencies require some degree of funding in order to acquire the staples of conflict: weapons, ammunition, food and medicines. Lack of sufficient

funds can limit the scope of an insurgency, inhibiting its prospects for success. Accordingly, state authorities must utilize this weakness to their advantage,

aiming to dismantle the insurgents'funding mechanisms. Lacking a friendly nation or individuals to back the insurgency, funding can be found in criminal

activities such as narcotics trafficking, robberies and extortion. While the illegal drug trade in particular has proven to be a more enduring source of income than

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bank robberies, it brings the movement into contact with unreliable, vulnerable groups who can attract undue attention from the authorities. lnsurgencies will

attempt to gain income from low-profile, high turn-over criminal sources such as movie and music pirating. External support may also have a political price

affecting the overall aim of an insurgency.

The Problem of Ghanging Aims. Changing aims is not a substantial problem at

an insurgency's onset but has a potentially damaging effect once an insurgency has been operational for some time. lndeed, changing aims is common when an

insurgency is still coalescing. lnitial operations may change the outlook of a number of insurgents, with some questioning the price of the overall aim

particularly if security force successes spread doubt about the cause or the insurgency's leadership. A seemingly generous compromise offered by the state

to the insurgents could prove divisive; forcing insurgent leaders to apply ruthless measures to ensure that unity and secrecy are preserved. Changing aims can

be further problematic given the aforementioned secrecy, which may spark misunderstanding and suspicion throughout the insurgency.

Setting the Pace. Controlling the pace and timing of operations is vital to the success of any campaign. Given that insurgents can control the start of

operations and have some measure of control over subsequent activity, it is surprising to note that many insurgencies have failed to capitalize on

opportunities or have allowed the pace of events and scope of activities to be dictated by the state authorities. Once momentum is lost, the strategic initiative

returns to the state, leaving the insurgency exposed.

lnformers. While informers have sometimes been infiltrated into insurgent cells,

it is far more common to achieve success by persuading the insurgent to become an informer. This is someone already in the organization, or is a link between

clandestine cells and their public accomplices, such as the couriers or suppliers. There is nothing more demoralizing to the insurgents than to fear that one of their

trusted comrades is giving information to the government. lnsurgent leaders will try to pre-empt the recruitment of informers by ruthless exemplary punishments.

Lack of Moral Authority. Given its use of violence and the fact that an insurgency will normally be related to and involved with criminal elements, its

leadership will be vulnerable to attacks on its moral authority and claimed superiority. lts susceptibility to this will depend upon the culture in which the

insurgency occurs. This lack of moral authority must be pointed out to the supporting and neutral populace. Furthermore, to exploit this weakness, COIN

forces must not only conduct their campaign from a standpoint of moral superiority, in terms of conduct and application of the law of armed conflict, but

must advertize this fact through public affairs and psychological operations. This will help to undermine the insurgency and its supporting narrative.

sEcTtoN 3

INSURGENT METHODS AND END.STATES

219. INSURGENT TACTICS

The deliberate promotion of adverse publicity against government agencies and security forces is essential and complementary. This aspect has proven more effective with the growing

trend towards political groups using civil liberties and human rights to lower the tolerance of the

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public for harsher COIN measures. The insurgents' claim to legitimacy is based on their declared ability to improve the position of the oppressed. The essentially violent nature of

insurgencies moves in two concurrent complementary paths, one destructive and the other constructive, as follows:

Destructive actions are clearly aimed at overthrowing the established order and

creating a climate of collapse in the states' authority. Destructive activities

include subversion, sabotage of the economic framework, terrorism and guerrilla

activity and large-scale combat operations.

The constructive effort, meanwhile, aims at creating an organization to subsequently replace the established order at a suitable moment.

Subversion. Subversive activity attempts to undermine the political, economic and military strength of a state without resorting to the use of force by the insurgent. Such activity

may provoke violent countermeasures, to be denounced as an overreaction by the authorities, thus discrediting the government. As such, subversion probably poses the most difficult and

dangerous threat to a government engaged in a COIN campaign, Subversion takes many forms, such as penetrating existing political parties and organizations and developing front

organizations that can have the appearance of challenging and defying the authority of government. An insurgency will seek to win supporters within the government, especially the

security elements, in order to discern future plans and possibly any other economic and financial information. These types of information are all useful for an insurgency to exploit as

required, particularly in the early days of an insurrection.

lnsurgent lnformation Operations. Propaganda is a key element of subversion. lt includes publishing information detrimental to the government or security forces and the

spreading of rumours, whether true or false, designed to undermine trust and confidence in the

government.

Passive Resistance. Depending upon the society in which the insurgency is operating, passive resistance may be a useful tactic. lt is more effective in liberal societies, given an

authoritarian regime's ability to crush such open dissent. Examples of passive resistance include withdrawing labour from public services, obstructing the law or sit-ins in public places.

These measures to gain political change do not alone indicate an insurgency, which by definition uses violence to acquire change. However, insurgent leaders will encourage passive

measures on behalf of the larger population in order to undermine the authority of the government and disrupt civil society through agitation. They may also seek to provoke violence

during public demonstrations in hopes of causing an overreaction by the government forces and creating another claim to injustice and a sense of alienation and frustration amongst the

populace.

Sabotage. Sabotage is disruptive activity that furthers the insurgents' interests. lt may be active or passive.

Active sabotage sees insurgents set out to disrupt important services, functions

or industrial processes by violent means. Targets may be selected at random for political or economic impact, or they may fit into a wider tactical plan with the aim

of increasing general confusion and tying down troops in the static defence of installations. Suitable targets include bridges, roads, telephone lines or

dispersed military logistics sites. Targets whose destruction might cause mass unemployment and thereby lose the goodwill of the people are in general

avoided.

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Passive sabotage is generally aimed at causing disorder and disruption by deliberate error, contrived accident, absenteeism or strikes. The target can be

industry, public services, supplies or troops, where action is usually planned on a wide scale through political front organizations. Data sabotage is facilitated by

the universality of computers in government, business and industrial control systems. These can be carried out through cyber attack or by having an

insurgent or sympathizer physically damage the system.

The Tactic of Terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. Despite the attention that it receives,

terrorism is a tactical level undertaking; however, one that is normally used to influence the situation at the operational and strategic levels. lt may be used by individuals, groups or states

as paft of a larger operational objective and strategy to intimidate and coerce governments,

societies or elements of each. Terrorist actions call attention to the perpetrators and their causes and may help them win support of potential sympathizers. Terrorism is used to strike at

civilian targets which normally have limited means of self-defence.to The more spectacular or outrageous the action, the louder it speaks. Terrorist attacks seek to undermine the legitimacy

of the indigenous government and security forces by demonstrating their inability to counter the threat and prevent attacks. Thus, the key effect of terrorist attacks is psychological, in that they

seek to shape the perceptions of various audiences, locally, regionally and internationally. The physical damages caused are simply the means of sending their message. Through the

resulting psychological impact, terrorist attacks seek to force policy changes or specific actions by the effected governments. For example, at a tactical and operational level, they may seek to

cause an over-reaction by local security forces, thereby giving testimony to claims of discrimination and bias against the perpetrating group. At the operational and strategic levels

they may seek to force a nation to withdraw its forces from a coalition campaign. Terror tactics may include assassinations, bombings, hostagetakings, kidnappings, hijackings and sabotage.

The method chosen will try to exploit a perceived weakness within the adversary or to attack what was thought to be a strength in order to heighten the psychological effect. Terror tactics

evolve with new technology and the availability of weapon systems, and seek to exploit globalization, often through international criminal organizations. The speed of global

communications has supported and enhanced the messages that the perpetrators send through their use of terror. These changes have served to strengthen the traditional network-based cell

structures favoured by organizations that use terror. This in turn reduces the efficacy of certain traditionalcountermeasures, such as leadership targeting, and makes penetration more difficult.

ln short, recent developments in the nature of global communications have made terror a

cheaper and more effective tool than in the past.31

Bard O'Neill, lnsurgency and Terrorism: From Revolutionary to Apocatypse,2nd ed., Revised. Washington DC: Potomac,2005. p. 33.

Allan Castle, Trans-nationalOrganized Crime and International Security, University of British Columbia lnstitute of lnternational Relations Working Paper No. 19, November 1997 .

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Terrorism is a tactic that may be used by a number of irregular threats including insurgents. The importance of terrorist acts is not in the act itself, but in the message

that it sends to various audiences. lt is fundamentalto the propaganda campaigns of many insurgent groups. One expert on insurgent propaganda, retired British Brigadier

and academic Maurice Tugwell noted the following regarding the messages that terrorist acts can transmit to various audiences:

"The nineteenth century anarchist Bakunin coined the phrase, 'Propaganda of the deed' to describe an act, usually of terrorist violence, committed more for its indirect

effect upon public opinion than for any direct benefit arising from the act itself. Mr. Paul Wilkinson has suggested that "the terrorist by his act of violence is telling the world,

are here. Look what we can do. Heed us or there is worse to come.' We may

comment that this message is the one intended for'enemies' and that the same act is telling 'neutrals' and 'friends' other things. To 'neutrals' it may say: 'We are here. See

'We

how the weak oppose the oppressors. Obviously our cause has justice on its side. Support us.' And to 'friends' it may impart this message: 'We are here. Look how the

mighty forces of the oppression fade before our blows. There is no cause to fear them. Victory will be ours. Join."'

Every enemy action, even a seemingly irrational one such as a terrorist bombing of a

crowded market, is conveying a message, often at the strategic level, to various audiences and is part of a larger propaganda campaign.

Source: Brigadier (ret'd) Maurice Arthur John Tugwell, "Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter- Measures," Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, London: King's College, University of London, March 1979,

p.22.

lnsurgents who employ terrorism willjustifu its use in a number of ways. Among other ways, terrorist acts will be justified as legitimate by portraying them as altruistic

because the act is supposedly for a greater good and that it is the only weapon available given the enemy's superior military capabilities. Historically terrorists have

sought to distinguish themselves from common criminals because of adherence to and support for whai they believe to be a legitimate cause and that those who die

committing such acts are martyrs who'll be remembered for their sacrifice. These justifications have been used by groups throughout history, including lrish nationalists,

Jewish settlers desiring the creation of a Jewish state, Sri Lankan separatists, and extremist lslamists of both the Sunni and Shia sects.

Source: Bruce Hoffman lnside Terrorism, rev. ed. NY: Columbia University Press,2006; Roger Trinquier, Modern Waffare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Westport CT: Praeger

Security lnternational, 1964, 2006; Bard O'Neill, lnsurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to

Apocatypse,2no ed, rev., Washington D.C.: Potomac,2005.

Fund Raising. The insurgents' operating budget for weapons, medicines, political bribes and other requirements will be substantial. An indicator of a developing insurgency

should therefore include fund-raising efforts. ln the early stages, this will probably be covert and criminal, such as bank robbery, Subsequently, the political organization within the insurgency

will take on the task of extracting aid from well-intentioned, charitable and philanthropic organizations and from sympathizers abroad. More violent methods may include, the extorting

of ransom from individuals (kidnapping) or from governments (hijacking) and perhaps the enforced levying of taxes on intimidated sections of the population. Finally, as has been

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demonstrated by the PLO and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a mature insurgency can develop a parallel socioeconomic order, which may attain a level of

political legitimacy greater than that enjoyed by the legal government in the eyes of the local

populace.

Some criminal organizations blur the line between lawbreaking and insurgency. For example, the Calidrug cartelfunds an insurgency in ColombiJthrough nJrco-ierrorism

that has spin-off economic benefits to the local growers of the coca plants. The sowing of this general disorder helps allow freedom to operate for the drug cartel.

Source; Loretta Napoleoni,Terror lncorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Sfories Press, 2005). See especla//y Chapter 2 '"The Macroeconomics of Terror," pp. 13-29

and Chapter 3 "The Privatization of Terror," pp. 31-48. Napoleoni examines and catalogues the methods and effects of various insurgent movements' linkages, if not outright involvement, with narcotics trade and

other forms of parallel socioeconomic structure and activity.

Weapons and Equipment. lnsurgents tend to use basic weapons whose essentials have not changed very much since the 1940s. Beyond simple availability, selection criteria are

based upon compactness, lethality and simple operating procedures. The following should be

noted:

Personalweapons are principally

high rate of fire. ln recent times, weapons and bombs have been miniaturized, explosives harder to detect and more lethal, accompanied by a dramatic increase

in improvised explosive devices (lEDs).

pistols,

carbines, rifles and weapons with a

lnsurgents generally have access to a complete range of combat support weapons. Sniper rifles utilizing armour-piercing ammunition are being seen more

frequently. lmprovised mortars are easy to make, although they are usually inaccurate and unreliable. Most require some form of "flat bed" for

transportation. Acquisition of military mortars and ammunition significantly increase the range and lethality of such weapons. Rocket-propelled grenade

(RPG)-type anti-armour weapons proliferate. Portable air defence missiles pose a significant threat. The mere possession of air defence weapons, particularly

man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), by an insurgent group will disrupt the government use of helicopters.

Explosives in various forms are the favoured weapons of insurgents. Military mines, both anti-personnel and anti-tank, are frequently utilized by insurgents.

They have the dual purpose of hampering COIN forces' efforts while terrifying the local population. lnsurgency forces are increasingly using lEDs. The

effectiveness of these weapons is well known, and expertise in their manufacture and handling is often of a high order. Sophisticated initiating devices, anti-lifting

mechanisms and innovative tactical placement (including secondary lEDs) are becoming common. Furthermore, any incident, bomb or hoax, can be used as a

bait to kill security forces and disposal specialists. Recently, the suicide bomber has emerged as a particularly effective weapon. The suicide bomber is in effect

a precision weapon that also demonstrates the degree of the insurgent's

commitment.

Sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)weapons will likely remain beyond the capability of insurgent groups. Since the release of

Sarin gas in Tokyo subway in 1995, the potentialfor insurgents to use crude

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CBRN devices must be considered. Such a capability is to be expected only in an insurgent group already employing terrorist tactics.

220. INSURGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

Rural insurgencies continue as the allocation of land, water or other scarce mineral resources continues to provide a real or perceived grievance, pafiicularly in areas where there

is a burgeoning population and a malevolent government. lnsurgent bases will be established in remote areas, often in difficult terrain (mountains, jungles, forest, etc.), from which attacks

may be launched over as wide an area as possible to disperse scarce security resources. These actions may be mistaken for banditry. Under the pretext of protection against such

banditry, isolated villages will be prepared for defence, including the discreet clearance of fields of fire. Other indications that a campaign is developing include hoarding supplies, training and

arming of village "self-defence" groups and increased evidence of local intimidation and

coercion.

ln its early stages, a rural insurgency relies upon small bands assembling for a limited attack, probably against a remote and inadequately guarded target. As the movement grows to

the stage where it can command significant support from the local population, so its objectives will become more ambitious and larger forces will be necessary. The relative strength of

insurgent bands will always place them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the security forces, and they will seek to avoid a pitched battle. Their tactics are therefore based on mobility and surprise,

generally using ambushes and explosives.

Rural populations are vulnerable to terrorism and intimidation, and very quickly a feeling of insecurity can spread throughout a whole region. Such intimidation is common within rural

insurgencies because of the population's relative physical isolation from the protective security forces and the government's presence.

Ambush is the most widely used insurgent tactic. lt is particularly effective against road movement, especially when the ground makes it difficult for the government forces to move off

the road and take cover, ln addition to sniping and massed fires ambushes, there is a growing trend in ambushes featuring lEDs and suicide bombing.

221. INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

With the degree of urbanization increasing globally, encountering urban insurgencies will likely expand. Urban populations are vulnerable, providing relatively small insurgent forces with

the opportunity to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity sufficient to discredit the

government.

ln the urban environment, insurgents do not normally plan to occupy and control territory, although they may seize small areas for a limited time to establish a presence from

which they can subsequently receive support. Lacking the ability to occupy territory on a significant scale, insurgents will aim to make the government's position untenable by

engendering a state of war-weariness, frustration and anger against government emergency measures. Under such conditions, the people may rally to any organization or leader who offers

stability.

Cities and towns provide great scope for insurgencies. The concentration of a large population in a relatively small area provides cover for the insurgents, although they may find

support only in certain areas. Additionally, the needs of a great city, related to the complexity of urban living, could find a city brought to its knees through the interruption of power supplies,

non-collection of rubbish or the cutting off of water.

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For these reasons, the urban insurgent can operate more boldly than his rural counterpad, and his tactics reflect this, lntimidating the local population, as seen in rural

insurgencies, also occurs in urban environments. ln this setting, population density facilitates the insurgents' audacity, as they are able to readily disappear amongst the populace. However,

this too is a double-edged sword, for population density may also be used to advantage

COIN forces in the recruitment and placement of agents and in the stealthy infiltration of patrols.

by the

The ready availability of large numbers of people in urban areas enables insurgents to engineer demonstrations and assemble crowds with relative ease. The emotions of the

demonstrators can then be readily manipulated, often in an effort to provoke an overreaction security forces. Women and children may be purposely included in a demonstration because

they lend a certain legitimacy to the event, are easier to gain sympathy from observers and help create an enormous propaganda victory if the insurgents succeed in provoking a

government overreaction that causes civilian casualties.

may

Countering an insurgency in an urban area offers a number of challenges to the COIN

forces, particularly given the density and complexities of an urban environment. However,

city is an "urban jungle," then it too consists of a number of villages or local areas. Each urban

if a

area may be divided into almost self-contained sections. Few individuals live throughout an entire city; instead they live, work, socialize and worship in the same local area, often within

walking distance. The terrain analysis and knowledge base established by intelligence assessment should work to identify the urban delineations and their internal power structures.

222. INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS

Given the political aims and secretive nature of insurgency, communicating is critical.

Contact amongst the insurgents is accomplished through small, surreptitious groups

lnsurgents make extensive use of secure methods, such as dead-letter drops or coded graffiti. ln addition to the methods below, they will also use political literature such as manifestos,

magazines, posters and circulars communicate. Today, modern mass communications facilitate the task of the insurrectionary leader and supporting cadres. They can gain secure

communications within their organization and stage broad appeals to the mass audience provided by the public. Therefore, a modern military seeking to defend its parent or foster

or cells.

society must be prepared to exploit modern media and deny its use to an opponent. Currently,

insurgents are known to employ modern communications as follows:

Gellular Telephone and Hand Held Radios. The mobile phone and similar devices have become ubiquitous in the developing world. lnsurgents use them

for communication and deception. Veiled speech and false information are used to compensate for and even exploit the open nature of these types of systems.

Radio. Radio is an increasingly used component of control as well as a means

of passing information or propaganda. Underground radio stations may disseminate propaganda or order crowds out for demonstrations. They may also

use radio frequencies to detonate bombs.

Television. Almost every insurgent group has used television directly to

promote their cause or indirectly, ensuring that incidents are newsworthy

to be reported on television. lt is no coincidence that the steep rise in terrorist and insurgent action has taken place at the same time as the growth in

television. The distribution of video tapes also enormously enhances an insurgent cause, as seen by the linkage between certain media outlets and

terrorist organ izations.

enough

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Media. Coded messages may be included in newspaper advertisements, articles in magazines or on posters or circulars to convey instructions to cells,

perhaps in conjunction with the dead letter box system. Such messages may be used to pass information when time is not essential for the execution of an

operation or to inform an insurgent of the time and date a pre-planned attack or incident is to be staged.

lnternet. The World Wide Web is being used increasingly within insurgencies. Not only can it be used for propaganda purposes but also as a tool to pass along

terrorist and insurgent techniques and procedures. lnsurgents are increasingly publishing their versions of events in order to attract support and show their

strength, often through video clips of attacks on security forces or killings of kidnapped government supporters. Such websites thus become a primary

source of intelligence, as analysts seek indicators of insurgent morale, noms-de-guerre, various factions and their motivators or ideologies, which may

then be useful for negotiations or PSYOPS targeting.

sEcTroN 4

CONCLUSION_A MEDICAL METAPHOR FOR AN INSURGENCY AND COIN

An insurgency may be compared to a communicable disease. The insurgent ideology and its popular suppor"t are spread through a population by exposure to the equivalent of risk

factors: the exploitation of legitimate grievances, propaganda and the insurgent narrative. Agents for the spread of the "disease" are memes-behavioural practices passed on by

imitation. Many individuals, especially young people, are not necessarily drawn to an insurgency out of ideological commitment but rather through social and cultural associations

between family members and friends.

A communicable disease is countered through a holistic and systematic approach involving a wide range of means: changes to behaviour and the environment, such as the

reduction of risk factors; isolation and quarantine; inoculation; and, treatment of the clinically

infected.

r,..

'.":,'

Figure 24 An Insurgency Spread as a Gommunicable Disease32

Just as a communicable disease may be treated in a numberof ways, we can extend the metaphor to illustrate how a COIN strategy may be applied to resolve an insurgency:

This construct was adopted from a briefing by LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC ret'd during the USMC JOINT URBAN WARRIOR EXERCISE 2005 given to the COIN study group.

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Changes to Behaviour and Environment. Just as the spread of a disease may be curtailed through changes to behaviour and the environment and the removal

of risk factors, the same idea may be applied to stop the spread of an insurgency. Grievances and circumstances that fuelled the insurgency's start

and that continue to lend it credence and support must be resolved.

lsolation and Quarantine. Just as those who are infected with a disease are often quarantined, COIN forces and policies must seek to separate insurgents

from the populace. This will firstly cut off supporl from the populace, but more

importantly, will help preclude the "infection" of others and thus an increase to the insurgency membership. The insurgents must be isolated both physically and

cognitively from the populace. ln the latter sense, this will rely upon defensive information operations and attacks against insurgent communication and

propaganda means.

lnoculation. Those not infected with a disease are inoculated. Likewise, whilst legitimate grievances are being resolved, information operations will be needed

to counter the ideological infection of the populace with the narrative and justification for the insurgency.

Treatment. Those who have been infected by a communicable disease undergo treatment, ln the case of those supporting an insurgency, a number of means

may be required. ldeally, influence activities (information operations) may be used to persuade and dissuade insurgents and their supporters to pursue

peaceful and legitimate means to resolve their grievances. lt may even be possible to conveft some insurgents to support the military forces of the COIN

forces. ln other cases, committed insurgents unwilling to surrender may have to be captured, killed or marginalized to the point that they are ineffective.

ln order to properly and effectively counter an insurgency, one must truly understand the motivations, aims, strategies and context of the insurgency. Moreover, one must understand

thecultureinwhichtheinsurgencyisoccurring. Thisisvital,fortheoverallgoaloftheCOlN campaign is to solve root causes and to convince the vast majority of the populace to support a

legitimate process and to reject the insurgency. This can only be done within the context of the

culture at hand.

The solution to an insurgency is a political one, which will require a comprehensive approach incorporating a wide variety of agencies with the military in a supporting role. This is

reflected in the philosophy and principles that frame the conduct of a COIN campaign.

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CHAPTER 3

COIN PRINCIPLES

The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sorl of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing

as a purely military solution because insurgencyis nof primarily a military activity. At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short

of surrender, because the very fact that a sfafe of insurgency exisfs implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by

the use of force.

-General Sir Frank Kitson, reflecting upon his experiences from campaigns in Kenya, Malaya, Oman and Cyprus.

301. INTRODUCTION

No insurgency has been defeated solely by military means. Successful conduct of counter-insurgency (COIN) requires a harmonized approach using political, social, economic,

psychological, informational and military measures to restore or establish the authority of a legitimate government and address the root causes of the insurgency. The root causes will be

political, social and economic in nature and therefore require agencies and elements of power other than the military to resolve.

Within this harmonized effort, military force will play a supporting role. The fundamental maxim of all COIN is that a strategic centre of gravity is the populace of the threatened state or

region. Without the moral support of the people, no COIN campaign can succeed, Similarly, no insurgency can succeed without at least the tacit acceptance of the populace. lnsurgents will

also seek to attack the will of nations contributing coalition forces and other elements of power and capabilities to combat the insurgency. These domestic populations and their will to support

a long-term commitment must be considered strategic centres of gravity in the campaign. Operations at all levels must be conducted with these centres to gravity in mind.

SECTION 1

COUNTER.INSURGENCY PHILOSOPHY

As in all campaigns, the application of military capabilities in a COIN campaign is guided by doctrine, which consists of a philosophy, guiding principles and tested practices and

procedures. A COIN campaign is conducted using the same overarching philosophies that guide the application of fighting power in other campaigns:

a comprehensive approach that uses military capabilities in conjunction with other elements of power to create enduring outcomes;

b. c.

d. e.

adherence to the Principles of War;

a war-fighting ethos;

a manoeuvrist approach;

mission command; and

an ethical application of combat power.

Specific to the conduct of a COIN campaign is a philosophy that reflects the centres of gravity that are generally common to any COIN campaign. The overarching philosophy of a

COIN campaign is encompassed by the following:

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An insurgency is a political problem that requires elements of power other than

the military to create an enduring solution and outcome. The military therefore plays a supporting role.

A successful COIN campaign requires the support of the populace. Thus all military activities must be conducted with a view to gaining and maintaining the

support of the local populace and, to this end, creating and maintaining the legitimacy of the campaign. This must be understood at all levels of command,

including the lowest tactical levels.33

sEcTtoN 2

PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER.INSURGENCY

302.

GENERAL

From the overarching philosophy, certain principles may be developed in order to guide the military and other agencies in the conduct of a COIN campaign. These principles are based

on history and theory and draw on the experiences of friend and foe alike. lt must, however, be remembered that principles are guidelines only and must be tempered by a realistic estimate of

the situation and an appraisal of the variables and potential responses. Like all principles, they should be applied pragmatically and with common sense to suit the circumstances peculiar to

each campaign. The assessment of the situation will indicate where application of a principle may not be possible (at least temporarily), where they may conflict or where there is overlap.

As with the principles of war, they must be balanced with one another, and all operations must be examined against them. Part of the art of command will be to balance competing demands,

consider options and develop the best course of action possible, adhering as closely as possible to the principles and the overarching philosophy. Plans and their implementation must be tailor-

made for the context in which they are to be implemented. Underpinning the principles are the assumptions of minimum necessary force and legitimacy of all actions.

Although the military plays a supporting role in a COIN campaign, the failure of commanders to properly apply the principles could easily and directly lead to failure of the entire

campaign.

ln any campaign, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)will routinely be modified in order to meet the situation at hand. Particularly in a COIN campaign, where the adversary will

be adaptive, cunning and resourceful, this will be a continual process.

Principles offer the civil leadership and the heads of all agencies, including the military commander, both a start point and useful guideposts. The COIN principles offered herein are

arranged in a logical sequence and provide a government and military commanders with a general pattern on which to base and review strategy and operational plans.

The principles for the conduct of a COIN campaign are:

a. b.

effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim;

promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies (including government machinery);

The ouerarching nature of this concept and the need for it to be understood at all levels of command, like mission command, raises the need to gain popular support to the level of a guiding philosophy rather than have it as a

constituent principle.

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COIN Principles

understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider

environment;

d. e.

exploit intelligence and information;

separate the insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength, including addressing their grievances, real and perceived;

f. g.

neutralize the insurgent;

sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period;

and

conductlonger-term,post-insurgencyplanning.

303. EFFECT POLITICAL PRIMACY IN THE PURSUIT OF A STRATEGIG AIM

lnsurgencies are a political problem that cannot be countered solely by military means. Although an insurgency may be slow in becoming apparent, once it is identified, the host

government and its international supporters must decide upon a strategy to stop, neutralize and reverse any effects of the insurgency. This must include an effective, pro-active response to

any violence and intimidation generated by the insurgents. Apart from immediate shortterm actions, many of which will be taken with the advice of the military force commander, the

government must formulate a long-term political plan-backed by political, economic and social programmes-with the aim of addressing legitimate root grievances and legitimacy for the

insurgency. The military role will be to provide a security framework that creates conditions conducive to implementing these programmes. That is, the military security and neutralization

of the insurgent violence will provide manoeuvre space for other agencies required for enduring solutions. A COIN plan involving the police, military, locally raised militias and coalition security

forces will implement this security framework.34 ldeally, the security framework will be lead by host nation police and military forces in order to provide additional legitimacy for the

government.

Political primacy underpins COIN as it legitimizes strategic, operational and tactical actions. All actions follow the political lead and support its strategic aim. Within a COIN

campaign, the specific strategy determines which instrument of power (diplomatic, military, economic or social) is the focus of effort, and which agency may have the lead at operational

and tactical levels. This will change over time as the COIN operation and situation evolve.

Security forces include military, coalition military forces, national police, local police and locally recruited

support forces.

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Ensuring a Public Perspective in a COIN Campaign

Not only is it imperative that the military takes a supporting role to the other COIN players during the execution of the campaign, it is also necessary that the fundamental of minimum

force be followed. Aggressive offensive actions should be viewed as a necessary, but secondary, aspect to the campaign with only short-term value. The longer-term influence

aspects of the military's engagement, particularly in conjunction with other agencies, that lead to enduring solutions of the crisis must be highlighted to both indigenous and domestic

audiences. This serves two purposes. Firstly it demonstrates to the indigenous population that COIN forces are not theie to destroy their lives and property but rathlr to assisi them in

securing the basics of life and enhancini their quality of iife. This in turn garners their active support for the campaign. Secondly, it illustrates to domestic populations of contributing

nations within a coalition that their sacrifice of treasure and lives are worthwhile in that measures are being actively pursued to resolve underlying grievances and create enduring

stability. This is particularly important when the domestic populations hold an inaccurate viewpoint focusing on the use of force only. ln order for this perspective to be better

balanced, efforts must be made to advertise the use of strategic-level advisory teams and other means used to build lasting capacity within a developing nation. Such was the case

with the former Canadian commander of the Afghanistan Strategic Advisory Team engaging a wide varie$ of audiences upon his return from theatre. Such publicity, locally and

domestic, may help protect two strategic centres of gravity.

304. PROMOTE UNITY OF PURPOSE TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS

OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES_CONTROL AND COORDINATION

The COIN effort requires a comprehensive approach involving a wide range of agencies seeking to resolve the causes of the insurgency. This should be a number of agencies and

elements of power united by common objectives and end-state, thus a unity of purpose and ideally a unity of effort will be achieved. This concept of a unity of effort may be implemented

through a variety of structures that promote various levels of common command, control and/or

coordination.

Many of these agencies have different philosophies, modus operandi and methods. Unity of command across this array of national, government and non-government organizations

and agencies will be impractical. Although unity of effort is most desirable, it too may not be achievable. Unity of purpose, however, must be achieved, and all agencies must agree to work

towards a common purpose and end-state. This will require close coordination, often led or

facilitated by local military commanders.

Within a national approach (i.e., that of the threatened nation or that of a coalition contributing nation) and within a coalition, one person will ideally be granted responsibility for

the direction of the campaign and authority over all government agencies involved in the effort. This will ideally allow differences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by an impartial

director and centralized coordination in order to exploit in a complementary and mutually supporting fashion the strengths of each contributing agency. While this single individual could

be a military commander, control will likely be vested in a politician, diplomat or civil servant. ln any case, the individual will be working to strict government guidelines and overall control.

ldeally, the single commander will lead a joint command and control structure.

Single Gommand System: Unity of purpose and effort is facilitated by organizing the COIN campaign under a single commander, or committee director. While the person so

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COIN Principles

designated may be civilian or military, it is critical that responsibility for overall direction is vested in one headquarters. The commander will bring together both military and non-military elements

of power in a single command structure. Advisors will be made available from all of the relevant participating elements, such as the civil service, international organizations, police and military.

The commander will oversee a staff system established to ensure that all plans and actions are conducted towards a common goal.

The Gommittee System: Operational-level committees are formed, again, mirroring the strategic-level command. These committees will conduct joint planning in order to ensure that

the representative subordinate elements execute such plans in a manner keeping with the overarching campaign plan. The actual committee structure and representation willvary

between insurgencies and indeed will likely change as the conflict evolves. As a minimum, representatives will include the host nation political and civil authorities, host-nation military and

security authorities, political and civiltroop-contributing representatives, troop-contributing military commanders and select staff, intelligence, security-contributing representatives and

probably i nternational organizations' representatives.

Trust is a key factor in making such an organization functional. This is often difficult to establish across differing organizational cultures. For example, the military requirement for

security and expertise in applied violence is potentially the antithesis of humanitarian non- governmental organizations' (NGOs') neutral transparency and abhorrence of things military.

The committee director and all members must continually strive to maintain mutual openness and confidence. A key component of this will be clearly communicating the purpose and

reasoning behind military operations, within the bounds of operational security (OPSEC)

considerations.

Role of Personalities: Given the inter-agency aspect of COIN operations and the need for the military to work hand-in-hand with its civilian and police partners (many of whom will

have little understanding3s of military organization or command structures)the role of individual personalities becomes magnified. Any system of control and coordination must be able to adapt

to the personalities of those involved. Military commanders must select their liaison officers and committee members with care, exploiting those who can achieve progress through a balance of

charisma, persuasion and graceful force of personality. Commanders must be able to realize that they themselves may not be the most suitable individuals to conduct daily faceto-face

operations and coordination with their civilian counterparts and therefore must select the most

suitable representative. This must be balanced with the message that the commander's own personal presence will send at any given time.

Assistance to Allies and Foreign Powers: When a military provides assistance to a foreign state, the forces assigned may necessarily be subordinate to that government in order to

preserve the host nation's sovereignty and the government's credibility in the eyes of its populace. At the very least, the leadership role of the indigenous government must be

highlighted. ln such cases, assisting forces will likely be obliged to adopt the coordination

system of the host nation.

Government Planning and Military Support-Assessment and Estimate of the Situation and Military Advisors. When the government is determining which of its objectives

can best be attained with the help of the armed forces, the military commanders and advisers

Experience has shown that some government political leaders, civil administrators and staff of NGOs will not only have lack an understanding of how the military functions and operates but will have significant misconceptions and

even hold hostilities towards the military, and thus may be reluctant to cooperate.

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will be able to explain the forces' capabilities and limitations in the context of the particular crisis. An analysis of the situation should reveal the areas in which the supported government and the

insurgents are most vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are likely to be spread over the entire political, economic, social and security spectrum. The aim will be to identify those government

vulnerabilities that are best suited to military defensive action and those vulnerabilities of the insurgents that are most susceptible to offensive military action. The military will likely be able

to assist in certain areas of stability activities, such as reconstruction and governance, but the capability limitations of the military and the perceptions of military involvement in these areas

must be fully assessed and clearly articulated to political leaders. Throughout the planning of a COIN campaign, the supporting role of the military must be emphasized, and the concept that

insurgencies require enduring political solutions must be stressed.

10.

Allocation of Priorities. The coordinated national plan that emerges from the above

estimate should address the political, economic, social and security spectrum and seek enduring solutions to the insurgency causes. Determining the type of insurgency faced will

highlight two priorities: identification of physical and moral centres of gravity for the insurgents, and identification of the government actions that will achieve meaningful results. Some of these

results, or at least the actions leading to them, should be achieved quickly so as to demonstrate resolution. Others, such as re-building of an economic infrastructure, will take a long time to

achieve, but it will often be these actions that lead to enduring success. The national priorities need to be addressed at this stage of the planning process. Once the overarching priorities are

identified, other allocations of tasks and resources will be identified, to include:

Roles and responsibilities between government departments and military offices in order to avoid duplication of effort, gaps and potential conflict.

Priority of action between the social, economic, military and civil administration

fields.

Priorities within each field of activity (social, economic, military and civil administration). Just as the military will apportion efforts across the operational

functions (command, sense, act, shield, sustain), so too must the civil, police and other authorities set priorities across their own organizations and capabilities.

11.

Campaign Design and Operational Planning. Once the strategic priorities and objectives have been identified, campaign design and operational planning may begin. The

military will work in conjunction with the host nation and the other elements of power and agencies involved. Operational objectives will be identified and grouped along thematic lines of

operation leading to the operational end-state. lt will be vital that the military conducts the campaign design in cooperation with the other elements of power involved in order the truly

realize a unity of purpose and effort across all agencies.

305. UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF THE INSURGENCY, INCLUDING

THE WIDER ENVIRONMENT

The various inter-related dynamics of an insurgency will present profound intellectual challenges for commanders and staff. ln order to understand the context of the insurgency, its

causes and motivations, a broad knowledge base must be created in order to understand it and the environment in which it has grown. This will require an assessment of all the various

elements within the environment: political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), informational and infrastructure. lt will also demand an understanding of the various,

often competing, power structures present in the society and insurgency itself.

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Given the large number of variables at work, it may very well be impossible to predict the secondary and tertiary effects of specific actions. Still, effort must be expended to understand

these variables and dynamics at hand and how best to tackle them.

The dynamics of an insurgency may include:

a. b.

cause-what makes the insurgency attractive to the uncommitted;

central idea (the narrative) of the insurgency-this may be an ideology or religious ideal that also identifies a strategic end-state;

c. d.

aims of the insurgency-long term, short term, advertised and hidden;

organization and capabilities-leaders, cadre, combatants, support base and politicalwings;

e. f.

external support-moral, physical and conceptual;

methodology-strategies and tactics; and

the wider environment-political, economic, sociological and technical.

For every dynamic within an insurgency, the lines of operation within the campaign plan

must anticipate and counter the evolving dynamics of the insurgency.

306. EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION_THE OVERARCHING

IMPORTANGE OF INTELLIGENCE

lntelligence is the key enabler that will allow the insurgency, its causes, its motivations, its power structures and its weaknesses and vulnerabilities on both the physical and

psychological planes to be understood. lt will thus support the creation of an effective and legitimate campaign plan. Such intelligence will demand a multi-faceted assessment and

analysis capability that will examine the entire environment and its influences, well beyond the

mere military capabilities of the insurgents.

Combating an insurgency requires a sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT)

network that includes not only local sources of intelligence but also a detailed collection plan that incorporates all sources, from the soldiers who patrol daily to the agents of influence within

a society. A sophisticated, well-guided network is essential to develop a complete picture of the

strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency.

lnformation and intelligence must be exploited in a systematic and thorough manner. All individuals concerned-civilians, commanders and soldiers of all ranks-must understand the

overriding importance of intelligence in actively defeating an insurgency and in gaining the support of the populace. lntelligence will support direct military action against insurgents, guide

influence activities and psychological effects to attack the root causes of the insurgency, create enduring solutions of standing grievances and allow for success to be measured. All-source

intelligence is the key enabler required to defeat an insurgency.

Operational-Level Application-Local Knowledge. Knowledge of the country-its

ethnic composition, culture, religions and schisms, the political scene and party leaders, the clandestine political organizations and their undercover armed groups, the influence of

neighbouring states and the economy-will provide the essential backdrop to understanding the insurgency. However, such a knowledge base takes time to build. lt is essential to do so

because the development of actionable intelligence relies on an ability to discern patterns of change in behaviour. The host nation police and its intelligence service should be the prime

agencies for providing background intelligence at the start of a mission so that a baseline of

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local conditions can be established. Creation of a baseline understanding and its growth into a broad knowledge base allows developing trends and changes in specific areas to be identified

and encouraged, if positive, or halted if negative. ln all cases, the best source of intelligence comes from members of an insurgent group who have been detained or convinced to switch

loyalties.

All operations must be intelligence driven. This produces two benefits: first, it mlntmtzes disruption to the general population by focusing on specific targets, allows refined risk

assessment and avoids collateral damages; and second, it creates a snowball effect, as each targeted operation inevitably produces more intelligence.

Since the summer of 2003 US forces in lraq had been searching for and trying to eliminate Abu Musab alZarqawi, the head of 'al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.' Al-Zarqawi

was personally responsible for innumerable suicide and roadside bombings, and

assassinations.

ln February of 2006 US forces had gleaned intelligence from a captured insurgent detailing a number of safehouses and residences in the lraqi town of Yusufiya. This

intelligence was used to launch a number of raids in mid-April that captured more insurgents and uncovered more intelligence. These operations had two effects: it

uncovered a videotape of al Zarqawi fumbling with a Cg (M249) light machine gun, which was broadcast worldwide by the US in a counter-propaganda effort aimed at

demonstrating the incompetence of al Zarqawi and his immediate associates. The second effect was more important. After weeks of interrogation by specially-trained

intelligence personnel, the captured insurgents revealed enough information to create a detailed mapping o'f al-Zarqawi's organization's mid-level leadership. This

breakthrough allowed a number of targeted raids on 19, 14, and 17 May by SOF that killed a number of insurgents and produced more physical intelligence.

Finally, at the beginning of June 2006 interrogators were able to produce intelligence detailing the security precautions taken by Sheikh al-Rahman, a close advisor to al-

Zarqawi. Combined with electronic intelligence, this enabled US forces to identify the location of a meeting between al-Rahman and al-Zarqawi, Using this intelligence, al-

Zarqawi was targeted and killed by aircraft-launched PGMs on 7 June 2006.

The deliberate, patient exploitation of intelligence guided and shaped an effective series of operations that produced tangible results, resulting in a weakened and less

operationally effective adversary.

Source: Mark Bowden, "The Ploy," The Attantic Monthty,Volume 299, No.4, May 2007,

Washington DC: The Atlantic Monthly, pp.54-68.

Tactical-Level Application. Without accurate intelligence, the security forces are reduced to conducting blind and ineffective operations, which often provoke a negative reaction

amongst the population. The ensuing negative media reporting can undermine domestic and

international support for the mission and benefit the insurgency. Furthermore, troops conducting routine framework patrolling tend to loose their focus and motivation, with the result

often being the conduct of patrolling for the sake of patrolling itself. Tactical intelligence requirements should be pushed down to the lowest levels, and all sources, specialist and

routine framework patrols alike, should be given specific informational requirements to gather. Furthermore, specialists wherever possible, should be pushed down to the lower (sub-unit)

tactical levels so that they may remain responsive to their intelligence requirements while

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COIN Principles

fulfilling those of the units and formations. Every soldier is a source of information collection and must come to understand the human and geographic terrain, including the operational

methodology of the enemy. Standing information requirements should be pushed down to the lowest levels in order to focus routine operations such as security patrols and to allow the

requirements to be applied pervasively. ln the end, each successful operation becomes an intelligence windfall and parlays into a stronger intelligence picture.

The tactical-level application of information and intelligence will allow large named areas of interest (NAls) to be reduced to point NAls and eventually to target areas of interest (TAls) for

subsequent precision strikes. For example, HUMINT reports may indicate a gang and their suspected weapons cache are located in a neighbourhood containing 20,000 occupants.

Patrols and other sources, through specific tasks and stated information requirements, may reduce this area NAI to a specific city block or house. This will eventually become a TAI that

can be passed to operations staff and commanders for subsequent action-in this case, a

cordon and search activity.

The same can be said regarding information exploitation for psychological effects, For example, HUMINT reports or interrogations may indicate that an insurgency is recruiting

members from a particular suburban region. Further examination and collection regarding this area may reveal that it is an ethnic enclave with high unemployment. Hence, this area may

become a TAI for the application of civil-military cooperation (ClMlC) and other influence activity capabilities in order to stimulate development of this enclave. Follow-up patrols can, in time,

gauge the public reaction to such measures. ln short, intelligence drives and focuses tactical operations, limits collateral damage and assists in measuring success.

The lntelligence Organization. lt should be expected that intelligence organizations in COIN campaigns will have to grow considerably compared to those in conventional operations,

which focus merely on a conventional enemy. ldeally, the intelligence organization should start expanding in lock step with the insurgents' developing threat, lnevitably, however, there is an

interval before the expanded organization becomes effective. Such expansion should reflect the need to understand the various elements of the environment that influence the campaign's

outcome, such as cultural and economic aspects.

307. SEPARATE THE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR PHYSICAL AND MORAL SOURCES

OF STRENGTH

Two Facets of lsolation. One of the primary operational objectives of the COIN

campaign is the physical and moral isolation of the insurgents from the sources of physical resources and the population. Without the support, both physical and moral, of the population,

an insurgency will likely be unable to survive. Additionally, it is important to work to eliminate the sources of funding and material support that sustain insurgent operations that come from

both internal and external sources. All agencies involved in the COIN operation must understand this and work within their own fields to this end. Both elements must be addressed:

Physical Separation. lnsurgents must be separated from their physical support, which includes recruits, finances and material resources that may be originating

from within the host nation or from external sources.

Moral Separation. lnsurgents must be undermined intellectually and morally and any justification for their moral support by a population removed. A narrative

willform the foundation of insurgent propaganda and guide their actions. This narrative will highlight real or perceived grievances and provide a vision and

strategic end-state as an alternative to the existing government or society. The

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narrative will also provide moral justification for the insurgency and attempt to capture the moral high ground from the government. Thus, undermining the

insurgency's narrative is critical to influencing the population to support the government. To this end, a legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be

offered by the COIN campaign. The insurgency must be deprived of any claim to

moral superiority.

PHYSICAL SEPARATION

308.

Establish a Firm Base. The first requirement may be to secure the base areas essential to the survival and functioning of the government and state. These normally include

the capital, key points of entry, vital installations such as public infrastructure and reinforcing those areas that are loyal to the government. The provision of security in these vital areas

encourages their inhabitants to rally behind the government.

Expand Secure Areas. Once established, security forces expand outward from the secure areas in a campaign akin to the spreading of an oil slick. As each area is consolidated,

loyal local forces could be raised to secure the area to release mobile regular troops to secure the next area while the host state's civil administration and police re-establish themselves in the

recently liberated territory and gain, through social development, the support of the populace. This is a proven approach to combating an insurgency.

The fache d'huile, or "oil spot," technique of counter-insurgency was first formalized by French General Hubert Lyautey in the first decade of the 20th century. The premise of the

technique is the provision of a security umbrella or framework at the local level concomitant to furnishing social services such as schools, health care and government administration.

Lyautey's aim was to physically and psychologically separate the insurgent from the population and to slowly expand government control by using "the army not as an instrument

of repression but as a positive social force." Support for the government would come with tangible improvements in the local populace's well-being. Versions of this technique have

been applied by, among others, the French in Morocco and Algeria, the US Marines in Vietnam and the US Army on southern Luzon during the 1899-1902 Philippine War (even

though the term tache d'huile had yet to be coined).

Source: Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The guerrilla in history (New York: Morrow, 1994), pp. 150-157.

Integration of Security Forces. The most effective way of expanding a COIN campaign's affect and achieving physical separation of the insurgents is by having security

forces living amongst the population. History has proven that isolating security forces in fortified strongholds is ineffective, allows insurgent infiltration and serves to separate the counter-

insurgents from the population, all of which is the reverse effect of that actually being sought.

Forthis "oilspot"

interact intimately with the population and its established authority and government. Not only does this create strong personal bonds between the people and the military, it enhances the

intelligence network and creates a hostile environment for the insurgents. This method is not without risk. lndeed, risks may have to be taken in force protection in terms the relative

exposure of the soldiers is increased. This will also involve a political risk in terms of the potential for higher casualties. Such risks must be carefully explained to soldiers and domestic

populations alike. ln order to mitigate such risks, a certain level of security is necessary before such a tactic can be employed. ln the final analysis, it is imperative for a successful campaign

"ink

spot" method to work as intended, the security forces must live and

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COIN Principles

that the security forces build confidence in the population, and it is unlikely that this can be achieved from behind fortified walls.

Eliminate the Insurgent Subversive and Support System. The security forces' operations must focus on eliminating the insurgents' subversive and support organizations.

This is an essential prerequisite to defeating any active insurgent group for the following

reasons:

The subversive organization controls the population, denies the government popular support, spreads propaganda unchecked and prevents witnesses from

provid ing information.

Without such action, the insurgents continue to receive supplies, recruits and information regarding the security forces and can continue to disrupt

development and stability even if the majority of their moral support has been

eliminated.

Once the subversive organization is destroyed or dislocated, the insurgents are

forced to operate more openly and thus expose themselves to deliberate military

actions and arrest.

Subversive elements arrested are the best sources of information on the

insurgent organization. These elements must be carefully handled, according to

legal constraints, by specialist staff skilled in extracting detailed intelligence.

Methods of Physical Separation. A thoughtful combination of methods by all agencies involved is needed to separate the insurgents from their subversive and suppoding constructs:

lntelligence should aim at the identification of support cells, quarter-master functionaries, subversive cells and propagandists. This information should come

in good part from civilian police sources, but where police forces lack a physical presence in a remote geographical area, the void may be filled with elements of

Special Forces assigned specific information requirements.

The provision of security for the populace, the overt supporters and informers. This is best done proactively through the use of anonymous tip telephone lines,

specialist handling of sources and low-level security measures (such as face masks) to hide the identity of informers working with security forces.

c. d.

The gradual spread of government and security force control over areas.

Curfews and searches of individuals thought to be supporting insurgents,

Patrols, ambushes and vehicle checkpoints (the latter best done at low levels for short intervals on likely routes).

f. g.

lnterdiction operations against the entry of external supplies.

Closing national borders or imposing control measures over them.

lnternational diplomacy to staunch the flow of external fiscal, human and material support for the insurgency. This may require government legal action in a

number of nations, particularly those contributing troops to an insurgency. Certainly, evidence collected in a theatre of operations indicating the sources of

external funding and resources should be advertised widely to support government action that will staunch this support.

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309. INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL SEPARATION

General. Undermining the narrative of the insurgents and removing grievances,

justification

and causes of the insurgency is criticalto enduring end-states. lndeed, such action will be decisive in the campaign.

Addressing this facet primarily involves dealing with the real and perceived grievances that help to intellectually draw supporters and recruits to outwardly or

tacitly support the insurgents. Just as insurgent propaganda involves both words and deeds, providing an alternative to the insurgent narrative requires both words

and actions. Therefore, not only does the campaign plan and its intent need to be broadcast, it must be constantly reinforced, updated and supported by real

action that creates a sense of normalcy and improves the day{o-day lives of the

populace.

A legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be offered to members of the insurgency, their supporters and the uncommitted in the population. Hand-in-

hand with this is the fact that the conditions that permit the spread of the insurgency, and its justification in the eyes of many, must be addressed and

resolved with long-term solutions that are well publicized through information

operations.

Broadly speaking, this will often involve the reform of government and government institutions and policies, and alternatives to the idealized vision of

society that insurgent propaganda will advertise. The insurgency must be deprived of any claim to moral superiority.

ln general, the concept of separating the insurgent in a moral or intellectual sense has been termed "winning the hearts and minds." More accurately, this

should be considered winning the minds and hearts of the population. Specifically, planned influence activities must be conducted to affect the

understanding and perceptions (i.e., the mind) of the target audiences in order to affect their will (heart) and ultimately their behaviour in a desired manner.

Reforming the Host Nation Government and lnstitutions. ln many cases, the government under attack from an insurgency requires some type of reform in order to solidify its

legitimacy, win and maintain the support of its own populace and gain international support.

This may include the reform of unjust policies such as inequitable distribution of land. Government actions within a moral context-such as observance of the

law, discrete use of force, the provision of public services, and equitable distribution of benefits realized through social and economic development-will

help to produce a favourable climate domestically and internationally. ln other words, the government must learn to envision and provide an equitable social

contract with its populace.

lnternationally, it is critical that the host nation government make real and sustained efforts at any needed reforms for responsible and representative

government. The publics of supporting nations in a coalition will likely demand a high standard of human rights, rule of law and good governance. Maintaining

this support is dependent partly on the efforts of the host nation to reform weak

institutions and develop internationally recognized legitimacy.

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Domestic and lnternational Diplomacy. Diplomacy must play a central role in the intellectual and moral separation of the insurgents from the population. This involves both

diplomacy within the affected state and internationally.

Domestically, it is important that the host nation government negotiate with disaffected groups to develop a sense of inclusion and ownership of the political

process. Broadening the base of stakeholders in a political process is critical to increasing participation in the legitimate process. With regards to insurgents,

undoubtedly there will be die-hards that refuse to support anything but absolute achievement of the stated goals. For these, the only options are capture, death

or to be made so irrelevant that they wield no influence or threat. However, the vast majority of most insurgent groups are normally composed of less highly

motivated people who simply want to achieve a better life. Domestic diplomacy is critical in trying to bring this group to the government side and, although their

trust will be difficult to gain, it is imperative that efforts to do so are made. lt is highly unlikely that a permanent solution can be achieved otherwise.

lnternationally, diplomatic efforts aimed at cutting moral support from countries that share ideological, cultural or religious links to an insurgency can play an

important part in countering the narrative underpinning insurgent propaganda. This may simply involve greater support to a state that demonstrates the

compatibility of religion and democracy or a successful example of settling long- standing grievances with government reforms. ln other cases, this may involve

encouraging governments to enforce legal constraints on religious leaders advocating violence or the support of extremist propaganda.

Holding the Moral High Ground. lnsurgent narrative and propaganda will provide a moral justification for the existence of the insurgency and for any violent acts committed. The

struggle to intellectually and morally separate the insurgents from the populace hinges on the government being seen as morally superior to the insurgents and the alternative society being

offered by the insurgency. This involves establishing and ascribing to the rule of law. Host

nation governments and institutions may require detailed assistance in achieving this concept in both practice and in the eyes of their populace. To this end, commanders and even their

soldiers must understand the need to help ensure the supported government remains legitimate and acts accordingly. Where possible, they must assist in the raising of standards of conduct,

from the local level upwards. Violations must be reported to the military and civil chains-of- command and addressed accordingly. Coalition forces involved in the campaign must, as part

of the solution, set the example for the host nation government were necessary. ln short, the insurgency must be deprived of any claim to moral superiority.

Apply Power Discriminately to lnfluence Human Will. Force must be applied

discriminately throughout a COIN campaign to avoid alienating the population through civilian casualties or unnecessary damage to property. At times, short-term tactical success may have

to be forsaken in order to meet the longterm operational objectives of the campaign and

maintain the support of the populace.

Minimum use of force should guide the actions of the security forces. This maxim must be reinforced at all stages of the campaign and at all levels of

command.

Furthermore, the exercise of power by any of the agencies involved in a campaign must be conducted with legitimacy, within the rule of law and without

prejudice to any one group within the affected population.

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Additionally, disruption to normal civic life must be limited to the greatest extent possible. This principle must be applied at the operational and tactical levels.

For example, the imposition of curfews should be as limited in time and scope as possible in order to avoid disruption to the lives of the majority of the populace,

who are always at risk of becoming fatigued by security measures. Likewise, the conduct of a cordon and search in private homes may require forced entry into

locked rooms. lf the owners cannot locate keys, even when breaching tools are produced, then the door should, whenever possible, be removed from its hinges.

lf nothing is found (as will often be the case), the door can then be replaced without damage. This in turns limits embarrassment for the security forces, and

the extra effort taken to avoid damages to private property is, to a ceftain extent, appreciated by the populace. lt in turn helps gain and maintain their support and

counter the propaganda undoubtedly spread by the insurgents regarding the

security forces and their methods.

310. NEUTRALIZETHEINSURGENT

The security forces of the government or coalition will have a significant role in the selective destruction, disruption and dislodgment of insurgents. Confidence, trust and freedom

of action, without the need to refer routine and anticipated operations that will exploit often

fleeting opportunities back to a higher level(s) of command, must be afforded tactical

commanders (particularly down to sub-unit level) if they are to be successful in striking the insurgent and dislocating him from his power base.

lt will be highly unlikely, if not impossible, to destroy the entire insurgent movement. Part of the neutralization of the insurgent will be to neutralize his presence in affected areas. A

critical aspect of successful military COIN is command initiative and action at the lowest tactical level that involves the junior commander (platoon and section level) leading small patrols36 into

the insurgents' area of operations. The aim should be to defeat the insurgent on "home ground" using adequate force, but no more than is absolutely necessary. Proportionality must be the

measure applied when employing force.

All military tactical actions must be conducted in harmony with the other actions taken to

neutralize and defeat the insurgency: amelioration of the causes, reformation of the government and development of local security forces (if necessary), information operations (to explain the

military actions) and social development. Without this multi-pronged approach, killing

insurgents simply becomes a form of attrition warfare and may encourage more converts to the insurgency. lndeed, this point may be exacerbated by socio-cultural codes of conduct that

demand retribution for the death of a relative regardless of cause or justification.

311. SUSTAIN COMMITMENT TO EXPEND POLITICAL CAPITAL AND RESOURCES

OVER A LONG PERIOD

lnsurgency and counter-insurgency, like all forms of warfare, are protracted contests of will. lnsurgents understand that they do not have to win a decisive battle but have to make the

campaign too expensive and demanding (in terms of time, resources, financial and political capital) for the government, the populace and/or the government's external supporters, some of

whom may be supplying troops to stabilize and support the state. Not only must the

The required size of the patrol will depend upon a number of factors considered in the estimate and planning process, including threat, insurgent tactics, distance to be covered and tasks of the patrol.

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COIN Principles

commitment of the local populace be sustained, but the populations of any supporting nations must be convinced to remain committed to the COIN. These are strategic centres of gravity

within the campaign.

A sustained commitment to the COIN is underpinned by unity of purpose across a wide

range of disparate elements and organizations involved in the campaign, that is, through the comprehensive approach to the campaign. lnformation operations will have to work towards

this aim. Furthermore, realistic measures of success will have to be decided and promulgated so that complementary lines of operation and successive operational objectives may be fully

identified, broadened and exploited.

312. CONDUCT LONGER.TERM POST.INSURGENCY PLANNING

The requirement for post-insurgency security and development probably holds the key to effectively applying all of the other principles. Merely providing for the military defeat of

insurgents does not in any way end the government requirement to make suitable, longer-term plans to address the perceived and real grievances that enabled the rise of an insurgency in the

first instance.

The plans and requirements to address these grievances must be communicated to the populace of the host nation, the international public and the populaces of nations contributing

resources and manpower to the campaign. This will allow the COIN campaign to develop the

longterm legitimacy required to sustain what will undoubtedly be a lengthy and complex effort.

The announcement of bold government initiatives to be started after the insurgency has been defeated, or at least significantly neutralized, can have a real and significant effect on

winning the moral support of the population. Such initiatives should be designed at the same time as the comprehensive strategic plans are being prepared to defeat the insurgency. The

timing of any statement about longer term plans could be of crucial importance and should be

handled in a sensitive and controlled manner by the state authorities in concert with the overall

information operations plan. lt is critical that the announcement of government reform initiatives coincide with actual deeds. Failure to coordinate the words and actions of a strategy will

increase disenchantment with the government, both domestically and internationally.

ln the British Dhofar campaign (1970-1975), the end of insurgent activity occurred in December 1975, but the authorities had to work relentlessly for several more years to

achieve continued support from the population before the causes of the insurgency had been

fully rectified. As with subduing a fire, the flames have to be out and the embers cold before

it can be considered fully extinguished.

SECTION 3

FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF COIN

313. POPULARSUPPORT

lnsurgent Aims. An insurgency aims to discredit the government, its legitimacy and its policies. lt will have spent much time preparing the ground for insurgency with propaganda,

using real and contrived discontents. When it considers that the government and/or its supporting authorities (e.9., support from an external nation) have been sufficiently undermined

and that a significant part of the population has been alienated from authority, the insurgency will use coercion and terror to reinforce its propaganda campaign.

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A Competition for Loyalty: Minds and Hearts. A government must convince its

population that it can offer a better solution, better government and a better life than the opposing insurgents in order to influence the minds and win the hearts of the population. This

will be a focal point for the information operations campaign. Just as an insurgency needs the sympathy or the acquiescence of a sizeable percentage of the population to survive and to

overthrow the government, so the government needs the people's support to appear legitimate

in its eyes and to obtain information leading to the arrest or capture of the terrorists. Violence, or the threat of it, is aimed at the citizen's fears for his family and freedom to earn a wage to

feed them. Whoever can guarantee citizens security can often command their allegiance. An insurgency is a competition between government and insurgent for the individual's loyalty.

Unless the government can offer reasonable protection, individuals are unlikely to risk their own or their families' lives by volunteering information, and the security forces will meet passive

resistance from the populace as a whole in addition to the active resistance of the insurgents.

Government Protection. Protection of the civilian population will require restrictions

and measures (searches, checkpoints, curfews, etc.) that will disrupt normal lives and frustrate the local populations. Their frustration will increase with time. lnsurgents will seek to

misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harsh and oppressive. Consequently, the government and its security forces must anticipate a possible hostile public reaction to such

security measures and prepare arguments to rebut insurgent propaganda in order to keep the initiative in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.

lnvolving the Local Population In the Gampaign. Even in situations in which the local authorities and host nation police forces require significant reform, much effort should be made

to include them, within the dictates of force protection and OPSEC, in the campaign. lncluding them will build their confidence, encourage higher standards and raise their profile in the eyes of

the local communities, Likewise, local populations should be made to feel that they have a vital

part to play in countering the insurgency and leading to its conclusion.

building measures may even extend to having remote communities raise their own local defence forces. The trust the community initially places in its protectors is repaid by the trust

the government shows in them by allowing them to bear arms in a common cause.

Such confidence-

Countering Insurgent Propaganda. lnsurgent propaganda must be monitored and addressed by a deliberate and multi-faceted information operations campaign, that is, through

the use of influence activities. However, as much authority as possible must be pushed down to the tactical levels in order that information operations at that level are able to be executed in a

timely and effective manner. Broad themes developed at the strategic and operational levels must be tailored to the specifics of a local target audience at the tactical level in order to

address the specific issues at the local level. Canadian and coalition soldiers must be aware of the key role that they play in countering insurgent propaganda, which, at the very least, will paint

them as foreign, oppressive occupiers, Their friendly (but professional) disposition, tone and decorum while patrolling amongst the local population, their ability to relate to the populace, and

the discriminate use of force will quickly undermine that propaganda,

314. AVOIDANCE OF MORAL RELATIVISM

Moral relativism is the doctrine that morality exists in relation to culture, society or historical context and that there is no absolute right and wrong. Moral relativism assumes that

morals are not universaland therefore confuses culture and morality. When working in another society, there is a natural tendency to practise moral relativism and thus accept immoral

practices by members of an indigenous population and attribute them to immutable local

customs and cultural values.

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