Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations

Unconventional warfare (abbreviated UW) is the opposite of conventional warfare. Where conventional warfare is used to reduce the opponent's military capability, unconventional warfare is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, orclandestine support for one side of an existing conflict.

On the surface, UW contrasts with conventional warfare in that forces or objectives are covert or not well-defined, tactics and weapons intensify environments of subversion or intimidation, and the general or long-term goals are coercive or subversive to a political body.

FM 3-05.201

Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations

APRIL 2003

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 March 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

FM 3-05.201 Field Manual HEADQUARTERS No. 3-05.201 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington, DC, 30 April 2003

Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations

Contents

Page

PREFACE ..................................................................................................................iv Chapter 1 OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................1-1 Unconventional Warfare Aspects............................................................................1-1 Resistance and Insurgency ..................................................................................... 1-3 Dynamics of Insurgencies ....................................................................................... 1-4 United States Sponsorship....................................................................................1-11 Information Operations in UW ...............................................................................1-18 Psychological Operations in UW...........................................................................1-19 Civil-Military Operations in UW..............................................................................1-20 Special Operations Imperatives ............................................................................1-21

Chapter 2 PREMISSION ACTIVITIES.....................................................................................2-1 Mission Analysis ...................................................................................................... 2-1 Procedures .............................................................................................................. 2-2 Products .................................................................................................................. 2-5 Staff Activities ..........................................................................................................2-7 Subordinate Operational Elements .........................................................................2-9 Mission Planning ...................................................................................................2-12 Deliberate Planning Process ................................................................................. 2-12 Feasibility Assessment Process............................................................................2-14

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FM 3-05.201

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Postfeasibility Assessment Activities .................................................................... 2-16 Mission Preparation .............................................................................................. 2-22 Premission Training .............................................................................................. 2-23 Intelligence ............................................................................................................ 2-23 Personnel .............................................................................................................. 2-24 Logistics and Communications ............................................................................. 2-24 Preemployment Preparation ................................................................................. 2-25 Time-Sensitive (Crisis-Action) Planning Process ................................................. 2-25 Emerging Missions................................................................................................ 2-25 Detailed Mission Preparations .............................................................................. 2-26

Chapter 3 EMPLOYMENT....................................................................................................... 3-1 Infiltration................................................................................................................. 3-1 Area Assessment.................................................................................................... 3-1 Development of the JSOA ...................................................................................... 3-3 Guerrilla Bases ..................................................................................................... 3-10 Development of the Resistance Organization ...................................................... 3-15 Elements of the Resistance .................................................................................. 3-18 Training the Resistance Organization................................................................... 3-34 Training the Guerrilla Force .................................................................................. 3-35 Training Staff and Auxiliary or Underground Personnel ....................................... 3-38 Combat Employment ............................................................................................ 3-43 Defensive Operations ........................................................................................... 3-48 Offensive Operations ............................................................................................ 3-48 Raids ..................................................................................................................... 3-49 Battalion (Large) Raids ......................................................................................... 3-56 Ambushes ............................................................................................................. 3-58 Categories of Ambushes....................................................................................... 3-60 Support and Sustainment ..................................................................................... 3-88 Indicators of Counterguerrilla Operations............................................................. 3-89

Chapter 4 POSTMISSION ACTIVITIES.................................................................................. 4-1 Transition ................................................................................................................ 4-1 Demobilization......................................................................................................... 4-2 Dangers of Demobilization...................................................................................... 4-5

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Appendix A UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT......................A-1 Appendix B COMMUNICATIONS...............................................................................................B-1 Appendix C MEDICAL ASPECTS............................................................................................. C-1 Appendix D LEGAL PRINCIPLES............................................................................................. D-1 Appendix E LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS ...........................................................................E-1 Appendix F INFILTRATION........................................................................................................F-1 Appendix G SPECIAL FORCES AREA ASSESSMENT........................................................... G-1 Appendix H AREA STUDY OUTLINE FORMAT....................................................................... H-1 Appendix I ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ........................................................................I-1 Appendix J EXAMPLE OF TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

FOR RESISTANCE FORCES................................................................................. J-1 Appendix K SPECIAL FORCES CACHING...............................................................................K-1 Appendix L LINKUP OPERATIONS ..........................................................................................L-1 Appendix M DEMOBILIZATION OF GUERRILLA FORCES....................................................M-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................Glossary-1 BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................Bibliography-1 INDEX............................................................................................................... Index-1

iii

Preface

Field manual (FM) 3-05.201 provides the doctrinal basis for the conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) missions across the operational continuum. It continues the doctrinal education process that begins with Joint Publications (JPs) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and P r

ocedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations; 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning P r

ocedures; and FMs 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, and 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. This manual informs and guides Special Forces (SF) commanders, staffs, and operational personnel primarily at battalion and lower echelons (Special Forces operational detachments [SFODs] A, B, and C) in their planning for and conduct of UW.

This manual provides historical examples to highlight key points throughout the text. It offers tactics, techniques, procedures, and references to support future SF operations. It also provides general UW guidance, mission procedures, and information ordered chronologically from receipt of the unit mission letter through postmission activities.

Users of this manual should adapt its content to meet their situation and mission requirements. The SFODs use the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis system.

Examples of specific UW techniques and procedures are provided in the appendixes. The appendixes let the users of this manual review the basics of UW mission performance from beginning to end. For users interested only in the details of specific techniques, the appendixes provide reference material keyed to the generic activities in the text.

Commanders and trainers should use this information and other related manuals to plan and conduct rehearsals of mission-specific training. They should also use command guidance and the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The key to assuring success is planning UW-related training before being employed with a specific UW mission.

The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-SFD, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Chapter 1

Overview

FM 3-05.20 defines UW as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare (GW), sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR).

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ASPECTS

1-1. UW also includes interrelated aspects that may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous or surrogate personnel. An external source usually supports and directs these personnel in varying degrees during all conditions of war or peace. The intent of United States (U.S.) UW operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives.

1-2. Regardless of whether UW objectives are strategic or operational, the nature of resistance and the fundamental tactics and techniques of UW operations remain unchanged. UW includes the following interrelated activities.

1-3. Guerrilla warfare consists of military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces against superior forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency.

1-4. Sabotage is an act or acts with intent to injure or obstruct the national defense of a nation by willfully damaging or destroying any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, including human and natural resources. It may also refer to actions taken to injure or obstruct the military capability of an occupying power. Sabotage may be the most effective or the only means of attacking specific targets beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum of manpower and material resources. SF conducts sabotage unilaterally through indigenous or surrogate personnel. Sabotage is also a form of effects-based targeting performed by SF personnel. FM 3-05.220, (S) Special Forces Advanced Special Operations (U), Volumes I and II, provides detailed information on sabotage.

1-5. Subversion is any action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. All elements of the resistance organization contribute to the subversive effort, but the clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground will do the

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bulk of the activity. Subversion is a form of effects-based targeting on human terrain.

1-6. Effective SF targeting demands accurate, timely, and well-organized intelligence. SF personnel must develop good intelligence skills for overt collection, tactical reconnaissance, and the assembly of available intelligence for mission planning packets. Sound target analysis uses the criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability (CARVER) matrix; provides options to planners; satisfies statements of operational requirements (SOR); meets the commander’s objectives; and reduces the risk to operators. FM 100-25 provides more detailed information on targeting.

1-7. Intelligence activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and enemy forces. SF must perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations, sustaining and protecting themselves and the UW force, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces. These activities may be unilateral or conducted through surrogates. SF intelligence activities may require coordination with other government agencies (OGAs) and may involve national-level oversight.

1-8. Unconventional assisted recovery is a subset of nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR) and is conducted by special operations forces (SOF) (Department of Defense [DOD] Directive 2310.2). UW forces conduct UAR operations to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control. UAR includes operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms (UARMs) and unconventional assisted recovery teams (UARTs). The UARM refers to an entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held territory that operate in a clandestine or covert manner to return designated personnel to friendly control and most often consists of established indigenous or surrogate infrastructures. UARTs consist primarily of SOF personnel directed to service existing designated areas of recovery (DARs) or selected areas for evasion (SAFEs) to recover evaders.

1-9. UW has taken on new significance for several reasons. Historically, SF units have focused on UW as a part of general war. Now, the U.S. policy of supporting selected resistance movements requires SF to focus on UW during conflicts short of war. Also, global urbanization provides for a shift in emphasis from rural guerrilla warfare to all aspects of clandestine resistance including urban and border operations. Training and support for these operations may come from the joint special operations area (JSOA) or from an external training or support site. Some scenarios may dictate a traditional role reversal—the urban guerrilla may conduct most of the operations while supported by the rural guerrilla.

1-10. UW is the most challenging of SF missions because it involves protracted operations with joint forces, allied forces, indigenous or surrogate forces, U.S. agencies, or elements of all of these entities. UW involves detailed, centralized planning and coordination from the SFODA through the Secretary of Defense, and ultimately, decentralized execution. UW requires

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proficiency in other SF principal missions (foreign internal defense [FID], direct action [DA], and special reconnaissance [SR]) since, once deployed, the UW mission may include portions of those missions. Before the conduct of SF UW operations, a resistance potential should exist. SF personnel do not create this resistance potential. It is already present and has usually developed into a resistance movement or an organized effort by some portion of the civil population to resist the regime.

1-11. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. When a conventional force is committed and its area of interest nears the JSOA, resistance operations may expand to help the tactical commander. In addition, there are times (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) when the introduction of conventional forces does not take the main effort away from unconventional operations; in fact, the conventional forces may support the unconventional forces. UW operations can—

• Delay and disrupt hostile military operations.

• Interdict lines of communication.

• Deny the hostile power unrestricted use of key areas.

• Divert the hostile power’s attention and resources from the main battle area.

• Interdict hostile warfighting capabilities.

RESISTANCE AND INSURGENCY

1-12. A government’s inability or unwillingness to meet the legitimate needs of its people may cause widespread frustration and dissatisfaction. People may lose their faith and confidence because the government lacks legitimacy. They may also simply recognize that the government is incapable of effectively providing internal security and development.

1-13. Resistance may be either nonviolent or violent. Nonviolent resistance involves acts such as ostracism, tax evasion, boycotts, strikes, or other types of civil disobedience. Violent resistance includes sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. People usually resist nonviolently at first. However, they may willingly take up violent resistance if a subversive cadre provides them with a cause they perceive to be both worthy and achievable. If the sociopolitical conditions are oppressive enough, resistance may develop into an organized resistance movement.

1-14. A resistance movement is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to oppose or overthrow the established government or cause withdrawal of an occupying power. The center of gravity in any resistance movement is the people’s will to resist. The people bear the brunt of the established authority’s retaliatory measures. Although armed resistance may be stability operations and support operations from the U.S. perspective, it is total war for those who take up arms.

1-15. An insurgency is an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the

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central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its operational environment, and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. They may also seek to—

• Overthrow an established government without a follow-on social revolution.

• Establish an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state.

• Cause the withdrawal of an occupying power.

• Extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means.

1-16. The structure of a revolutionary movement can be compared to a pyramidal iceberg, the bulk of which lies submerged with only its peak visible. In building a resistance structure, insurgent leaders give principal attention to the development of a support infrastructure—a task done by specially trained personnel. The resistance cadre organizes the support infrastructure, which in turn supports the guerrillas. This infrastructure works among the citizens in rural villages, towns, and urban cities; within the military, police, and administrative apparatus of government; and among labor groups and students.

DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCIES

1-17. Insurgencies arise when the government is unable or unwilling to address the demands of important social groups. These groups band together and begin to use violence to change the government’s position. Insurgencies are often a coalition of different forces united by their common hostility for the government. To be successful, an insurgency must develop unifying leadership, doctrine, organization, and strategy. Only the seeds of these elements exist when an insurgency begins. The insurgents must continually nurture and provide the necessary care if the insurgency is to mature and succeed. Insurgencies succeed by mobilizing human and materiel resources to provide both active and passive support for their programs, operations, and goals. Mobilization produces workers and fighters, raises funds, and gets the necessary weapons, equipment, and supplies. Mobilization grows out of intense popular dissatisfaction with existing political and social conditions. In an insurgency, the active supporters consider these conditions intolerable. The insurgent leadership articulates the dissatisfaction of the people, places the blame on government, and offers an alternative. The insurgent leadership then provides organizational and managerial skills to transform disaffected people into an effective force for political action. Ultimately, the insurgents need the active support of most of the politically active people and the passive support of the majority.

1-18. A successful insurgency is the most important political power in a newly liberated country. Guerrillas, existing and fighting under conditions of great hardship, develop extremist attitudes and become very jealous of their prerogatives to determine the postwar complexion of their country. These attitudes may make it difficult or impossible to establish a government

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sympathetic to U.S. national interests. However, a nation that sponsors a successful insurgency generally has a political advantage at the close of hostilities.

1-19. There are seven dynamics that are common to most insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework for analysis that can reveal the insurgency’s strengths and weaknesses. Although the analyst can examine the following dynamics separately, he must study their interaction to fully understand the insurgency.

LEADERSHIP

1-20. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. The insurgency leaders must make their cause known to the people and gain popular support. Their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government, and to establish credibility for their movement. The leaders must replace the government’s legitimacy with that of their own. Their education, background, family, social connections, and experiences shape how they think and how they will fulfill their goals. These factors also help shape their approach to problem solving.

1-21. Leadership is a function of both organization and personality. Some organizations deemphasize individual personalities and provide for redundancy and replacement in decision making. These mechanisms produce collective power and do not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. They are easier to penetrate but more resilient to change. Other organizations may depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a focal point for the movement. Organizations led in this way can produce decisions and begin new actions rapidly, but are vulnerable to disruptions if key personalities are removed or co-opted by the enemy.

IDEOLOGY

1-22. To win, the insurgents must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its actions. They must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency accomplishes this goal through ideology. Ideology guides the insurgents in offering society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for ease of focus. The insurgents’ plans must be vague enough for broad appeal and specific enough to address important issues.

1-23. The ideology of groups within the movement may suggest differing views of strategic objectives. Groups may have ideological conflicts that need to be resolved before an opponent can capitalize on them. Ideology may suggest probable goals and tactics. It greatly influences the insurgent’s perception of his environment. This perception of the environment in turn shapes the movement’s organization and operational methods.

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List of conflicts in Central America

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[hide]

Guatemala[edit]

1524 — 1697 Spanish conquest of Guatemala

[hide]Date	Event	Modern department (or Mexican state)
FebruaryFebruary – March 1524	Spanish defeat the K'iche'	Retalhuleu, Suchitepéquez, Quetzaltenango, Totonicapán and El Quiché
8 February 1524	Battle of Zapotitlán, Spanish victory over the K'iche'	Suchitepéquez
12 February 1524	First battle of Quetzaltenango results in the death of the K'iche' lord Tecun Uman	Quetzaltenango
18 February 1524	Second battle of Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango
March 1524	Spanish under Pedro de Alvarado raze Q'umarkaj, capital of the K'iche'	El Quiché
14 April 1524	Spanish enter Iximche and ally themselves with the Kaqchikel	Chimaltenango
18 April 1524	Spanish defeat the Tz'utujil in battle on the shores of Lake Atitlán	Sololá
9 May 1524	Pedro de Alvarado defeats the Pipil of Panacal or Panacaltepeque near Izcuintepeque	Escuintla
26 May 1524	Pedro de Alvarado defeats the Xinca of Atiquipaque	Santa Rosa
27 July 1524	Iximche declared first colonial capital of Guatemala	Chimaltenango
28 August 1524	Kaqchikel abandon Iximche and break alliance	Chimaltenango
7 September 1524	Spanish declare war on the Kaqchikel	Chimaltenango
1525	The Poqomam capital falls to Pedro de Alvarado	Guatemala
13 March 1525	Hernán Cortés arrives at Lake Petén Itzá	Petén
October 1525	Zaculeu, capital of the Mam, surrenders to Gonzalo de Alvarado y Contreras after a lengthy siege	Huehuetenango
1526	Chajoma rebel against the Spanish	Guatemala
1526	Acasaguastlán given in encomienda to Diego Salvatierra	El Progreso
1526	Spanish captains sent by Alvarado conquer Chiquimula	Chiquimula
9 February 1526	Spanish deserters burn Iximche	Chimaltenango
1527	Spanish abandon their capital at Tecpán Guatemala	Chimaltenango
1529	San Mateo Ixtatán given in encomienda to Gonzalo de Ovalle	Huehuetenango
September 1529	Spanish routed at Uspantán	El Quiché
April 1530	Rebellion in Chiquimula put down	Chiquimula
9 May 1530	Kaqchikel surrender to the Spanish	Sacatepéquez
December 1530	Ixil and Uspantek surrender to the Spanish	El Quiché
April 1533	Juan de León y Cardona founds San Marcos and San Pedro Sacatepéquez	San Marcos
1543	Foundation of Cobán	Alta Verapaz
1549	First reductions of the Chuj and Q'anjob'al	Huehuetenango
1551	Corregimiento of San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán established	El Progreso, Zacapa and Baja Verapaz
1555	Lowland Maya kill Francisco de Vico	Alta Verapaz
1560	Reduction of Topiltepeque and Lakandon Ch'ol	Alta Verapaz
1618	Franciscan missionaries arrive at Nojpetén, capital of the Itzá	Petén
1619	Further missionary expeditions to Nojpetén	Petén
1684	Reduction of San Mateo Ixtatán and Santa Eulalia	Huehuetenango
29 January 1686	Melchor Rodríguez Mazariegos leaves Huehuetenango, leading an expedition against the Lacandón	Huehuetenango
1695	Franciscan friar Andrés de Avendaño attempts to convert the Itzá	Petén
28 February 1695	Spanish expeditions leave simultaneously from Cobán, San Mateo Ixtatán and Ocosingo against the Lacandón	Alta Verapaz, Huehuetenango and Chiapas
1696	Andrés de Avendaño forced to flee Nojpetén	Petén
13 March 1697	Nojpetén falls to the Spanish after a fierce battle	Petén

1530 Alvarado enslaves the Mayan kingdoms of Cakchiquel, Mam, and Ixil.
1811 1811 Independence Movement
1823 — 1838 Federal Republic of Central America Independence and annexation by the Mexican Empire
1896 — 1898 Greater Republic of Central America
1960 — 1996 Central American crisis
- 1960 — 1996 Guatemalan Civil War

Nicaragua[edit]

1898 — 1934 Banana Wars
- October 3, 1912 — October 4, 1912 Battle of Coyotepe Hill
- May 16, 1927 Battle of La Paz Centro
- July 16, 1927 Battle of Ocotal
- July 25, 1927 Battle of San Fernando
- July 27, 1927 Battle of Santa Clara
- September 19, 1927 Battle of Telpaneca
- January 1, 1928 Battle of Las Cruces
- May 13, 1928 — May 14, 1928 Battle of La Flor
- December 31, 1930 Battle of Achuapa
- September 16, 1932 Battle of Agua Carta
- December 26, 1932 Battle of El Sauce
1926 — 1927 Nicaraguan civil war
1960 — 1996 Central American crisis
- 1961 — 1990 Nicaraguan Revolution

El Salvador[edit]

1969 Football War
1960 — 1996 Central American crisis
- 1979 — 1992 Salvadoran Civil War
  - December 11, 1981 El Mozote massacre
  - August 21, 1982 — August 22, 1982 El Calabozo massacre
  - June 19, 1985 21:30 Zona Rosa attacks
  - November 16, 1989 Murder of UCA scholars

Honduras[edit]

1960 — 1996 Central American crisis
- 1982 — 1986 Battalion 3-16 was responsible for the kidnapping, torture, disappearance and murder of at least 184 Honduran students, professors, journalists, human rights activists and others

Panama[edit]

1960 — 1996 Central American crisis
- 1989 — 1990 United States invasion of Panama
  - December 20, 1989 Operation Acid Gambit
  - December 23, 1989 Operation Nifty Package

Belize[edit]

1981 Heads of Agreement Crisis

List of conflicts in South America

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is a list of armed conflicts in South America.

This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it.

Development of Spanish American Independence

Government under traditional Spanish law

Loyal to Supreme Central Junta or Cortes

American junta or insurrection movement

Independent state declared or established

Height of French control of the Peninsula

[hide]

Peru[edit]

circa 900 B.C.E. — circa 200 B.C.E. Chavín culture

The area of the Chavín culture, as well as areas the Chavín culture influenced.

circa 500 C.E. — circa 1,100 C.E. Wari Empire

A map of the extent of the Wari Empire

circa 1230 C.E. Sinchi Roca, the second Sapa Inca of the Kingdom of Cuzco, waged war against a nearby kingdom after the killing of the Inca diplomat Teuotihi
circa 1290 C.E. Mayta Cápac, the fourth Sapa Inca of the Kingdom of Cuzco, put the regions of Arequipa and Moquegua under the control of the Inca empire
circa 1320 C.E. Cápac Yupanqui, the fifth Sapa Inca of the Kingdom of Cuzco, was the first Inca to conquer territory outside the valley of Cuzco
circa 1350 C.E. — circa 1,380 C.E. Inca Roca, the sixth Sapa Inca of theKingdom of Cuzco, is said to have conquered the Chancas
circa 1380 C.E. Yáhuar Huácac, the seventh Sapa Inca of the Kingdom of Cuzco, abandoned the capital in an attack by the Chancas
circa 1410 C.E. — circa 1,438 C.E. Viracocha Inca, the eighth Sapa Inca of theKingdom of Cuzco, defended the capital against the attack by the Chancas
circa 1438 C.E. — circa 1472 C.E. Pachacuti, the ninth Sapa Inca of theKingdom of Cuzco, defeated the Chancas and the Chimú

A map of the extent of the Kingdom of Cuzco in 1438

A map of the extent of the Kingdom of Cuzco in 1463

circa 1472 C.E. — circa 1493 C.E. Topa Inca Yupanqui, the tenth Sapa Inca of the Inca Empire, extended the realm northward along the Andes through modernEcuador, and developed a special fondness for the city of Quito, which he rebuilt with architects from Cuzco. During this time his father Pachacuti reorganized theKingdom of Cuzco into the Tahuantinsuyu, the "four provinces". He led extensive military conquests to extend the Inca Empire across much of South America, within the boundaries of the nations which are today called Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. He became Inca in his turn upon his father's death in 1471, ruling until his own death in 1493. He conquered Chimor, which occupied the northern coast of what is now Peru, the largest remaining rival to the Incas.

A map of the extent of the Kingdom of Cuzco in 1493

circa 1493 C.E. — circa 1527 C.E. Huayna Capac, the eleventh Sapa Inca of theInca Empire, extended the Inca Empire significantly to the south into present-dayChile and Argentina and tried to annex territories towards the north, in what is now Ecuador and southern Colombia, founding cities like Atuntaqui. Further north, Huayna Capac's forces reached the Chinchipe River Basin but were pushed back by the Shuar in 1527. The Inca Empire reached the height of its size and power under his rule, stretching over much of present-day Bolivia, Peru,Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and southwestern Colombia.

A map of the Inca Empire at its greatest extent

circa 1529 C.E. — circa 1532 C.E. Inca Civil War

1529 C.E. Battle of Chillopampa
1531 C.E. Battle of Mullihambato
1531 C.E. Battle of Chimborazo War between Atahualpa and Huascar.
1532 C.E. Battle of Huanucopampa
1532 C.E. Battle of Quipaipan

1525 C.E. — 1,572 C.E. Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire

1812 C.E. — 1821 C.E. Peruvian War of Independence
1836 C.E. — 1839 C.E. War of the Confederation between the Peru-Bolivian Confederation and Chile
1879 C.E. — 1884 C.E. Bolivia and Peru fight Chile in the War of the Pacific
1932 C.E. — 1933 C.E. Leticia Incident with Colombia.
1941 C.E. — 1942 C.E. The Ecuadorian-Peruvian war occurs.
1981 C.E. Ecuador and Peru clash again in the Paquisha Incident.
1980 C.E. — present The Peruvian Armed Conflict fought between the Shining Path insurgents and the Peruvian government.
1995 C.E. Ecuador and Peru dispute territory in the Cenepa War.

Chile[edit]

circa 500 C.E. — circa 1100 C.E. Wari Empire
circa 1472 C.E. — 1493 C.E. Topa Inca Yupanqui, the tenth Sapa Inca of theInca Empire, extended the realm northward along the Andes through modernEcuador, and developed a special fondness for the city of Quito, which he rebuilt with architects from Cuzco. During this time his father Pachacuti reorganized theKingdom of Cuzco into the Tahuantinsuyu, the "four provinces". He led extensive military conquests to extend the Inca Empire across much of South America, within the boundaries of the nations which are today called Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. He became Inca in his turn upon his father's death in 1471, ruling until his own death in 1493. He conquered Chimor, which occupied the northern coast of what is now Peru, the largest remaining rival to the Incas.
circa 1493 C.E. — 1527 C.E. Huayna Capac, the eleventh Sapa Inca of the Inca Empire, extended the Inca Empire significantly to the south into present-dayChile and Argentina and tried to annex territories towards the north, in what is now Ecuador and southern Colombia, founding cities like Atuntaqui. Further north, Huayna Capac's forces reached the Chinchipe River Basin but were pushed back by the Shuar in 1527. The Inca Empire reached the height of its size and power under his rule, stretching over much of present-day Bolivia, Peru,Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and southwestern Colombia. The lands conquered in the south within Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile would form the province Qullasuyuof the Inca Empire.
1536 C.E. — 1826 C.E. War of Arauco

1536 C.E. Battle of Reynogüelén
1546 C.E. Battle of Quilacura
1550 C.E. Battle of Andalien
1550 C.E. Battle of Penco
1553 C.E. Battle of Tucapel
1554 C.E. Battle of Marihueñu
1556 C.E. Battle of Peteroa
1557 C.E. Battle of Mataquito
1557 C.E. Battle of Lagunillas
1557 C.E. Battle of Millarapue
1558 C.E. Battle of Quiapo
1564 C.E. Siege of Concepcion
1564 C.E. Battle of Angol
1569 C.E. Battle of Catirai
1598 C.E. Disaster of Curalaba
1599 C.E. — 1604 C.E. Destruction of the Seven Cities
1612 C.E. Defensive War
1655 C.E. Mapuche Insurrection
1712 C.E. Huilliche rebellion
1723 C.E. The Mapuche Uprising
1759 C.E., 1,766 C.E., and 1,769 C.E. The Mapuche Rebellions
1792 C.E. The Huilliche Rebellion

1810 C.E. — 1826 C.E. Chilean War of Independence
1829 C.E. — 1830 C.E. Chilean Civil War
1836 C.E. — 1839 C.E. War of the Confederation between the Peru-Bolivian Confederation and Chile
1851 C.E. Chilean Revolution
1861 C.E. — 1883 C.E. Occupation of Araucanía
1864 C.E. — 1866 C.E. The Chincha Islands War between Spain and former colonies Peru and Chile occurs
1879 C.E. — 1884 C.E. Bolivia and Peru fight Chile in the War of the Pacific
1891 C.E. Chilean Civil War

Bolivia[edit]

circa 500 C.E. — circa 1100 C.E. Wari Empire
circa 1472 C.E. — 1493 C.E. Topa Inca Yupanqui, the tenth Sapa Inca of theInca Empire, extended the realm northward along the Andes through modernEcuador, and developed a special fondness for the city of Quito, which he rebuilt with architects from Cuzco. During this time his father Pachacuti reorganized theKingdom of Cuzco into the Tahuantinsuyu, the "four provinces". He led extensive military conquests to extend the Inca Empire across much of South America, within the boundaries of the nations which are today called Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. He became Inca in his turn upon his father's death in 1471, ruling until his own death in 1493. He conquered Chimor, which occupied the northern coast of what is now Peru, the largest remaining rival to the Incas. The lands conquered in the south within Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile would form the province Qullasuyu of the Inca Empire.
1836 C.E. — 1839 C.E. War of the Confederation between the Peru-Bolivian Confederation and Chile
1879 C.E. — 1884 C.E. Bolivia and Peru fight Chile in the War of the Pacific

Ecuador[edit]

circa 1471 C.E. — 1493 C.E. Topa Inca Yupanqui, the tenth Sapa Inca of theInca Empire, extended the realm northward along the Andes through modernEcuador, and developed a special fondness for the city of Quito, and conqueredChimor
circa 1493 C.E. — 1527 C.E. Huayna Capac, the eleventh Sapa Inca of the Inca Empire, extended the Inca Empire significantly to the south into present-dayChile and Argentina and tried to annex territories towards the north, in what is now Ecuador and southern Colombia, founding cities like Atuntaqui. Further north, Huayna Capac's forces reached the Chinchipe River Basin but were pushed back by the Shuar in 1527. The Inca Empire reached the height of its size and power under his rule, stretching over much of present-day Bolivia, Peru,Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and southwestern Colombia. The lands conquered in the north within Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia would form the province Chinchay Suyu of the Inca Empire.

Argentina[edit]

circa 1472 C.E. — 1493 C.E. Topa Inca Yupanqui, the tenth Sapa Inca of the Inca Empire, extended the realm northward along theAndes through modern Ecuador, and developed a special fondness for the city of Quito, which he rebuilt with architects from Cuzco. During this time his father Pachacuti reorganized the Kingdom of Cuzco into the Tahuantinsuyu, the "four provinces". He led extensive military conquests to extend the Inca Empire across much of South America, within the boundaries of the nations which are today called Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. He became Inca in his turn upon his father's death in 1471, ruling until his own death in 1493. He conquered Chimor, which occupied the northern coast of what is now Peru, the largest remaining rival to the Incas.
circa 1493 C.E. — 1527 C.E. Huayna Capac, the eleventh Sapa Inca of the Inca Empire, extended the Inca Empire significantly to the south into present-day Chile and Argentina and tried to annex territories towards the north, in what is now Ecuador and southernColombia, founding cities like Atuntaqui. Further north, Huayna Capac's forces reached the Chinchipe River Basin but were pushed back by the Shuar in 1527. The Inca Empire reached the height of its size and power under his rule, stretching over much of present-day Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and southwestern Colombia. The lands conquered in the south within Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile would form the province Qullasuyu of the Inca Empire.
1754 C.E. — 1757 C.E. Spanish-Portuguese invasion of the Jesuit-sponsored "Guarani Nation"
1810 C.E. — 1818 C.E. Argentine War of Independence
1976 C.E. — 1983 C.E. The Dirty War in Argentina.
1982 C.E. The Falklands War occurs.

Colombia[edit]

circa 1493 C.E. — 1527 C.E. Huayna Capac, the eleventh Sapa Inca of the Inca Empire, extended the Inca Empire significantly to the south into present-day Chile and Argentina and tried to annex territories towards the north, in what is now Ecuador and southernColombia, founding cities like Atuntaqui. Further north, Huayna Capac's forces reached the Chinchipe River Basin but were pushed back by the Shuar in 1527. The Inca Empire reached the height of its size and power under his rule, stretching over much of present-day Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and southwestern Colombia. The lands conquered in the north within Peru, Ecuador, andColombia would form the province Chinchay Suyu of the Inca Empire.
1470 C.E. — 1490 C.E. Muisca warfare
1499 C.E. — 1602 C.E. Spanish conquest of the Chibchan Nations
1828 C.E. — 1829 C.E. Gran Colombia – Peru War
1860 C.E. — 1862 C.E. Colombian Civil War
1899 C.E. — 1902 C.E. Colombian Thousand Days War
1932 C.E. — 1933 C.E. Colombia-Peru War
1948 C.E. — 1958 C.E. La Violencia in Colombia.
1964 C.E. — present the Colombian Armed Conflict between the government and guerrilla insurgencies devastates the country.
2012 C.E. 6th Summit of the Americas, North American rejection (United States and Canada) to Cuba in the Summit of the Americas, provoked the creation of more wars and maintenance of simultaneous wars due to a discussion.

Brazil[edit]

1557 C.E. — 1575 C.E. French-Portuguese conflict over France Antarctique, a French colony in Rio de Janeiro.
1591 C.E. Thomas Cavendish, a British corsair, occupied Santos
1821 C.E. — 1825 C.E. Brazilian War of Independence
1835 C.E. Malê Revolt
1835 C.E. — 1845 C.E. Republican revolt against the Empire of Brazil is put down in the Ragamuffin War
1896 C.E. — 1897 C.E. War of Canudos
1912 C.E. — 1916 C.E. Contestado War, a rebellion in Brazil, fails.

French Guiana[edit]

1809 C.E. Portuguese invasion of French Guiana

Venezuela[edit]

1811 C.E. — 1823 C.E. Venezuelan War of Independence
1859 C.E. — 1863 C.E. Federal War in Venezuela
1908 C.E. Dutch-Venezuela War, a dispute between Venezuela and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
January 2014 C.E. — ongoing Venezuelan protests

Paraguay[edit]

1864 C.E. — 1870 C.E. The Paraguayan War occurs
1932 C.E. — 1935 C.E. The Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay is fought.
1947 C.E. The Colorado Party gains the upper hand in the Paraguayan Civil War.
2005 C.E. - ongoing Paraguayan People's Army insurgency

Uruguay[edit]

1820 C.E. — 1828 C.E. The Cisplatine War over the status of future Uruguay occurs
1839 C.E. — 1851 C.E. Uruguayan Civil War
1864 C.E. — 1865 C.E. The Uruguayan War
1851 C.E. — 1852 C.E. Platine War