SECURITY
IN A DANGEROUS
WORLD
Mitigating Threats at Home and Abroad
The Importance of Knowing the Risks in Advance
INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks against the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the way Americans viewed personal security. Literally out of the blue, fuel- and passenger-laden airliners struck business and governmental landmarks in New York City and Washington, D.C., like guided missiles, killing thousands of Americans. The threat of crime was one thing; most law-abiding Americans believed it could be mitigated by sensible precaution. A spectacular attack by a non-state actor against the World Trade Center and Pentagon was quite another. How does one defend against that?
As the United States assumed a war footing, creating the Department of Homeland Security and invading Afghanistan and Iraq, STRATFOR began covering these developments with keen interest. Our interest was not only at the geopolitical level. The 9/11 attacks were a stark reminder that the world is a dangerous place and that individuals as well as nation-states need to be prepared to defend themselves. Clearly, no government can possibly protect every one of its citizens against every conceivable type of attack. Therefore, people need to assume primary responsibility for their own security. This is even more important when a person is traveling or working in a foreign country where the central government is highly corrupt or incompetent.
To help our readers become more aware of existing and emerging threats and attain some useful level of self-protection, STRATFOR’s security team began analyzing risks at home and abroad and issuing advisories on how best to deal with them. This book is a collection of those advisories, going all the way back to Jan. 27, 2004 (“The Militant Threat to Hotels,” page 45). In the years since, a lot has changed in the world — and in the so-called “Global War on Terror.” The Bush administration’s military offensive, although stalled in Iraq, did succeed in isolating al Qaeda’s core leadership in the mountains of northwestern Pakistan and limiting its reach. A major effort remains under a new administration to further reduce that threat, stabilize Iraq and Pakistan and roll back the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. At the same time, Mexico’s increasingly violent campaign against the drug cartels has transformed life along the U.S.-Mexican border and has begun bleeding into the southwestern United States — and beyond.
While the threat of another terrorist attack against the United States may seem more distant now than it was in the aftermath of 9/11, it is clear — almost eight years after the fact — that the world is still a dangerous place and individual self-protection may be more important now than ever. It remains a question of when rather than if another terrorist attack will occur on U.S. soil, and the terrorist threat overseas is still very real. The threat of crime in the United States, spawned by current economic conditions as well as the drug trade in Mexico, is growing, and the need for security at home and abroad is an issue that will be with us for some time.
With those thoughts in mind, STRATFOR presents the following security reports, most of which originally appeared on our subscription Web site. They are organized under chapter headings and presented in the order in which they were published. There is some overlap from piece to piece and chapter to chapter, since most of the articles were written as individual analyses. Also, some of the information may seem dated, which it is by necessity. These pieces represent some of our best tutorials on personal security since January 2004, less than a year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Naturally, some observations are linked to a specific time or event years removed from today’s security environment, which continues to evolve. Nevertheless, most of the recommendations and principles are every bit as relevant today as they were when they were written, and none should be considered misleading or counterproductive.
In any case, we hope this collection will provide useful guidance, context and perspective on ways to stay safe in a dangerous world.
STRATFOR
Austin, Texas
April 13, 2009
CHAPTER 1: Planning
The Importance of Knowing the Risks in Advance
Jan. 13, 2006
In today’s world, international travel presents certain risks for Westerners, especially in areas of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the former Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Europe where governments have less control, and law and order is not as formally established as in other countries. Certainly, the best chance of remaining out of harm’s way while traveling or working abroad is to know and understand — in advance — some of the idiosyncrasies of each country’s bureaucracy and the security risks that have been identified. Armed with this knowledge, then, the traveler can take proper precautions.
To that end, the U.S. State Department’s Web site (www.travel.state.gov) is an excellent place to begin. The site lists travel warnings issued for countries in which potentially dangerous conditions have been identified. It also provides the current Consular Information Sheets for every foreign country, which contain information on visa requirements, health conditions, crime, unusual currency or entry requirements, any areas of instability and contact information for the U.S. Embassy and consulates. In addition, the site provides a link to a page where travelers can register their personal information with the State Department at no cost, which can make it easier for the government to help during an emergency.
The British and Australian governments have similar Web sites that also are excellent sources of information for their citizens traveling abroad. These sites have similar information as found on the U.S. government’s site, but may contain additional information that can be useful to U.S. citizens as well. In addition to government Web sites, private security consulting firms can provide more customized information tailored to a specific location or client.
Common street crime presents the most prevalent risk to travelers abroad — although that by no means is the extent of the threat in many areas. The cardinal rule for travelers is that they should never take anything along they are not prepared to part with. This includes items of extreme value — as well as those of sentimental value. For the business traveler who carries a personal computer, this means leaving back-up discs of all important documents at home.
Large sums of money should not be carried. Cash and credit cards should not all be carried in one wallet or pocket, but dispersed in various pockets. Identification and other important documents should be separate from money. Furthermore, it is important to make copies of passports and other important documents, and leave the originals in a safe location, such as a hotel safe. It also is a good idea to keep a copy of the front page of the passport with the relevant identification information at home with relatives in case of an emergency. Relatives and/or co-workers should be provided a full itinerary before the traveler leaves home, so they can provide at least the basic information to the home office or to the appropriate government agency in case of emergency.
Some countries will react negatively or deny entry if the traveler’s passport contains a stamp from certain other countries. Many travelers maintain multiple passports — or request that the visa stamp for a particular country be placed on a separate sheet of paper — in order to keep offending stamps separate. Keep in mind that visa and passport information is primarily used by many host governments to collect intelligence, especially in places such as China, India and Russia. There really is little the law-abiding traveler can do to prevent revealing such information to a foreign government, as traveling with a fake passport is the only alternative and that is never a good idea.
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Assessing Threats and Vulnerabilities
May 31, 2006
Personal security services are thriving in the post-Sept. 11 world as more and more top executives seek expert protection. The fact remains, however, that many executives — including those whose work location or professional status would seem to warrant them protection — either prefer not to employ security details or are not afforded them by their employers. With some professional help and a fair amount of work, however, it is possible to create a self-protection system that will greatly enhance one’s safety and that of one’s family.
Professional security details range from a trained, perhaps armed, driver to full-blown, Secret Service- or Diplomatic Security Service-style arrangements involving numbers of agents, armored cars, a communications system and perhaps other high-tech equipment. A few of the more sophisticated corporate executive protection teams operate “black,” blending into the background and relying on keen observation and surprise rather than an overwhelming show of force.
Many executives, however, tend to view some types of protective operations as potentially bad for business, fraught with potential liability exposure and not in keeping with the corporate image they wish to project to the world. Those whose only exposure to protective details is to have witnessed the antics of some details operating in the entertainment business also might find the idea of being surrounded by such protectors personally distasteful.
Having a protective detail can have consequences for one’s personal life as well. Privacy and spontaneity are inevitably lost when one is surrounded by people who legitimately need advance knowledge of one’s every move. A well-known executive once told a host who asked him to stay on at a party: “I’d love to, but the truth is, if I stay late there are 10 people outside who have to stay late with me.”
Moreover, the decision to hire protection implies acceptance of the existence of danger, a tough psychological hurdle for many people to overcome — at least, until something bad happens. For all these reasons, many key executives continue to say “no” to protection, regardless of advice and indications to the contrary.
Equally bereft of professional protection are midlevel corporate employees, many of whom are serving lengthy tours as expatriate executives in foreign cities. The economic realities of globalization mean some of those cities are the most crime-ridden in the world, including such places as Mexico City, Bogotá, Sao Paulo and Moscow. As a result, employees who in the United States would spend their lives under the radar of professional criminals are now prime targets for kidnapping, home invasion, burglary and carjacking. Corporations take responsibility for keeping their people safe in such environments, but full-time professional protection for every employee and family member is expensive. Few expatriate executives, therefore, can be afforded it, absent a specific threat.
In the United States and elsewhere, midlevel managers of banks and other cash repositories are also potential targets for extortion/robbery operations. The $43 million Securitas heist in the English county of Kent in February is a case in point. In that heist — only the latest of many — a gang stopped a Securitas manager as he was driving and forced him to provide access to the money. The facts suggest the gang engaged in careful investigation and long-term surveillance of its target. Though the threat against such victims is high, they typically are afforded neither protection nor in-depth training.
For all of these types of executives and for all of these reasons, a viable alternative is self-protection. An effective plan will include most of the same elements that a professional security manager would employ, with the exception that the necessary training and actual practice must be undertaken by the principal. The four elements of a self-protection plan are: assessment, analysis and planning, training, and practice and drilling.
The first step on the road to devising a personal protection system is making a realistic baseline assessment of threats and vulnerabilities. Although one can do this on his or her own, it is best done by professionals, and it should be updated annually or when circumstances warrant. Regardless of who does the assessment, it should start with general research of crime history and current statistics for the area, concentrating especially on the areas around the home and workplace, and the travel corridors between them. The potential for natural disasters, for civil unrest and riots and, in some cases, the likelihood of war should all be considered.
Following STRATFOR’s philosophy of assessing from the outside in, the next step should be to determine the specifics by studying the environment and performing certain analyses and diagnostics. Professionals should be consulted for some of this work:
In-depth cyber-stalking report. Few people have done Internet database searches on themselves, and even fewer have the skills to do an adequate job of it. They might be surprised to find how much “private” information is available free — or for a few dollars— to criminals who might be targeting them for kidnapping, extortion or other crimes. The study should also include family members. Children, for example, are sometimes profiled through their participation in sports or other activities that expose them to the public.
Baseline surveillance diagnostics. Surveillance diagnostics, a sophisticated blend of several surveillance-detection techniques, are performed by a professional team to determine whether the principal or his/her family is under programmatic hostile surveillance or criminal casing. It concentrates on the home, the school (if applicable), the workplace, any regular venues the principal predictably visits, and the routes between them. This is a “snapshot” to establish a baseline from which to plan, going forward.
Route analysis. Route analysis looks for vulnerabilities, or choke points, on the principal’s regular travel routes. Choke points have two main characteristics: First, they are places where rapid forward motion is difficult, such as sharp blind curves. Second, they are places where hostiles can wait with impunity for their victims. The “best” choke points also offer rapid escape routes for attackers. Choke points are used both by highly professional kidnap/assassination teams, and by criminal “ambush predators” who wait for targets of opportunity. Route analysis is usually done at the same time and by the same team that conducts surveillance diagnostics.
Physical security surveys. These surveys are performed for the home, work place or school for the principal and family members. Although principals can effectively survey their homes, a professional look is highly recommended. Professionals also should handle any security upgrades that might need to be installed. For surveys and upgrades at workplaces and schools, obviously principals must rely on security resources at those venues.
Assessment of response capabilities. Also critical is a realistic assessment of the capabilities and responsiveness of local police, other security assets, and fire and medical first responders in the area. It is not sufficient to make assumptions about this; personal security depends critically on knowing whether and under what circumstances help is available, and when it is not.
Armed with a realistic assessment, complete with recommendations, the principal can begin to formulate a personal- and family-protection plan.
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Analysis and Planning for Self-Protection
June 1, 2006
No one can be on red alert everywhere and at all times and still expect to live a satisfactory life. Even if one did live in a constant state of hypervigilance, it would be no guarantee of safety. This is true even of executives whose professional status and/or job location might put them in harm’s way but who prefer to go without expert security protection or are not provided this service by their companies. By working with professionals to develop a self-protection system, these executives can assess possible threats and begin to determine when and where they must be most vigilant.
The first step on the road to devising a personal protection system is making a realistic baseline assessment of threats and vulnerabilities. Armed with this assessment, one can then make informed distinctions about how to prioritize the threats and vulnerabilities, and what kinds of actions are appropriate to each. A comprehensive — but simple — security plan can then be crafted. Personal security does not involve living on red alert, but making the appropriate distinctions and leveraging the percentages in one’s favor. For example, a principal who lives a normal suburban American life but happens to be the manager of a large cash repository in an industrial park should prioritize planning that accounts for long-term, sophisticated hostile surveillance by professional extortion kidnappers. A jeweler who routinely hand-delivers expensive items to clients might first think about the possibility of information compromises originating from his workplace.
An expatriate in a crime-ridden Third World city might think primarily in terms of choke points along his and his family’s routes, where predatory criminals could wait for attractive targets to ambush. A key executive with a high public profile might think first about venues and events that put him or her in direct, previously announced contact with the public.
For purposes of analysis and planning, then, it makes sense to divide the criminal threat into two rough categories: threats directed specifically against the targets because of who they are and threats from ambush predators who wait for attractive targets to come to them. In the first case, privacy protection, surveillance awareness and physical security are called for. In the second, understanding route analysis and avoidance of choke points is necessary. Some cities unfortunately present both classes of threat to a high degree.
Making these distinctions in a pragmatic way can allow one to convert a general, often vague atmosphere of fear into a manageable set of priorities and actions.
Whatever the analysis indicates, the plan should include active measures that allow one to sensibly raise and lower his or her level of security awareness as the circumstances warrant. This is the secret to living with security. For most people, this means knowing where one is relatively safe, and where one is not, and taking steps to create “safe areas” within which security awareness can be more relaxed. For most people, these are the home, the workplace and, if it applies, the school. In the latter case, parents must select schools based on their security measures as well as their academic qualities and should stay active in monitoring the security environment through the school administration, parent-teacher association or other groups. For some executives, the threat of workplace violence also can be a concern. In such situations, extra measures are required to secure the environment. Physical security and access-control measures should be taken to establish these safe areas, measures that exceed the realistically perceived threat. Outside established safe areas, principals should understand that they are most vulnerable to targeted crime when they are most predictable. For most people this means travel between home, work and school, though for many people the best advice, to vary routes and times, is not practical. This concept in fact is counterintuitive for most people. The very familiarity of their routine movements can create a sense of false security. Many people have had the experience of leaving the office at the end of the day and pulling into their driveways, unable to remember a single detail about the drive home. This tendency must be consciously eliminated from one’s behavior.
In countries where kidnapping for ransom is an industry, the security of school buses often is overlooked. Many expatriate parents send their children to high-end private schools, most of which provide busing for a fee. Despite the convenience, parents should recognize that a busload of children traveling to and from a school known to serve the children of wealthy, prominent parents may present a tempting target to kidnappers. Moreover, school buses are uniquely predictable, both as to times and routes. School buses are seldom protected.
Having established safe areas and worked out safe travel procedures and routes, principals should add some final refinements to the security plan:
Privacy plan. Principals should understand that most targeted, professional crime follows this progression: target selection, target investigation, target surveillance and then attack. The first two stages — target selection and investigation — require first of all that information about the targets be available. The cyber stalker report will help reveal the degree of transparency principals’ lives present to outsiders. Although some of this information is already “out there” and cannot be erased, some things can be done. Delisting phone numbers, removing personal information from cars and buildings, restricting the circumstances under which one — and especially one’s children — are photographed and re-registering homes, cars, boats and personal aircraft under innocuous shell corporations should be considered. Principals should use crosscut shredders to destroy papers that would otherwise be available to “dumpster divers.”
Finally, household staff must be vetted for criminal records and for credit/financial problems. Some executives also require psychological evaluation of personal staff. Principals also should maintain an active interest in the personal lives of staff, especially those who live in the home. Some kidnapping operations begin with criminals seeking a personal relationship with a live-in maid or nanny. Principals also should consider avoiding ostentation in their personal lives. Owning the largest estate in a community or the only customized red Ferarri with vanity plates in town raises one’s profile.
Communications. Principals should ensure redundant communications systems for themselves and family members. Push-to-talk cell phone/radio combinations with text messaging work very well in many countries, and should be considered. Communication capability does not help, however, if one does not know whom to call. In most developed countries, there is some version of the 911 system. In areas where police response and capabilities are not to be trusted, employees and their families may have access to the employer’s security control center, which can call out a protective response. If family members are scattered (kids at school, wife at her workplace, husband at his), families should have a preset plan for who calls whom to alert them and ascertain their safety. In some cases, families should have a simple code for communication under duress. This is an easily remembered word or phrase known by all family members that will discreetly signal that one is under duress. For children, “kid phones” traceable via a global positioning system will soon be available.
Fire and home evacuation. Not all threats are criminal. Principals should have an established plan for evacuating the home and ensuring that all family members are safe.
Area evacuation. In regions threatened by war, major civil unrest or possible natural disaster, leaving the area during a crisis could be the safest course of action. Principals should have a preset plan in place for accomplishing this successfully.
Drilling. Emergency plans, even simple ones, cannot be expected to work unless they are practiced periodically. This is not only true in cases involving children. Under sudden stress, people of all ages can experience diminished thought and decision-making processes.
Once the security plan is in place, the principal and his or her family can begin the process of learning the skills to become mentally and physically prepared to successfully handle a threat. This step, training, is the most challenging.
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Contingency Plans: An Ounce of Prevention
Aug. 15, 2007
U.S. counterterrorism sources remain concerned that an attack against the U.S. homeland will occur within the next two to three weeks. This is not surprising, considering that the drums have been beating loudly in Washington this summer about a potential attack — first from Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and then in the form of a National Intelligence Estimate. More recently, several other reports have appeared concerning an impending attack, including an alert over the weekend in New York triggered by an alleged dirty bomb plot. One reason for the heightened concern is that most everyone, including STRATFOR, is surprised that no major jihadist attack has occurred on U.S. soil since 9/11. Many plots have been disrupted, and it is only a matter of time before one of them succeeds. Simply put, attacks are not difficult to conduct and the government cannot stop them all.
STRATFOR’s assessment of the jihadist threat to the U.S. homeland is that al Qaeda and jihadists retain the ability to conduct tactical strikes against the United States but lack the ability to pose a strategic threat. While this may be reassuring on one level, people can and will be killed in a tactical strike. The fact that an attack is not strategically significant will provide no immediate solace to those near the carnage and confusion of a tactical attack. Additionally, as we saw in Hurricane Katrina or the recent bridge collapse in Minneapolis, other disasters also can lead to chaos and disruption. Given the current threat environment, this is an opportune time to examine again ways to avoid — or at least mitigate — the impact of that chaos and panic. The set of tools designed to do that is called personal contingency planning.
Chaos and Disruption
When disaster strikes, as in a terrorist attack, a number of things happen quickly and simultaneously. Often, panic erupts while people attempt to flee the scene of the attack. At the same time, police, fire and emergency medical units all attempt to respond to the scene, so there can be terrible traffic and pedestrian crowd-control problems. This effect can be magnified by smoke and fire, which can occlude vision, affect breathing and increase panic. Indeed, many of the injuries produced by terrorist bombings are not a direct result of the blast or even shrapnel but of smoke inhalation and trampling.
In many instances, an attack or natural disaster will damage electrical lines, or the electricity will be cut off as a precautionary measure. Elevators also could be reserved for firefighters. This means people are trapped in subway tunnels or in high-rise buildings, and might be forced to escape through smoke-filled tunnels or stairwells. Depending on the incident, bridges, tunnels, subway lines and airports can be closed or merely jammed to a standstill. This gridlock effect might be multiplied if the power is out to traffic signals.
In the midst of this confusion and panic, telephone and cell phone usage soars. Even if the main trunk lines and cell towers are not damaged or otherwise affected by the loss of electricity, this huge spike in activity quickly overloads the exchanges and cell networks. This means the ripples of chaos and disruption roll outward from the scene as people outside the immediate vicinity of the attack zone hear about the attack via the media and wonder what has become of loved ones who were near the site of the attack.
The Importance of Planning
Those in the vicinity of an attack have the best chance of escaping and reconnecting with loved ones if they have a personal contingency plan. Though such planning is critically important for people who live and work in close proximity to known terrorist targets such as Manhattan, Washington and Los Angeles, the recent bridge collapse in Minneapolis has demonstrated that such planning is important for people in other parts of the country as well. Sudden disasters, such as tornados, earthquakes, school shootings or the derailment of train cars carrying chlorine, can strike anywhere.
Emergency plans are vital not only for corporations and schools but also for families and individuals. Such plans should be in place for each regular location — home, work and school — that an individual frequents, and should cover what that person will do and where he or she will go should an evacuation be necessary. This means establishing meeting points for family members who might be split up — and backup points in case the first or second point also is affected by the disaster.
The lack of ability to communicate with loved ones because of circuit overload or other phone service problems can greatly enhance the sense of panic during a crisis. Perhaps the most value derived from having personal and family contingency plans is a reduction in the amount of stress that results from not being able to immediately contact a loved one. Knowing that everyone is following the plan frees each person to concentrate on the more pressing issue of evacuation. Additionally, someone who waits until he or she has contacted all loved ones before evacuating might not make it out.
It also is important to have a communication plan, which should include the contact information for the pre-chosen rallying site as well as an alternate communications hub outside of the area. It might be difficult to communicate from Point A to Point B, but both A and B might be able to get through to a person at Point C. Alternative means of communication also should be included in the communications plan. If the phone lines and cell phones are clogged, many times text messages can still get through and Internet connections will work to send e-mail. The communications plan also will be helpful in case one member of the family is unable to evacuate immediately or finds it unwise to evacuate at all. In that case, he or she will know where the rest of the family is going and how to contact them once communications are restored.
Planning also is important because, when confronted with a dire emergency situation, many people simply do not know what to do. Not having determined their options in advance — and in shock over the events of the day — they are unable to think clearly enough to establish a logical plan and instead wander aimlessly around. Having an established plan in place gives even a person who is in shock or denial and unable to think clearly a framework to lean on and a path to follow.
If You Must Evacuate
One of the keys to surviving a catastrophe is situational awareness [more about this important mindset in Chapter 2]. This means recognizing the threat at an early stage — and taking measures to avoid it. Another element of situational awareness is to know where to go when an unforeseen disaster strikes. For example, if an improvised explosive device (IED) were to detonate in a subway car ahead of the car you are in, would you know how to get out of your car and in which direction to travel to get to safety? If your office building is hit by an IED or catches fire, do you know where the fire exits are located and where they lead? Could one fire exit take you out of the frying pan and into the fire? Situational awareness also involves knowing how to react. If a subway tunnel is filling with smoke, you must have the situational awareness to keep low in order to avoid being overcome. In some cases, evacuation might not be the best idea. If there is no immediate threat to you at your current location, you could run a larger risk of being injured by joining the crowd of panicked people on the street. In some cases, it might be safest to just stay in place and wait for order to return — especially if you are in a location where you have emergency stocks of food and water.
If you work in a high-rise building, frequently travel or take a subway, there are a couple of pieces of equipment that can assist you in case the need to evacuate arises. One of these is a smoke hood, a protective device that fits over the head and provides protection from smoke inhalation. Smoke hoods are relatively inexpensive devices that can be carried in a briefcase or purse and quickly donned in case of emergency. They will usually provide around 20-30 minutes of breathing time — which could quite literally mean the difference between life and death in a smoke-filled hallway, stairway or subway tunnel. The second piece of equipment is a flashlight small enough to fit in a pocket, purse or briefcase. Such a light could prove to be invaluable in a crisis situation at night or when the power goes out in a large building or subway. Some of the small aluminum flashlights also can serve as a handy self-defense weapon.
If you live in an area likely to be hit by such an attack, it also might be prudent to prepare a small “fly-away” kit containing clothes, water, a first-aid kit, nutritional bars, medications and toiletry items for you and your family. It also is a good idea to include a battery-powered radio and other useful items, such as multi-tool knives and duct tape. The kit should be kept in a convenient place, ready to grab on the way out. Even if it is impractical to keep all these items in constant readiness, keeping most of them together and using a prepared list to collect the other items quickly can help get you out the door in seconds. Maintaining important papers, such as vehicle titles, deeds, licenses, birth certificates, passports and credit card information, in a central file allows you to grab that file quickly and take it with you.
The Need for Flexibility
It is important to listen to authorities in the case of an emergency, though you cannot rely on the government to take care of you in every situation because the resources simply are not there to do so. You must have plans ready to take care of yourself and your family.
If you have pets, you will want to take them into consideration when you make your plans. Will Fluffy be taken to the evacuation site in the case of a dirty bomb attack?
The emergency plan also must be fluid and flexible. It is important to recognize that even a good contingency plan can be worthless if protective measures taken by authorities during an emergency impede execution of the plan, or if the catastrophe itself closes down a section of your route. For example, bridges and tunnels might be closed and streets blocked off or jammed with traffic, meaning you might not be able to travel to safety or pick up family members or coworkers. Those whose plan calls for a flight out of the city might be unable to get to the airport or helipad or, once there, find that air traffic has been grounded, as happened after the 9/11 attacks. For these reasons, it is best to have several alternate contingency plans that account for multiple scenarios and include various evacuation routes. Once the emergency is announced, it likely is too late to start devising a plan.
Plans must be reviewed periodically. A plan made following 9/11 might no longer be valid. Bridges and roads you included might now be closed for construction. If Uncle Al’s place in West Virginia is your planned communications hub, then that needs to change when he moves to Texas.
Your equipment also should be checked periodically to ensure it is functional. Have you checked the batteries in your flashlight? Has your smoke hood become battered from being carried around for too many years? Have the power bars in your fly-away kit become fossilized?
Finally, while having a contingency plan on paper is better than having nothing, those that are tested in the real world are far superior. Running through an evacuation plan (especially during a high-traffic time such as rush hour) will help identify weaknesses that will not appear on paper. It also will help to ensure that all those involved know what they are supposed to do and where they are supposed to go. A plan is of limited use if half of the people it is designed for do not understand their respective roles and responsibilities.
No plan is perfect, and chances are you will have to “shift on the fly” and change your plan in the event of an actual emergency. However, having a plan — and being prepared — will allow you to be more focused and less panicked and confused than those who have left their fate to chance. In life and death situations, an ounce of prevention is a good thing.
CHAPTER 2: Situational Awareness
Guarding Cash and ATM Transactions
Jan. 23, 2006
Robbers, pickpockets, kidnappers and other criminals — not only in developing countries — tend to target traveling Westerners because of a general belief that their pockets are filled with cash or that they have access to large sums of money. Indeed, when traveling abroad, tourists and businesspeople often find it necessary to carry large amounts of cash or to frequently use ATM cards. To minimize the risk of being robbed — or worse — travelers can take several precautions.
Perhaps the best way to avoid being robbed while in a foreign country is to maintain a low profile. Travelers who wear flashy jewelry or pull out a large wad of cash in public are walking advertisements for victimization. It is best to leave jewelry in the hotel room or, better yet, at home. If it is necessary to carry large amounts of cash, the best practice is to keep it in several locations, and not all in one wallet or purse. A moderate amount of cash, say around $50, kept in a front pocket can be handed over to an assailant should the traveler be confronted. The thinking is that a robber will take the money and run, and the whole confrontation will be over in seconds. The key in this case is to minimize contact with the assailant.
When using an ATM, travelers tend to focus on the task at hand, not so much on those who could be lying in wait. This lack of situational awareness can lead to robbery or, even worse, to an “express” kidnapping [see Chapter 4, page 102], in which the victim is abducted and forced to withdraw money from his or her bank account using his ATM card until the balance is exhausted. Kidnappers who discover there is a large balance in the account have been known to hold on to the traveler until the account is depleted — often stuffed in the trunk of their car. To minimize this danger, many travelers choose to travel with a prepaid bank card — usually obtained at one’s local bank — that has a limited amount of money in the account. Having the bank card’s international assistance number in a secure location is helpful in the event an ATM card is stolen.
The best location for ATM use is a secure location such as inside a bank or hotel lobby. Many hotels abroad also will process cash advances from the traveler’s credit card account or exchange U.S. dollars into local currencies. Traveler’s checks also can reduce dependence on ATM’s altogether. The key to avoid using ATMs at risky times or in risky locations is to plan ahead, and have correct amount of cash needed for the day’s or night’s activities.
An increasingly prevalent type of high-tech fraud at ATMs is “skimming.” This crime involves placing a device that looks like part of the machine over the card slot. The device contains a card reader that records account information when the ATM machine is used, allowing cyber-
criminals access to bank account information. In many cases a camera also is placed on the machine to record PIN numbers.
The exchange rate in some countries — which can be artificially skewed in the host country’s favor — could tempt some travelers to take part in informal currency exchanges on the street or even in established places of business that are unauthorized to change cash. Visitors who engage in such illegal practices put themselves at risk of being deported — or worse — being jailed in some cases. This practice also opens up the possibility of receiving counterfeit money, which further puts the traveler at risk of ending up on the wrong side of the law. Being caught exchanging money on the black market can give some governments a means to blackmail foreign executives, forcing them to commit industrial espionage on their companies or face the consequences.
Exchanging money on the street also can put the traveler in close proximity to the local criminal element, which is often tied to organized crime. What starts out as an informal money exchange can easily end up becoming a kidnapping scenario. Generally speaking, if the exchange rate offered by someone on the street sounds too good to be true, it is.
Maintaining situational awareness at all times — at home or abroad — is key to minimizing risks of all kind. While in a strange city, however, travelers can reduce the chances of becoming a victim while away from home by being aware of their surroundings and taking certain precautions.
Key Steps to Avoid Falling Victim to Crime
June 5, 2006
A 35-year-old man awaited trial in Alabama on June 5 following his indictment on five felony counts in connection with the armed abduction and sexual assault of Birmingham lawyer Sandra Eubank Gregory. The suspect, Dedrick Griham, allegedly took Gregory from the parking lot of her apartment complex the morning of May 31 and forced her to make cash withdrawals from a series of ATMs. Details on the case, including surveillance video of the abduction, clearly indicate this began as an “express kidnapping.” Common in Third World countries but unusual in the United States, express kidnappings are easy to perpetrate and often last only a few hours. In Gregory’s case, Griham allegedly took her by surprise in broad daylight, pulling a gun on her from behind as she fumbled in her purse while exiting her car. After forcing her back into the car, her boyfriend’s Lexus RX300, the gunman forced Gregory to withdraw cash from three different ATMs. Police arrested Griham and rescued Gregory at a Comfort Inn motel nine hours after the abduction. The two apparently had never met prior to the incident, and it appears that Gregory was simply chosen at random.
Video of the crime scene suggests the 34-year-old Gregory made two mistakes during the initial moments of the kidnapping: She apparently failed to practice situational awareness and she let herself be taken from the primary crime scene.
Being aware of one’s surroundings is paramount in this day and age — so much so that it should be routine in everyday life. This is especially true because criminals tend to select victims who are not paying attention, and tend to shy away from those who have made eye contact. This kidnapping only highlights the fact that even in a downtown apartment complex in broad daylight, an unaware person can easily be taken by surprise. Although a large pickup truck in the next parking space may have obscured the kidnapper’s approach until he and the victim were virtually face-to-face, it probably did not help that Gregory was looking into her purse instead of checking her surroundings.
People who are not familiar with an area, tourists for instance, can be easy targets for criminals because they may be more focused on the surrounding scenery and not on the people. But people also can become targets in their usual surroundings precisely because they are in familiar territory and thus assume they are safe. In the Gregory case, the attacker did not simply “appear from nowhere,” as victims often are tempted to say. Since he approached the victim on foot, he doubtless was waiting nearby, casing for someone to grab. Gregory probably saw her attacker before he approached her. The question is whether she noticed him, and what she might have done differently if she had.
Perhaps Gregory’s biggest mistake was allowing herself to be taken from the parking lot. A victim has the greatest chance of survival during the first moments of a kidnapping, making his or her reaction during this brief period crucial. Once victims are taken to a secondary crime scene, they no longer are in a familiar setting and are less likely to be able to obtain help — and so the advantage falls to the kidnapper. Statistics clearly show that resistance and escape, even when facing a firearm, yields better odds of survival than going to a secondary crime scene. In this case, just as the suspect was backing Gregory’s car out of her parking spot, a second woman entered the lot. If Gregory had only delayed a few moments longer or screamed for help, the second woman might have been able to, at the very least, summon help. As a general rule, then, victims should resist an assailant’s attempts to force them into a vehicle, even one belonging to the victim. In this case, the assailant was only a robber. Had he been a sexual predator or a killer, he would have had ample time to commit his more violent crime.
The best way to avoid becoming a victim is to be aware of potential threats in the immediate vicinity and take proactive measures against them. By establishing early eye contact with potential assailants, people often can ward off attacks, as this small gesture communicates a nonsubmissive posture without being overtly confrontational. Most criminals seeking a target of opportunity will target a victim that displays less-assertive behavior. In interviews with law enforcement after a crime, many victims report they had felt something was wrong, or had a bad feeling about their assailant immediately before the attack, but that they took no preventive measures such as crossing the street or taking some other evasive action. Trusting one’s instincts or “inner voice” and not allowing one’s denial to override common sense often is the best way to avoid becoming a victim.
Threats, Situational Awareness and Perspective
Aug. 22, 2007
In last week’s Terrorism Intelligence Report, we said U.S. counterterrorism sources remain concerned an attack will occur on U.S. soil in the next few weeks. Although we are skeptical of these reports, al Qaeda and other jihadists do retain the ability — and the burning desire — to conduct tactical strikes within the United States. One thing we did not say last week, however, was that we publish such reports not to frighten readers but to impress upon them the need for preparedness, which does not mean paranoia. Though some threats are indeed hyped, the world nonetheless remains a dangerous place. Undoubtedly, at this very moment some people are seeking ways to carry out attacks against targets in the United States. Moreover, terrorism attacks are not the only threat — far more people are victimized by common criminals. Does this reality mean that people need to live in constant fear and paranoia? Not at all. If people do live that way, those who seek to terrorize them have won. However, by taking a few relatively simple precautions and adjusting their mindsets, people can live less-stressful lives during these uncertain times. One of the keys to personal preparedness and protection is to have a contingency plan in place in the event of an attack or other major emergency. The second element is practicing situational awareness.
The Proper State of Mind
Situational awareness is the process of recognizing a threat at an early stage and taking measures to avoid it. Being observant of one’s surroundings and identifying potential threats and dangerous situations is more of an attitude or mindset than it is a hard skill. Because of this, situational awareness is not just a process that can be practiced by highly trained government agents or specialized corporate security countersurveillance teams — it can be adopted and employed by anyone.
An important element of this mindset is first coming to the realization that a threat exists. Ignorance or denial of a threat — or completely tuning out to one’s surroundings while in a public place — makes a person’s chances of quickly recognizing the threat and avoiding it slim to none. This is why apathy, denial and complacency are so deadly.
An example is the case of Terry Anderson, the Associated Press bureau chief in Lebanon who was kidnapped on March 16, 1985. The day before his abduction, Anderson was driving in Beirut traffic when a car pulled in front of his and nearly blocked him in. Due to the traffic situation, and undoubtedly a bit of luck, Anderson was able to avoid what he thought was an automobile accident — even though events like these can be hallmarks of preoperational planning. The next day, Anderson’s luck ran out as the same vehicle successfully blocked his vehicle in the same spot. Anderson was pulled from his vehicle at gunpoint — and held hostage for six years and nine months.
Clearly, few of us are living in the type of civil war conditions that Anderson faced in 1985 Beirut. Nonetheless, average citizens face all kinds of threats today — from common thieves and assailants to criminals and mentally disturbed individuals who aim to conduct violent acts in the school, mall or workplace, to militants wanting to carry out large-scale attacks. Should an attack occur, a person with a complacent or apathetic mindset will be taken completely by surprise and could freeze up in shock and denial as his or her mind is forced to quickly adjust to a newly recognized and unforeseen situational. That person is in no condition to react, flee or resist.
Denial and complacency, however, are not the only hazardous states of mind. As mentioned above, paranoia and obsessive concern about one’s safety and security can be just as dangerous. There are times when it is important to be on heightened alert — a woman walking alone in a dark parking lot is one example — but people are simply not designed to operate in a state of heightened awareness for extended periods of time. The body’s “flight or fight” response is helpful in a sudden emergency, but a constant stream of adrenalin and stress leads to mental and physical burnout. It is very hard for people to be aware of their surroundings when they are completely fried.
Situational awareness, then, is best practiced at a balanced level referred to as “relaxed awareness,” a state of mind that can be maintained indefinitely without all the stress associated with being on constant alert. Relaxed awareness is not tiring, and allows people to enjoy life while paying attention to their surroundings.
When people are in a state of relaxed awareness, it is far easier to make the transition to a state of heightened awareness than it is to jump all the way from complacency to heightened awareness. So, if something out of the ordinary occurs, those practicing relaxed awareness can heighten their awareness while they attempt to determine whether the anomaly is indeed a threat. If it is, they can take action to avoid it; if it is not, they can stand down and return to a state of relaxed awareness.
Telltale Signs
What are we looking for while we are in a state of relaxed awareness? Essentially the same things we discussed when we described what bad surveillance looks like. It is important to remember that almost every criminal act, from a purse-snatching to a terrorist bombing, involves some degree of preoperational surveillance and that criminals are vulnerable to detection during that time. This is because criminals, even militants planning terrorist attacks, often are quite sloppy when they are casing their intended targets. They have been able to get away with their sloppy practices for so long because most people simply do not look for them. On the positive side, however, that also means that people who are looking can spot them fairly easily. The U.S. government uses the acronym TEDD to illustrate the principles one can use to identify surveillance, but these same principles also can be used to identify criminal threats. TEDD stands for time, environment, distance and demeanor. In other words, if a person sees someone repeatedly over time, in different environments and over distance, or one who displays poor demeanor, then that person can assume he or she is under surveillance. If a person is the specific target of a planned attack, he or she might be exposed to the time, environment and distance elements of TEDD, but if the subway car the person is riding in or the building where the person works is the target, he or she might only have the element of demeanor to key on. This also is true in the case of criminals who behave like “ambush predators” and lurk in an area waiting for a victim. Because their attack cycle is extremely condensed, the most important element to watch for is demeanor.
By poor demeanor, we simply mean a person is acting unnaturally. This behavior can look blatantly suspicious, such as someone who is lurking and/or has no reason for being where he is or for doing what he is doing. Sometimes, however, poor demeanor can be more subtle, encompassing almost imperceptible behaviors that the target senses more than observes. Other giveaways include moving when the target moves, communicating when the target moves, avoiding eye contact with the target, making sudden turns or stops, or even using hand signals to communicate with other members of a surveillance team.
In the terrorism realm, exhibiting poor demeanor also can include wearing unseasonably warm clothing, such as trench coats in the summer; displaying odd bulges under clothing or wires protruding from clothing; unnaturally sweating, mumbling or fidgeting; or attempting to avoid security personnel. In addition, according to some reports, suicide bombers often exhibit an intense stare as they approach the final stages of their mission. They seem to have tunnel vision, being able to focus only on their intended target.
Perspective
We have seen no hard intelligence that supports the assertions that a jihadist attack will occur in the next few weeks and are somewhat skeptical about such reports. Regardless of whether our U.S. counterterrorism sources are correct this time, though, the world remains a dangerous place. Al Qaeda, grassroots jihadists and domestic militants of several different political persuasions have the desire and capability to conduct attacks. Meanwhile, criminals and mentally disturbed individuals, such as the Virginia Tech shooter, appear to be getting more violent every day. In the big picture, violence and terrorism have always been a part of the human condition. The Chinese built the Great Wall for a reason other than tourism. Today’s “terrorists” are far less dangerous to society as a whole than were the Viking berserkers and barbarian tribes who terrorized Europe for centuries, and the ragtag collection of men who have sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden pose far less of a threat to Western civilization than the large, battle-hardened army Abdul Rahman al-Ghafiqi led into the heart of France in 732.
Terrorist attacks are designed to have a psychological impact that far outweighs the actual physical damage caused by the attack itself. Denying the perpetrators this multiplication effect — as the British did after the July 2005 subway bombings — prevents them from accomplishing their greater goals. Therefore, people should prepare, plan and practice relaxed awareness — and not let paranoia and the fear of terrorism and crime rob them of the joy of life.
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Terrorist Targets and the Lifesaving Mindset
Oct. 27, 2005
In our recent series on the terrorist attack cycle, we noted that terrorist and criminal operatives planning an attack are most vulnerable while conducting preoperational surveillance. Once the operation progresses to the attack phase, it generally is too late to stop it. Terrorists will have seen the target’s security measures during their surveillance and will have factored them into their operational planning. If they are unable to develop a tactic to counter the target’s protective security measures — or deploy enough firepower to overwhelm the measures — they simply will choose an easier target. By the attack phase, the attackers have identified the time and place in which their intended target is most vulnerable and have gathered the personnel and weapons required for the strike. In other words, they now have the luxury of choosing the precise time, place and method of attack — giving them the element of tactical surprise. They also will have prepared overwhelming firepower, such as a large improvised explosive device (IED), if the operation calls for it.
Given the attackers’ advantages, only a few factors can prevent a successful attack. The first is simple human error, often due to inexperience. On Dec. 22, 2001, Richard Reid was able to achieve tactical surprise by sneaking a shoe filled with explosives onto American Airlines flight 63. Between Paris and Miami Reid attempted to light his shoe with a match, but an alert flight attendant intervened in time. Reid’s inexperience in quickly and properly lighting a piece of safety fuse — and his failure to carry out his task in a locked restroom — saved the flight.
Equipment malfunction also can work against the terrorists. On Jan. 19, 2001, two Iraqi intelligence officers prepared to place an IED at the Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Manila, Philippines. Teams of intelligence officers had been dispatched from Baghdad to several parts of the world using consecutively numbered Iraqi passports. Their explosives were shipped via the diplomatic pouch and their operations coordinated by Iraqi embassies in their respective countries. By attacking the U.S. government in the Philippines instead of in some expected place such as Istanbul, Turkey, or Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the Iraqis achieved tactical surprise. Unfortunately for the officers, as they pushed the button to activate the timer, the device cooked off instantaneously, killing one of them and severely wounding the other. An identical device placed at the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Jakarta, Indonesia, failed to detonate.
The third factor is the target’s plain luck. On March 15, 1985, the vehicle driven by Terry Anderson, who at the time was The Associated Press bureau chief in Beirut, Lebanon, was nearly blocked by a car that pulled in front of it. Due to a number of traffic factors, Anderson was able to avoid what he thought was an automobile accident and continue on his way. The next day, Anderson’s luck ran out as the same vehicle successfully blocked his vehicle in the same spot. Anderson was pulled from his vehicle at gunpoint — and held hostage for six years and nine months.
Although intended targets have almost no control over the abovementioned factors, they do not have to resign themselves to being “sitting ducks” — if they employ attack recognition.
The most vital aspect of attack recognition is the target’s mental mindset. If a target remains unaware of the surroundings and oblivious to the fact that he is a potential target, his chances of recognizing the attack and taking countermeasures — and thus surviving — are very slim. A target in the it-will-never-happen-to-me frame of mind usually will go into shock — and freeze — as the attack begins.
This is not to encourage paranoia. One cannot function for long in that mental state, as extreme situational awareness and fear lead to a quick burnout. However, potential targets, such as U.S. businesspeople in a critical terrorism or crime environment, must maintain a heightened state of situational awareness. Only by paying attention to the people and events in the vicinity — whether one is walking, driving or riding a subway or in a chauffeur-driven car — can one begin to take evasive measures in time to possibly prevent an attack.
Victims of abductions and attempted assassinations many times are able to describe in detail — and in retrospect — how they were surveilled. They also acknowledge having had indications that they were about to be attacked, such as bad feelings about particular people or situations. Because of their mindset at the time, however, they failed to heed the warning signs and take action.
Not all of these indications will be as blatant as the failed abduction attempt against Anderson, but certain signs can indicate that something is afoot. One such sign is an operational signal. Quite often the attack team will employ a spotter to positively identify the target and alert the team that the target is entering the attack site. This signaling can be done by hand, with vehicle headlights or radios. Cell phones can be used but are not fast enough in many situations. Another sign could be a broken down vehicle or some other event or person who seems out of place.
Also, it is important in successful attack recognition to analyze the potential target to determine where vulnerabilities exist. This analysis should look at schedules and routes to determine predictable patterns. It also should identify potential choke points — places along a normal travel route that give the hostile elements the ability to control the target, provide cover for their actions and escape. Particular attention should then be paid to people, objects and events in and around the choke points and other possible attack sites. This often is where hostile surveillance or elements of an impending attack can be detected before the hostiles can spring their trap.
Of course, recognizing that something is amiss is just the first step. The second step is action. This can be as simple as following one’s instincts. If something “feels” wrong to the target, even if he or she cannot articulate the problem, some action should be taken — even if it means simply turning off the road and avoiding a choke point.
More important, if the potential target senses an attack coming, or actually is attacked, they must not let themselves slip into shock, freeze and panic. We call this “getting off the X.” The attackers already have selected the ideal attack site — the X — and the target cannot just sit on it. The target must fight back.
Many government and private training courses are available that teach tactical driving techniques and personal defense skills for “getting off the X.” No amount of training, however, can save even highly trained targets if they freeze up in an attack situation. It also is important to realize that solutions to every problem cannot be taught. Classrooms and practical exercises can only simulate a limited number of scenarios. When confronted in the real world by a life-or-death scenario, improvisation often is necessary.
The same principles also apply to IED attacks. Certainly the flight attendant on Reid’s flight realized what was going on and quickly rallied the passengers to restrain him and prevent him from lighting his device. Recognizing that a possible IED attack is in progress and avoiding the attack zone by driving, running, ducking or diving for cover is vital.
CHAPTER 3: Various Venues
The Militant Threat to Hotels
Jan. 27, 2004
Islamist militants are changing the way they do business. With the “hardening” of security around high-value targets worldwide that followed the Sept. 11 attacks, militants increasingly have turned their attention to “soft targets,” which include hotels. From the jihadist viewpoint, Western hotel chains and large luxury hotels could become the next best targets to embassies — they are symbols of Western elitism and offer excellent opportunities to strike at Westerners on foreign soil. And unlike government-protected embassies, most hotels remain easily accessible for preoperational surveillance and attacks, as demonstrated by bombings in Mombassa, Jakarta, Casablanca and, most recently, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.
Though the most likely method of attack at a hotel would involve a car or truck bomb or a suicide bomb in a public area, the risk to Westerners of being kidnapped or assassinated by Islamist militants is growing — and hotels are a venue for these crimes as well. Past plots demonstrate that such plans may be highly sophisticated.
These threats present serious considerations for corporate executives in the hotel and hospitality industry. Beyond the obvious necessity of protecting guests and employees, taking pre-emptive security measures is emerging as a corporate legal imperative, with failure to do so opening companies up to the possibility of damaging litigation.
Hotel operators have numerous methods to limit threats and deflect the interest of militant groups. In addition to important physical security measures like vehicle barricades and window film, employee training and protective countersurveillance programs are invaluable tools for securing a property.
Resources need to be spread evenly over all properties. In fact, geography is a key factor in determining the threat level to a particular hotel. The highest threats to hotels exist in Muslim countries with a known militant presence; such threats are somewhat lower in Western countries, including the United States. Vulnerability assessments of properties are a key method for determining how to best deploy finite resources to reduce the risk of a terrorist event.
The Emergence of Soft Targets
One of the important outgrowths of the Sept. 11 attacks was the substantial increase in security measures and countersurveillance around U.S. government and military facilities in the United States and overseas. The attacks had a similar impact in U.S. and foreign airports. The effective “hardening” of such facilities — which top the list of preferred militant targets — has made it measurably more difficult for militants to carry out large-scale strikes in these areas.
As a result, potential target sets have shifted from government and military facilities to lower-profile “soft targets” — defined generally as public or semi-public facilities where large numbers of people congregate under relatively loose security. Soft targets include various forms of public transportation, shopping malls, corporate offices, places of worship, schools and sports venues, to name a few.
Generally speaking, soft targets are easily accessible areas: They attract high human traffic and are surrounded by small security perimeters — often limited to gates and poorly trained guards — if perimeters exist at all. They are noteworthy for their dearth of trained, professional security personnel, actionable intelligence on potential threats and countersurveillance measures. The combination makes for an attractive target in the eyes of a militant.
Between the first World Trade Center bombing on Feb. 26, 1993, and the second attack on Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda focused primarily on hitting hard targets, including:
A U.S.-Saudi military facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Seven people, including five Americans, were killed when two bombs exploded on Nov. 13, 1995.
U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. More than 250 people were killed and 5,000 injured in the Aug. 7, 1998, bombings.
Following Sept. 11, there was a marked shift in attacks that was consistent with one of al Qaeda’s key strengths — adaptability. Al Qaeda-linked militant strikes since that time read like a laundry list of soft targets:
April 11, 2002. The firebombing of a synagogue in Tunisia kills 19. The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, an al Qaeda subgroup, claims responsibility.
Oct. 12, 2002. Jemaah Islamiyah stages a pair of bombings at a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 people.
Nov. 28, 2002. The bombing of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, Kenya, kills 13. An attempt to shoot down an Israeli charter jet with a surface-to-air missile at Mombassa airport is unsuccessful. Both incidents are believed to be the work of al Qaeda’s operational center in east Africa.
May 12, 2003. Suicide bombers attack a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 34 people, including 10 Americans.
May 16, 2003. A series of bomb attacks in Casablanca, Morocco, targeting a Jewish community center, a Spanish restaurant and social club, a hotel and the Belgian consulate, kill 41.
March 11, 2004. Multiple explosions hit the rail system in Madrid, killing nearly 200 people and injuring about 1,800. The Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades claims responsibility.
May 1, 2004. A team of four militants attack a Western corporate office in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, killing six people.
May 29, 2004. A team of four militants attack several Western corporate offices and housing compounds in al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia, taking hostages and killing 22 people.
Oct. 7, 2004. At least 22 people are killed when an vehicle into the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Taba, Egypt, a resort town on the Sinai Peninsula, and another suicide bomber detonates explosives in the pool area moments later. Separately, two car bombs also are detonated at campsites near Nuweba. Israelis are targeted in all incidents.
While there have also been attacks since Sept. 11 against harder targets such as embassies, the trend toward softer targets is unmistakable. This trend will continue as Islamist militant cells become even more autonomous, and with the growth of “freelance” jihadists in various parts of the world. These are al Qaeda sympathizers inspired by Sept. 11, Afghanistan, Iraq or some other event but who lack specific training in camps and likely have no direct connection to the wider jihadist network. Nevertheless, they can be dangerous, particularly if they are attempting to prove their value. In both cases, a lack of resources, planning capabilities and operational experience will necessitate the choice of softer targets.
Hitting such targets allows militants to maximize the casualty count while limiting the chance of preoperational interdiction. This is a question of access to the target as well as limited or ineffective countersurveillance.
From a militant perspective, the downside is that hitting soft targets usually limits the political and ideological mileage of the attack. Islamist militants prefer targets with high symbolic value, but they have proved willing to forego some degree of symbolism in exchange for a higher chance of success. However, attacks against certain soft targets, such as synagogues and large Western hotels, can at times provide the necessary combination of symbolism and a large — primarily Western — body count.
The Threat to Hotels
Hotels — particularly large, Western-owned hotels on foreign soil — are the quintessential “soft target.” They have fixed locations and daily business activity that creates a perfect cover for pre-operative surveillance. Extensive traffic — both human and vehicular, inside and outside the buildings — goes largely unregulated. This is especially true for larger hotels that incorporate bars, restaurants, clubs, shops and other public facilities. While security workers do monitor and confront suspicious loiterers, one easy work-around for militants is simply to check into the hotel, thereby gaining full access and guest privileges.
The ingress and egress gives militants ample opportunity to blend into the crowd, both for extensive preoperational surveillance and actual strikes. In a departure from the security situation in airports and other places, it is not uncommon to see anonymous and unattended baggage.
Outside, most hotel perimeters are unsecured, with limited to non-existent standoff distance and easy access for cars and trucks — including buses and taxis that could be used as a Trojan horse for a bombing. Also, it is common for vehicles to be parked and left unattended in front of many hotels. Loading ramps and parking garages offer other opportunities for those seeking to detonate large truck or car bombs.
Ultimately, security rests primarily in the hands of hotel workers. Globally, police and other government security forces are stretched thin; their priority is to protect official VIPs and critical infrastructure. Threats to hotels and other private facilities are of secondary concern, at best.
However, many large hotels and hotel chains are unwilling to incur the direct costs associated with hardening security, such as more numerous and better-trained guards. Though some hotels have expanded the use of video surveillance, most lack the trained professionals and man hours needed to turn electronic gadgets into intelligence tools. In most cases, the utility of the technology comes after an attack, during the investigative phase, and thus has little preventive value. Similarly, guards and other employees are rarely trained in countersurveillance techniques, which may be the most cost-effective method of preventing an attack.
In the past, many hotel managers have been unwilling to risk alienating their clientele by incorporating more cumbersome security measures — such as identity and key checks upon entry, baggage screening and more extensive standoff areas — that guests view as inconvenient and which thus could directly impact business. Moreover, it can be difficult to justify the investment of millions of dollars in security precautions when the risk — much less the return — cannot be quantified. Given the highly competitive nature of the industry and guests’ unwillingness to accept inconvenient security practices, hotel owners often have been forced to take the calculated risk that their businesses will not be targeted.
In the wake of the October 2004 attacks at the Hilton hotel on the Sinai Peninsula, however, that might be changing: An attorney representing some victims has demanded that the Hilton hotel chain accept responsibility for the security and belongings of its guests. Terrorism-related liability considerations, which perhaps could be termed a hushed concern among hotel industry insiders since Sept. 11, are becoming a much more prominent issue. On the upside, there are unique methods of countersurveillance that can help mitigate threats to hotels.
From the jihadist viewpoint, there are several more advantages to targeting hotels. In many countries where militants are numerous, large hotels are among the most prominent symbols of Western culture — especially recognized Western chains such as Marriott, Hilton and Inter-Continental hotels. Also, Islamists long have looked upon hotels as places of vice: They are places where men and women mix freely, and guests can engage in the consumption of alcohol, music and dance, fornication and adultery. This provides an additional, ideological justification for attacking hotels.
Because large hotels are places where Westerners are most likely to be found — either in residence or living or attending meetings, parties or conferences — they offer the best opportunity for militants in many countries to kill or injure large numbers of Westerners, possibly including visiting business and government leaders, in a single attack. Such elites are particularly high-value targets, especially if they are seen as collaborating with or supporting “illegitimate” or “apostate” rulers in Islamic countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Jordan.
In Issue No. 7 of al Qaeda’s online training manual, Camp al-Bataar Magazine (issued in March 2004), an article providing guidance for striking human targets noted: “The primary targets should be Jews and Christians who have important status in the Islamic countries . . . Our advice is to start with unprotected soft targets and the individuals from countries that support the local renegades.” Hotels may well be the best way of attacking Jews and Christians who are visiting and collaborating with local regimes.
Additionally, jihadists increasingly have shown an interest in attacks that carry economic impacts. Spectacular attacks against hotels in certain countries — especially those with tourism-based economies — can generate substantial economic pain. One example is the 2002 nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which temporarily decimated the island’s tourism trade and impacted the wider Southeast Asian tourism industry. The bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, Kenya, in 2002 and of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, the following year had similar impacts, resulting in government travel warnings that cut into those countries’ economies. Elsewhere, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and ETA in Spain also have struck at hotels and tourist sites as a means of harming the economy and pressuring the enemy governments, a factor that also was at issue in the recent bombings in Sinai.
Bombings: The Primary Threat
Hotels figure prominently in a growing list of successful attacks, with two main types of operations: car and truck bombings and human suicide bombings. Assassinations and kidnappings at hotels also should be considered as a growing risk for Westerners. The most substantial threat comes from bombs: either a car or truck bombing at a hotel entrance, inside a garage or other perimeter locations, or a suicide bomber who seeks to detonate his explosives within a hotel lobby, restaurant or other public gathering place inside a hotel.
Vehicle bombings tend to generate the greatest number of casualties — and they are difficult to defend against, especially without some type of countersurveillance program. Recent car or truck bombings involving hotels as targets have occurred in Jakarta, Indonesia (August 2003); Costa del Sol, Spain (July 2003); Mombassa, Kenya (November 2002); Karachi, Pakistan (May 2002); and Taba, Egypt (October 2004), as well as on multiple occasions during the past year in Iraq.
Suicide bombings or human-placed bombs have occurred inside and outside hotels recently in Katmandu, Nepal (August 2004); Moscow, Russia (December 2003); Casablanca, Morocco (May 2003); Bogota, Colombia (December 2002); Netanya, Israel (March 2002); Jerusalem, Israel (December 2001); and Phnom Penh, Cambodia (July 2001).
In both types of attacks, the majority of those killed or injured were just inside and outside of the hotel lobbies and on the ground floors, with some impact also to the hotels’ lower floors. Many of the deaths and injuries result from flying glass, making window film a cheap and effective way of lowering the death toll.
Kidnappings and Assassinations
While bombings remain al Qaeda’s favored tactic globally, kidnappings and assassinations are increasing in number as other Islamist militants adapt their tactics. As recent events in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, Chechnya and the Philippines have shown, jihadists have begun to adopt kidnappings — often followed by murder — both as a symbolic act and as a practical means of raising funds.
The editions of Camp al-Bataar Magazine issued in April and May 2004 give very detailed tactical recommendations for carrying out assassinations and kidnappings. Related targeting guidance has placed increased emphasis on symbolic individuals, including Western executives. This certainly does not preclude lower-level employees of Western companies from becoming targets as well.
Hotels, with their substantial traffic and relatively uncontrolled environments, are a prime venue for kidnappings or assassinations. Even high-profile, protected individuals who have constant security protection while traveling generally are more vulnerable at the hotel than elsewhere.
Though security teams can be deployed ahead of time to protect the sites that VIPs visit during the day, individuals tend to be at greatest risk while entering or leaving hotels — which, again, are high-traffic, high-risk environments. Moreover, in such a location, it would be possible for a guest to be kidnapped or killed without anyone noticing his or her absence for some period of time. Sophisticated attacks could be carried out at hotels, where a VIPs location remains static for the longest period of time.
The creativity or planning that al Qaeda could employ in an attack against a VIP at a hotel should not be underestimated. And the threat of a hotel-based assassination of a VIP is not just theoretical: In fact, hotels have been on al Qaeda’s radar screen for more than a decade.
The New York City Bomb Plots
In the aftermath of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, several plots were uncovered that centered around attacks against the U.N. Plaza Hotel and the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City. Extensive surveillance of the hotel had been conducted — both inside and out — and various attack scenarios were outlined by Ramzi Yousef (the mastermind of the WTC bombing) and the local militant cell. As past experience testifies, it would be foolish to discount these plans today; al Qaeda is known to return to past targets and plot scenarios.
In the New York cases, operatives had devised the following scenarios:
Using a stolen delivery van, an attack team would drive the wrong way down a one-way street near the Waldorf “well,” where VIP motorcades arrived. A hand grenade would be tossed as a diversionary tactic by a lone operative from the church across the street. A four- man assault team (a tactic recently used in Saudi Arabia) would deploy from the rear of the van and attack the protection cars and then the VIP’s limousine.
Another scenario involved militants in gas masks infiltrating the hotel after midnight — when they knew protection levels were lower — moving up to the VIP’s floor via the stairwells with assault weapons, hand grenades and tear gas, then attacking the VIP in his room.
Follow-up analyses by counterterrorism authorities determined that these scenarios would have carried a 90 percent success rate, and the VIP — as well as multiple protection agents — would have been killed.
In the aftermath of the New York City bomb plots, intelligence also indicated that elements associated with al Qaeda had planned to detonate car bombs at hotels where high-value targets were staying.
Determining the Threat Level
The threat to hotels is not equal around the globe, and in fact is highly correlated to geography. Geographic threat rankings are as follows:
High. Hotels in Islamic countries with a proven level of militant activity and a regime that Islamists consider hostile, especially Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Turkey, Kuwait, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. At a slightly lower level, the rest of the Persian Gulf can be included in this ranking, as can North Africa — including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt — and much of Central Asia. Though Israel boasts some of the world’s most secure hotels, the threat level there remains quite high.
Moderate. Hotels in other countries with a proven Islamist militant presence, especially India, Russia, Malaysia and much of Western Europe — notably Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Asian nations that are considered allies of the United States — including Japan, Singapore and South Korea, and particularly those with a rich tourism trade such as Australia and Thailand — also are included. Hotels in major U.S. cities, such as New York City, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, Detroit and Houston also rank in this tier. STRATFOR views Houston, New York City and Washington as particularly high-risk cities.
Low. Hotels in Latin America are at low risk of strikes by Islamist militants. Most of Central, Eastern and Northern Europe ranks in this tier, as does China and most of North America (excepting the major U.S. cities noted above). Hotels in the United States and, to some degree, Europe, are at lower risk, due to the vast number of other soft targets — especially public transportation — available to militants.
U.S. counterterrorism sources tell STRATFOR that they are particularly concerned about hotels in two locations: Amman, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In Amman, the concerns center on the large Western hotel chains that serve as forward deployment locations for contractors, journalists and others waiting to enter Iraq. One hotel that is popular among Westerners is located very near the U.S. Embassy. The hotels and bars are filled with Westerners and could make attractive targets for Jordan’s substantial Islamist militant community.
Sources within Saudi Arabia also have expressed concern about the large Western hotel chains, specifically because they lack basic security measures — such as standoff perimeters and ballistic window film. STRATFOR shares the view that an attack against a Western hotel in Saudi Arabia is just a matter of time.
Meanwhile, British and Australian intelligence sources cited in June 2004 by the Far Eastern Economic Review said they believe Indonesian militant group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has shifted its tactics away from car bombings toward targeted assassinations of Western VIPs. The report specifically mentioned the risk to British, American and Australian diplomats but also warned that JI assassins could widen their target sets to include foreign businesspeople.
Recommendations
The first step for large hotel operators in dealing with this threat is to undertake a vulnerability assessment to identify properties that are most likely to be at risk. Such an assessment — based primarily upon assets’ geographic locations and an understanding of Islamist intentions and areas of operations — will allow companies to focus their time and resources on the most vulnerable properties, while more generally ensuring that security measures do not overshoot or undershoot the threat level for a particular property. This allows for better, more efficient use of resources.
For high-threat properties, the next step is usually a physical security survey to identify specific weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In some cases, diagnostic protective surveillance can help to ensure that properties are not currently under hostile surveillance. Some kind of ongoing protective surveillance program is the best insurance for interdicting hostile actions.
Because of the very large number of potential targets in most locations, the implementation of some very basic but visible measures might be sufficient to send an attacker on to the next possible target. These security enhancements include:
Landscaping in front of and around the hotel that prevents vehicles from directly approaching the entrance or actually entering the building — for example, large cement flower pots that can stop vehicles, hills with rocks embedded in them, and palm trees.
Other security measures might be appropriate in medium- and high-threat level locations:
If possible, increase the stand-off distance between the hotel and areas of vehicular traffic. Physical barricades are among the most effective deterrents to vehicle bombings, helping to keep drivers from crashing through the doors of a hotel and detonating explosives in high-traffic areas.
The following practices also are recommended for all locations:
Employee education. At minimum, hotels should train employees, especially doormen and other ground-level employees, in basic protective- surveillance techniques.
Maintain a good working relationship with local police and other relevant authorities. Identifying hostile surveillance is useless unless a plan is in place to deal with it. Sound relationships with local police and other agencies — such as foreign embassies in overseas locations — are the answer. Though authorities might not be able to spare resources to monitor a hotel, in many places they will respond quickly to reports of suspected surveillance activity, confront suspicious people and possibly head off an operation.
Air Marshals and Risk Mitigation
Dec. 15, 2005
U.S. media attention has again returned to the Federal Air Marshal Program, following the fatal shooting of an airline passenger on a Miami jetway last week — and fresh news, on Dec. 14, that a test of the marshal program will be run on passenger rail and bus systems in some U.S. cities. Intriguingly, the expansion plans are being made public in the wake of a 9/11 Commission report that says the government still hasn’t done enough to ensure homeland security in the four years since the Sept. 11 al Qaeda attacks.
Of course, the homeland security dilemma has many aspects, and the air marshal program is only a part of one of those — transportation security. But it is a significant program, in that it touches directly on the psychological comfort (or lack thereof) of American travelers and commuters, which has direct economic impacts. Taken together, the Miami shooting, news of the marshal program’s plans for expansion and the 9/11 Commission report underscore some compelling truths — and raise some deeper questions — about U.S. homeland security as a whole:
The air marshal program, where it is in use today, is working. The shooting of an unarmed passenger in Miami, while potentially controversial for outside observers, unfolded along more-or-less textbook lines from a security perspective: A threat emerged on board an aircraft, air marshals were present to monitor and react to the threat and, once the situation exceeded a certain threshold, officers shot to kill.
While most of the post-event questions focused on whether the shooting of the passenger — who reportedly was mentally ill but was not armed — was justified, it raises a very different question from a security perspective: What would have been the outcome if the same event, or one involving a passenger who actually was carrying a weapon, had occurred on a flight that was not manned by an air marshal? Certainly, not all U.S. flights have security coverage, and there is potential for loopholes to be exploited.
The U.S. government clearly recognizes the vulnerabilities of the public transportation system, which Islamist militants — even prior to what is recognized as al Qaeda today — have a long history of targeting. And while plans to protect passenger rail systems are important, the evolution of a protective strategy has been slow. The plan announced Dec. 14 has certain merits and drawbacks, but the diversion of scarce resources from the airline industry to other forms of transportation would not, on its face, appear to be the wisest solution to the security problem.
Having said that, the diversion of air marshals may in fact be the most viable fix to the dilemma, at least for the near term. In what could be termed the federal “war for funding,” the proposal announced Dec. 14 — in which air marshals would team up with local police or transit authority security forces to monitor threats on subways and buses in certain cities — was a shrewd move by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Not only is it responding to congressional pressure to do more for national security, it is also highlighting its capabilities in a way that eventually could lead to greater funding for the air marshal program, which has been operating at a manpower deficit from the beginning.
The issue with which the TSA is struggling is the classic dilemma of a growing business in any competitive industry: At a certain point, it often becomes necessary to expand operations or areas of focus in order to grow (in terms of manpower and revenue). With the Dec. 14 announcement, it appears that the air marshals are surging forward to fill an obvious vacuum in the U.S. security infrastructure in a way that few, if any, other federal security agencies could.
Applied on a limited basis — as the upcoming rail-security test has been devised — this is a move that could yield important insights and developments in protecting public transportation systems. But there also is a clear risk that the TSA’s ability to protect, with a fixed number of assets, both commercial aircraft and other forms of transportation could be affected.
To be sure, neither the TSA nor the air marshals have yet mastered all the intricacies of protecting commercial air flights, as the 9/11 Commission recently pointed out. In all fairness, the problems in that area are not issues that any government agency can overcome on its own. They are combinations of manpower shortages, bureaucratic inefficiencies, commercial considerations and — let’s face it — political will on the part of the public.
It is easy to cite the flaws in the U.S. air-travel security program — and some international security leaders are fond of doing so — when it is compared to a leading industry example: Israel’s El Al airline. In this case, the numbers alone tell much of the story: El Al receives comprehensive security coverage for each of its 31 aircraft, which fly into and out of a single airport (Ben Gurion) with an annual passenger load of just over 3 million people, according to 2004 figures. In the United States, the eight largest commercial carriers own a combined 2,861 aircraft, which fly in and out of dozens of airports on a regular basis, with a 2004 passenger load of more than 483.7 million people.
In El Al’s case, two to four Shin Bet agents accompany each flight, and crew members —who frequently are veterans of the Israeli Defense Forces — have security training as well. The precise number of U.S. federal air marshals working today is not known, but officials say it now numbers in the “thousands,” as opposed to about three dozen at the time of the Sept. 11 attacks. However, there is a gap between the number of assets available and the number of flights demanding protection — thus, many flights go without federal protection, and civilian crew members cannot necessarily fill the void.
There are other differences as well, many of them structurally driven. For instance, El Al’s pre-flight screening procures are detailed and intensive, with each passenger subjected to covert surveillance and interviewed about travel histories before ever boarding a flight. There is a public/private partnership at work behind the scenes: Because El Al is a state-owned airline — and that state considers itself to be perpetually at war — there is an unwavering commitment to security; protective systems have been hard-wired into its business methods, and revenue and profit considerations take a lower priority. In the United States, attention to airline security (indeed, all forms of travel security) has been reactive rather than pre-emptive, and attempts to fuse security considerations into business methods frequently come into direct and predictable conflict with profit and revenue considerations.
In short, it is not possible, in the United States, to simply “protect things the Israeli way,” as some have suggested, because of the vast differences in scale and the fundamental structural differences between not only the airline industries but also government and public mindsets.
Given those limitations, the TSA has been using what, to our minds, is the most logical means of deploying limited assets: It uses a “threat matrix” that combines known information about threatening groups with, when possible, intelligence about direct threats or risks to specific areas. For instance, a commercial flight from London to New York City or from Damascus to Washington, D.C., likely would be manned by an air marshal as a way of mitigating threats from al Qaeda or other Islamist groups, whereas an internal flight from Columbus, Ohio, to Charleston, W. Va., would not — unless, for example, security agencies were to get a tip about a plot touching on those areas in some way. This is, as we say, a logical method, but not a foolproof one, as there have been instances when some high-risk flights had no marshal coverage at all.
Any search for a perfect solution would, in the end, be a vain one. It might be possible for El Al to provide flawless security aboard its aircraft, but Israelis standing in line at bus stops in some cities are risking life and limb. Likewise, the only truly viable security systems to be found in the U.S. context are those striving for risk management and deterrence, rather than total risk elimination. This will be a permanent feature of the U.S. travel industry — whether applied to airlines, commuter rail or public bus systems.
It is against this backdrop that the expansion of the program — even on a test basis — to rail and bus systems becomes interesting. Security in other areas of transportation, particularly passenger rail, is indeed needed. In the wake of the July 7 attacks in London, the Madrid bombings nearly two years ago, and ongoing — albeit intermittent — rumors and threats of terrorist attacks within the United States, doing nothing to protect the rail systems is not, for the Bush administration, an option. For the TSA, having the air marshals step up to lend a hand in this area could, in time, bring in more funding to help plug holes in the existing system as well.
But at the same time, disturbing questions about the speed of the federal government’s response still linger. Threats to passenger-rail systems have not been as clearly visible in the United States as threats to commercial airliners, but they have been visible in the global context for quite some time, and passenger rail was pinpointed as a vulnerability even before the Madrid attacks took place. Further, the learning curve of terrorist groups — including but not limited to al Qaeda — has been material for considerable study; groups in various parts of the world learn from each other and can adapt techniques and methods used elsewhere quite easily. But the learning curve — measured by response — for the U.S. government is not as dynamic. While the nation’s pre-emptive intelligence efforts have improved, protective security responses still are coming late.
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Self-Preservation Techniques for Airline Passengers
Jan. 13, 2006
The International Air Transport Association, a Montreal-based industry group, predicts the number of people who fly each year on business and leisure will soon top 2 billion worldwide. As traffic rises, airports around the world are increasingly jammed with crowds of passengers waiting to check in, pass security and board their flights. Although the congestion increases pressure on security authorities, the fact is that air travel is safer today — in the post-Sept. 11 environment — than it has been in years. Passengers, however, should not rely solely on outside security for their personal protection.
Air marshals are present on U.S. and many foreign airlines, cockpit doors remain locked while the plane is in flight and international “no-fly” databases are aimed at ensuring that people who pose a potential threat do not board international flights. Perhaps most effective is the heightened state of vigilance and awareness that air travelers have adopted since the Sept. 11 attacks. In addition to official security, hijackers also would have to contend with a plane full of passengers who know now that the highjacking could be a suicide mission — and that their lives are at stake.
Even with this atmosphere of security surrounding air travel, travelers nevertheless can take steps to ensure their own security while on a plane. Passengers who include a smoke hood and a small flashlight among their carry-on items, for example, could help themselves in an emergency situation, whether it be an attack or an accident aboard the aircraft. In such situations, smoke inhalation, especially from the extremely toxic burning plastics within a plane, poses a serious threat. In addition, a flashlight can be used to facilitate getting off of the aircraft when the power is out and the air is thick with smoke. With more emphasis placed on securing aircraft, however, militants could be content to confine their attacks to terminals, where crowds of waiting people present an enticing target for militants aiming to cause mass casualties. Travelers, however, can mitigate the risks by maintaining a high degree of situational awareness and taking other personal protection measures.
In a security sense, airport terminals are divided into two parts. The “soft side” is before the security checkpoint — where passengers and carry-on luggage is screened — while the “hard side” is after. Time spent in line at the ticket counter and then at security checkpoints, therefore, should be minimized. In the first case, arriving at the counter early enough to avoid the mad dash of latecomers would help, while avoiding wearing clothes with lots of metal buttons and buckles, and minimizing carry-on baggage can expedite getting through security. Once on the hard side, travelers should avoid the waiting areas at the gate, if possible, by utilizing the members-only lounges operated by many airlines. This helps to keep the traveler out of a potential attack zone — away from crowds and out of plain view.
In many parts of the world, air travel can be dangerous because of lax maintenance and safety procedures. This is especially true in the developing world, where maintenance regulations and procedures often are not strictly enforced. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration prohibits U.S. carriers from flying into foreign airports that do not meet security and safety standards. Although this information is not readily available to the public, determined travelers could contact the FAA for a list — and then avoid those airlines and airports that U.S. authorities consider substandard. The consular information sheets issued by the U.S. State Department also provide information about air travel safety.
At the destination airport, transportation can be arranged in advance to further minimize time spent on the soft side. For traveling executives, discretion should be employed when it comes to finding the local driver on the other end of a flight. A driver who holds up a sign bearing the executive’s name and/or the company’s name could tip off potential kidnappers and terrorists to the presence of a high-value target.
Airport terminals, especially in the developing world, are notorious for criminal activity. When on the soft side, unattended luggage can be stolen and travelers can be victimized by pickpockets — especially when they are less vigilant after a long, exhausting intercontinental flight.
Situational awareness and preparation are the most effective personal security measures a traveler can take. Paying attention to people and events in the area and avoiding potential attack zones are two basics for self-preservation while in the terminal and on the plane.
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The Risks of Public Transportation
Jan. 20, 2006
Travelers who rely on public transportation in some parts of the world risk losing their wallets or purses — if not their lives — to criminal or terrorist elements. Recent history has shown that buses, taxis and even subways can be extremely dangerous. When at all possible, travelers are better off using private transportation, or at least exercising the utmost caution while even in the vicinity of public transportation vehicles or facilities — as the Jan. 19 suicide bombing near the Old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv, Israel, proved.
By far, the most common threat to passengers on buses and at bus stations are petty crimes such as pickpocketing. But bus stations and the buses also make excellent terrorist targets. Although Tel Aviv’s Old Central Bus Station apparently was not the main site of the Jan. 19 attack, three previous attacks have occurred in the vicinity since 2000. In Baghdad, bus stations also are frequently targeted by suicide bombers. Buses are one of the favored militant targets because they present not only the opportunity to kill or maim a large number of people, but also because they allow the bomber to target a specific demographic group, such as Shia heading to a shrine south of Baghdad or Israeli soldiers waiting at a bus station in Tel Aviv. These are basic targeting criteria for militants. Taxis also present a significant degree of risk in many countries, where visitors have been robbed or abducted while in a taxi from the local airport or while riding around city streets. In many cases, taxi drivers actually belong to criminal gangs who use the driver to deliver unwitting passengers to armed accomplices waiting nearby. From there, the visitor can become the victim of an “express kidnapping,” in which he is forced to withdraw money from his bank account using his ATM card. In other scenarios, the driver might fake having engine problems or simply stop at a traffic light to give accomplices in a following car an opportunity to enter the cab and rob the passenger.
In cities such as Mexico City and Bogota, Colombia, foreigners should never hail a taxi on the street and should never share a cab with a person other than the driver, including the driver’s so-called “brother,” “son” or “cousin,” who are often preludes to a criminal attack. Furthermore, taxis are not well regulated in many cities, which means “independent” drivers — some not using taxi meters — roam around the streets looking for potential passengers. In parts of the former Soviet Union, including Moscow, people hailing a taxi have had private cars stop to offer rides. In most of the world’s more developed countries it is against the law to ride in a taxi that is not accredited or certified by the government — and those who do so put themselves at risk not only of falling victim to crime but also of being caught in illegal activities.
In India, authorities have taken steps to safeguard cab riders — and preserve the country’s tourism industry — following attacks against passengers, including the rape and killing of a female Australian tourist by a New Delhi taxi driver in March 2004. In addition, the Indian Tourism Ministry established a special taxi service for women. Of course, this is no guarantee that all taxis in the country are safe.
In China, on the other hand, the Beijing airport operates regulated and well-secured taxi lines, and the taxi companies provide a card and pamphlet (in poor English) with phone numbers to call if the service is unsatisfactory.
In many cities worldwide, international travelers often prefer to use the subway or metro system, finding it cheaper, faster, less language-dependent and more reliable than taxis or buses. The threat of petty crime and terrorist attack, however, is no less significant with this mode of transportation. To mitigate these threats, hiring a private car service often is the best way to go — and reputable cars for hire can be reserved in advance through hotels or reliable local sources. Many hotels also have exclusive arrangements with accredited taxi companies.
In many cities, especially ones in the developing world, business visitors often are met at the airport by company vehicles with drivers who sometimes double as armed security escorts. As a precaution, waiting drivers should not hold out a sign with the passenger or company’s name at the airport, as it could attract kidnappers or extortionists who know companies will pay ransoms.
Detailed and customized information about specific threats to travelers overseas can be obtained by utilizing a private security consulting firm. In addition, consular information sheets provided by the U.S. State Department and similar services provided by the British and Australian foreign ministries list common crime and/or transportation problems for particular countries.
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Protecting Information in Electronic Devices
Jan. 27, 2006
The tag line of an old American Express commercial warned travelers, “Don’t leave home without it.” In today’s world, the business traveler finds it hard to leave home without at least a laptop, cell phone and personal data assistant (PDA). Some also tote iPods in which sensitive information has been stored. Executives who fail to secure these devices while traveling abroad, however, are exposing the information they contain to the possibility of theft from business competitors — and even from foreign governments.
Criminals, too, like laptops because of their high value on the resale market. These devices are frequently stolen in airports, bars and restaurants and on trains, buses and even the street. Therefore, a laptop should not be set down in a place where a thief can quickly snatch it and run. In addition, it is a good idea to carry a laptop in a non-typical
bag, rather than its case, which often has the manufacturer’s logo on it.
Beyond the risk of a snatch-and-run robbery, however, is the chance that private business competitors or foreign governments — or state-owned or -operated business competitors — will peek into the system in order to glean valuable company-specific information such as client lists and account numbers.
Some countries have been known to use their national intelligence services to spy on visiting executives, especially when the executive’s competition is state-subsidized. This makes the visitor’s information vulnerable not only to hostile intelligence but also to hostile intelligence backed by the resources of a government, which is a significantly greater threat than corporate spies. This has been known to occur in Russia, India and China, as well as in countries that many executives would not consider hostile in this area, such as France and Israel. Using a commercially available encryption program can help protect sensitive information on computers when traveling. To further safeguard the information, however, the program’s pass code should never be cached in the computer’s memory. In addition, icons for the encryption program should not be displayed on the desktop or taskbar. In some countries, airport security personnel have been known to start up a visiting executive’s laptop and, upon finding a software encryption program icon, attempt to retrieve the computer’s data. In some countries, laptop screens have been smashed by frustrated intelligence officers who have discovered that the device was password-protected and encrypted.
The best way to protect sensitive information contained in a laptop or PDA is to avoid exposing the device to potentially compromising situations. Minimizing the amount of sensitive information stored on the computer also is a good idea. In other words, the computer should contain only information that is specific to the current trip and, when possible, it should not contain account numbers, passwords or other sensitive information. Then, should the device be compromised, the executive can take some small comfort in knowing that not all of the company’s sensitive information has leaked out. It goes without saying that no sensitive information should be stored on cell phones or iPods, especially when traveling abroad.
It also is important to ensure that all important data on a laptop is backed up in another location. In high-crime areas it is advisable to carry the laptop’s hard drive separately from the rest of the computer, such as in a coat pocket. Then, should the laptop be stolen, the thief will not get the data — which likely is much more valuable to a traveling executive than the machine itself.
In some countries, it is not beyond the local intelligence service to steal a visiting executive’s laptop and make it look like a simple theft. For this reason, a laptop should never be left in a hotel room or even in the room’s safe — especially in a country in which the government has only to ask the hotel for the pass key to get in.
Because of this, ensuring constant, physical security of PDAs and laptops is one way to have the best chance of securing important information. Executive protection personnel should take custody of a traveling executive’s PDA and/or laptop when they are not being used; while the executive is making a speech or attending dinners or other engagements, for example.
Another way to avoid exposing a laptop to a security breach is to leave the laptop at home and instead carry a device such as a BlackBerry or other PDA. These devices are small enough to tuck inside a pocket and thus can be carried at all times. Of course, this does not eliminate the theft risk — and wireless devices carry their own inherent security risks — but at least the devices can be kept close at hand. Laptops and other electronic devices have become essential travel accessories because of the vast amount of information they can hold in a relatively small space. For the same reason, they also make a prize catch for anyone with hostile intentions. Travelers who take precautions to safeguard the information on these devices and to mitigate the potential adverse effects of a compromise could be saving their companies from serious harm.
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Common-Sense Measures for Leisure Time
Jan. 31, 2006
Westerners who travel abroad on business often find they must entertain themselves in the evenings or during breaks between meetings. Some even build extra time into their schedules in order to become better acquainted with their host city. These times, however, can be especially risky for strangers in a strange land.
In many countries the number of people who should not be trusted generally exceeds those who can. Included in this list are many the Western traveler would not normally suspect of having hostile intentions, such as taxi drivers, street vendors, those claiming to offer guide services, prostitutes — and even law enforcement officials and children.
Westerners, and particularly U.S. citizens, often are targeted for robbery or kidnappings — at the hands of common criminals or militant groups — simply because they are believed to have deep pockets. They must remain vigilant against possible threats to their personal security, especially after business hours, when people tend to let their guard down.
Bars and casinos represent a threat for many reasons, especially those venues that might cater to prostitutes or drug traffickers. A traveling executive who engages in some form of illicit liaison can find one or more of his or her companion’s accomplices lying in wait to commit a robbery — or worse.
In many countries, taxi drivers often are part-time criminals. Some will offer to take visitors to a local hot spot off the beaten path when they are actuality setting the visitors up for robbery. Street vendors also can make a victim out of an unwitting visitor by offering to escort the foreigner someplace to look at merchandise or to meet local artisans. These scenarios sometimes end in a bad part of town where accomplices are waiting to commit robbery or cause bodily harm. Children are known to be expert pickpockets in many countries, and they often will surround a traveling Westerner, seemingly to talk or ask questions but in reality to remove his or her possessions.
Although there have been stories of Western visitors breaking local laws and getting off with only a fine or a “slap on the wrist,” foreigners who engage in illegal activity while abroad can find themselves in serious trouble. First, taking part in unregulated, illegal activities such as gambling, prostitution, drug transactions or black-marketeering puts the visitor in contact with a criminal element, which can lead to violence. Second, in many countries, local law enforcement officials literally have the power of life and death over people who break the law in their jurisdictions. They can be just as likely as a criminal element to beat, rob or even kill someone in their custody. Before departing, it is a good idea to be absolutely clear on the destination country’s laws.
Criminal elements also will take advantage of a visitor’s lack of familiarity with local geography and customs. Travelers who walk around a foreign city with the idea of taking in the local color risk wandering into a dangerous neighborhood. Just as in the United States, foreign cities have areas that are dangerous for local inhabitants, to say nothing of conspicuous strangers. This risk is compounded when the wandering occurs at night, even when travelers are in a small group.
In order to keep a low profile, visitors should dress conservatively, especially in a conservative or religious country. They also should avoid wearing clothing purchased locally, as they can miss the subtle meaning of a color or pattern — and perhaps offend the wrong people.
The desire to record travel memories on videotape or photos also can lead to problems for travelers who are unaware of local laws and customs. In many countries it is forbidden to photograph military installations or government buildings. Security forces also can take offense when being photographed and in some parts of the world may respond by confiscating film, breaking cameras or worse. It also can be dangerous to photograph civilians, as in many countries this is considered offensive behavior. This goes doubly for locals taking part in religious rituals, as they can react negatively, perhaps aggressively, to having their pictures taken, or even to being asked to be photographed by an outsider.
To avoid having trouble abroad, traveling executives should use common sense and always maintain a high state of situational awareness. The same general rules that apply in any large U.S. city also apply in cities around the world: Avoid hustlers, muggers, gangsters, pimps, grifters and pushers. In many parts of the world, however, these elements are more prolific and brazen than in U.S. cities. When preparing for a trip abroad, travelers should consult the U.S. State Department’s consular information sheet on the destination country. This document, as well as any recent Warden Message, will contain information on potential threats and recent trends in local criminal activity. For more information about generally safe places to visit —and those to avoid — the concierge in most quality hotels can be a reliable, knowledgeable guide. In some cities, however, it could be advisable not to leave the hotel at all during leisure times. By staying in the hotel and taking advantage of the services in the resident bar or restaurant, the visitor minimizes contact with potential criminal elements. Furthermore, by charging meals and drinks to the room, travelers avoid having to carry a large amount of cash. Westerners who want to avoid danger while traveling abroad will arrive in their host country with a basic knowledge of local threats, laws and customs. Furthermore, they will avoid danger zones and maintain situational awareness at all times. Practicing a little common sense can’t hurt either.
Residential Security: Assessing the Environment
March 8, 2006
A common bond among people throughout the world, regardless of nationality or place of residence, is the need to feel safe in one’s home and to protect the family members who dwell in it from criminal invasion and other threats. In some neighborhoods in the United States and elsewhere, security might mean simply locking the front door at night and turning on the porch light. In many other places, residential security can be much more complicated. In all cases, having a plan for residential security is of key importance.
Effective residential security planning starts from the outside and works in. This allows residents and security professionals to make informed choices, beginning with the selection of a residence location, and down to detailed decisions about guards, fences, locks and alarms. Both limitations on resources and aesthetic considerations call for a measured, informed approach to security countermeasures.
The first step, then, is to assess the general security environment of the region in which one lives, taking into account both the national and city-specific history of crime, terrorism and civil unrest — and the current climate on all three. Residential security should be more robust in Beirut, Lebanon, for example, than in Oslo, Norway. The potential threat from natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and hurricanes also should be taken into account, as should the threat of martial law or government-imposed curfews that could leave residents isolated and, perhaps, without basic supplies and services. In such environments, a good security plan will provide for self-sufficiency in case of infrastructure disruptions and imposed limitations on mobility.
The next steps are assessments of the specific security environment of the neighborhood and of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the residence itself. It also is vital to understand whether the inhabitants themselves are prime targets for crime or terrorism simply because of their nationality, job position or level of wealth. Western housing compounds in some countries can be particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack, for example, because of their symbolic value and the likelihood that a strike would cause a high number of casualties. Similarly, the occupants of the home of
a high-profile executive or government official might be more attractive to kidnappers or other criminals because of the wealth or status associated with the person’s job. Entire neighborhoods, in fact, can be targeted by professional criminals because of their affluence. Of course, the number of valuables inside the home also increases the risk factor. A person with a multi-million-dollar art collection has a greater chance of being targeted by art thieves than someone without such a collection, for instance.
The effectiveness of local law enforcement and emergency response personnel also should be evaluated. If something goes wrong, what are the chances of getting help from them? Law enforcement that tends to respond ineffectively to petty crime often is opening the door to criminals of all kinds, including violent ones. If possible, a statistical history of crime in the neighborhood, usually available from local law enforcement, should be studied. Questions to be answered include: Are violent or confrontational crimes prevalent, as opposed to petty theft? Are home invasions common? It should be borne in mind that in many areas (Mexico City, for example), serious crimes often go unreported, due to mistrust of the police and lack of public confidence in their competence. In such cases, official government statistics are not to be trusted, and a deeper, perhaps more intuitive, study is required.
Whether one lives in an urban or rural setting is another consideration when determining to what degree the home must be secured and the kind of contingency plan to put in place. Recovering from a disaster, violent crime or militant attack could be more difficult in a remote area or a town with poorly developed facilities. With this in mind, an assessment of the area’s infrastructure should be made, with attention paid to the availability and reliability of communications and electricity as well as the quality of local medical facilities. The specific questions when considering this issue would include: Should the residence have backup generators in case of power loss? Is a secondary supply of food and drinking water needed? How far away is the nearest hospital? What are its standards of treatment and equipment?
Beyond the safeguards that might be needed for a particular dwelling, it also is important to know the risks associated with the geography of the immediate neighborhood. Some street layouts, for example, are attractive to criminals and potential attackers because they offer easy access to the neighborhood from outside or rapid escape routes after crimes have been committed. Some neighborhoods include features such as trees and bushes, vacant lots, or busy roads that help those engaged in hostile surveillance blend in. Local ordinances or covenants that restrict the erection or walls or the use of security measures such as window grates or certain lighting also can be a factor in determining the security of a neighborhood. In addition to examining the immediate vicinity, the surrounding areas also should be evaluated for their level of crime or other hostile activity, as these problems can easily spill over and become a direct security threat.
Once the broader security analysis is complete, residents can begin to create an informed plan to protect their home and its occupants.
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The Five Rings of Protection
March 9, 2006
The “outside-in” approach to developing an effective residential security plan involves a system of five concentric rings of protection. The outermost ring is off the property in the area surrounding the residence. The second ring usually is the residence property line, and the third is the outer perimeter and grounds. The fourth ring is the “hard line,” the actual walls of the residence, and the final, innermost circle is the safe haven, a place to shelter during an attack or intrusion. Ideally, a professional security service that is trained in countersurveillance should provide the first ring of protection, by patrolling the neighborhood regularly. In U.S. neighborhoods, however, this function often is performed by police and neighborhood watch programs, both of which can be effective deterrents to crime. If dedicated security patrols are not available, residents should encourage local authorities to step up police patrols and develop a cooperative relationship with others in the vicinity. The area around the residence also should be well-lighted at night to discourage both surveillance and criminal activity.
The second ring starts with a clearly delineated property line, which is marked as private property and includes physical barriers such as fences or hedges to discourage casual or accidental intrusion. For this, aesthetic considerations should be taken into account. A high wall topped with razor wire, for example, might not fit in with many residential areas. If possible, the entire property line should be accessible to security personnel, including police, so that they can regularly inspect the entire perimeter to watch for signs of intrusion.
Depending on the size of the area contained by the property line and the available security personnel, the outer perimeter of the property — the third ring — can reach to the property line. For larger estates, however, fencing in the entire property might not be feasible, meaning the outer perimeter will be closer in to the residence. In general, it is better to establish an outer perimeter that can be adequately patrolled and protected by available security personnel than to try to cover too much area and have security spread thin. In any case, the outer perimeter should, at a minimum, provide a physical barrier to intrusion and shield the property from prying eyes such as paparazzi or hostile surveillance. The physical barrier along the outer perimeter can range from aesthetically pleasing privacy fencing or hedges to electric fencing or massive concrete walls topped by razor wire.
If the security assessment has deemed it necessary, the outer perimeter also can be monitored by security personnel and/or the resident using closed-circuit television cameras. The perimeter should be well-lighted to discourage intruders and to provide enough light for the cameras to be effective. Where aesthetic concerns or local light-pollution ordinances must be considered, infrared lighting and infrared sensitive cameras can be used. Intrusion-detection equipment, such as pressure plates, buried radio frequency loops or motion-detector systems — all connected to alarms — also can be used.
Full lighting should be available on demand, in case of emergency, though suddenly flooding the grounds with light can be a double-edged sword: It can expose intruders, but it also can reveal the location of residents and/or security personnel. Therefore, the circumstances and techniques for employing full lighting should be carefully considered, based on the situation.
The outer perimeter should be established far enough away from the residence to provide enough stand-off distance to mitigate the effects of explosives or to give security personnel a better chance of intercepting an intruder who is heading for the house. In extreme cases, in regions in which the overall threat is especially pronounced or the resident is assessed to be at extreme risk, the outer perimeter should be actively patrolled at all times by human security personnel. These can include armed or unarmed security guards, on foot or in patrol vehicles. Guard dogs can be employed in extreme situations, as they make excellent patrol and detection assets, especially with an armed handler.
In some cases, an upper-floor apartment in a well-secured building can be a wise choice for housing because such living provides a degree of anonymity, while access to the public is limited via the use of security cards or doormen. However, the quality of the building’s security system and personnel, as well as the risk incurred by living in close proximity to the other residents, some of whom may be high-value-targets, must be taken into consideration. Apartment living also complicates fire/evacuation plans.
The dwelling’s grounds, part of the third ring of security, also can be covered by closed-circuit TV or seismic detection devices, infrared cameras and motion detectors. Any system, however, should be linked to a single, integrated alarm set to alert both security personnel and residents to any intrusion.
Residents and security management should develop clear understandings with first responders, such as local police, as to the actions they will take should an intrusion occur beyond the outer perimeter. These procedures should be tested by both residents and security personnel, with response times carefully noted.
The “hard line” — the walls, doors and windows of the residence itself — makes up the fourth ring. In practical and legal terms, this barrier can and should be protected according to the level deemed appropriate in the overall security assessment and, if necessary, defended with force. The hard line should have its own system of passive and active defenses. Passive defenses include robust construction, locks, landscape features and security procedures, while active defenses include alarms, detection systems and security personnel.
Special attention should be paid to the strength, quality and proper installation of doors and locks. Ideally, cipher locks with combinations that can be changed frequently should be used, as changing the combinations mitigates the threat of a former, possibly disgruntled, employee or staffer from having access to sensitive areas. In cases in which a combination lock is not optimal, a good quality dead bolt also can be effective. Double-cylinder dead bolts should be used if the door is near any window. Both types of locks can be augmented by a simple slide bolt that goes into the floor. In all cases, locks should be professionally selected and installed by specialists. However, the best lock in the world, even when set in a sturdy metal door, can easily be kicked in if it also extends into a cheap wood frame.
Special attention should be paid to windows, especially ground-floor windows. It goes without saying that locks on ordinary glass windows are useless, as shattering or removing a glass pane allows access to the residence. In extreme cases, then, ground-floor windows should be barred, as should any higher window that can be reached if the intruder climbs onto a wall or tree. Of course, emergency releases should be installed on an adequate number of the window bars to allow for escape in case of fire. Wherever possible, landscaping features such as hedges should be kept away from hard-line walls, windows and doors, as they can conceal an intruder. Another passive defense is having the entire hard line flooded with light, infrared if necessary. In addition, any outside roof access ladders should be enclosed by cages and locked.
Active defenses along the hard line should consist of redundant intrusion-detection systems and individual alarms that are connected to the overall alarm system but that function if the main system fails. The system should be backed up with battery power in case electric power is lost or disconnected. A cell phone backup also should be at hand at all times, in case the phone lines go down or are cut. In addition, door and window alarms plus systems that detect motion or glass breakage can be installed inside the residence if the broader assessment demands their use.
“Panic alarms,” those that can alert the entire household and even local police to an intrusion, also should be discreetly placed in several strategic locations around the residence. And an intrusion beyond the hard line must always be treated as an extreme emergency until security responders can clear the residence. This requires that security respond immediately and aggressively to an intrusion and that the residents retire immediately to the final ring of protection — the safe-haven.
It is important to note that a security plan should be commensurate with the overall threat assessment for the residence. In other words, while the five rings of protection are standard for every dwelling, the degree to which they are reinforced can fluctuate. What works to prevent criminal intrusion may not be sufficient to defend against militant attackers armed with heavy weapons or explosives. Also, some individuals, based on their status or what they symbolize, are at greater risk than others and require fuller security. With this in mind, a measured response to the assessed threats should be applied.
Safe Havens and Evacuation Plans
March 9, 2006
Of the five rings of protection in residential security, the innermost ring is the safe haven, or “panic room.” It is the place to which residents can retreat if a potentially violent intruder successfully penetrates the outer security rings and gains entry into the residence. Safe havens are small, windowless rooms such as sufficiently sized and unobstructed closets or purpose-built rooms designed and installed by professionals. In most cases, using these rooms is preferable to attempting to run from the residence in the event of a break-in, as running could expose the residents to the intruders.
Not all residential security plans require a safe haven, although if the decision to create or install one is part of the broader security assessment, it should become an integral part of the plan. Every home, however, should have a fire/evacuation plan. The safe haven should be centrally located on the sleeping floor, the part of the residence where bedrooms are located. If there is more than one sleeping floor or area, each one should have its own safe haven. The pathways from the sleeping quarters to the safe haven should be easy to maneuver and free from obstructions — and they must not cross the paths likely to be used by the intruders.
Safe havens usually are rated based on the time it would take an intruder equipped with hand tools such as sledge hammers and crowbars to break into them. Thus there are 10-minute safe havens, two-hour safe havens, etc. This rating is reflected in the design and materials used in constructing the haven. The level of protection required should be based on the overall security assessment, and as a rule should at minimum protect residents for twice the known and tested average response time of security responders. In its design phase, attention should also be given to the safe haven’s air supply.
The safe-haven also can be equipped with a firearm for defense, although the decision to maintain firearms for self-defense in the home is personal and specific to each family, and depends on the capabilities of family members who might use them. In the hands of a well-trained person who has the will — not everyone does — to use deadly force in an emergency, a firearm can be an effective deterrent to violent intruders. Whatever the decision, firearms must be well maintained mechanically, able to be deployed quickly under high-stress conditions and carefully secured inside the safe haven. A firearm in the hands of an untrained person is more dangerous to him or her than it is to the attacker.
As part of their attack, intruders could cut telephone and power lines. Thus, it is best to have two communication options in the safe haven in case one system is unavailable or nonfunctioning. A regular hard-line phone supplemented by a combination cell phone/radio on a battery charger would work in this case. A panic alarm whose signal is different from those of other alarms in the house also should be part of the safe haven’s equipment, in order to let first responders and security personnel know that the family has gone to the safe haven. A stand-alone backup power source is advisable in case the primary power source is cut.
The safe haven should also be stocked with materials and supplies that the residents might need during an assault and subsequent siege. This includes first-aid supplies as well as necessary medications. In certain cases, the safe haven might include an inhaler for an asthma sufferer, a defibrillator for an elderly family member or insulin and sugar sources for diabetics. Auxiliary light sources such as flashlights or battery-powered lanterns will be needed if all sources of power have been interrupted. In addition, drinking water, an emergency food supply such as energy bars, and provision for toilet functions should be included in the event of a prolonged siege.
Like any security precautions, a safe haven is useless without a plan, and a plan is useless unless it is practiced. A typical plan might go as follows: When an unauthorized intrusion is detected, family members move immediately toward the safe haven. As they move, the nearest available panic alarm is activated. Once the family goes into the safe haven and secures the door, the safe-haven’s alarm is activated. Then a head count is taken to ensure that everyone in the household is present. In the case of separate safe havens, the head count can be completed by phone.
During the emergency, a line of communication is established with security personnel and first responders who are briefed on the situation. It is essential that this line be kept open. The family stays inside the safe haven until the all-clear is given by security responders. This plan should be practiced by all family members in conjunction with any employed security personnel. Everyone should know the plan and their part in it so they will know what to do in the event of an emergency.
Because fire or other environmental dangers, such as gas leaks, smoke and dangerous fumes, are far more common than invasion by hostile intruders, a fire/evacuation plan should be included in every residential security plan. It is advisable to cooperate with firefighting professionals in formulating fire/evacuation plans. In many cases, experts from the local fire company are available to provide on-site advice and surveys, and some have formal training programs established, as do some home insurance carriers. In the United States, a good fire plan will at minimum adhere to standards established by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which provides codes for fire detection equipment. In homes with valuable art collections, some insurance carriers may impose requirements over and above those of the NFPA.
A good fire plan includes frequent, regular maintenance of detection equipment and fire extinguishers, and all adult family members should be trained in the use of extinguishers. Because kitchen fires are perhaps more common than any other kind in modern houses, consider equipping kitchens with automatic extinguishing systems employing Argonite or FM-200. If the residence contains any appliance that could produce carbon monoxide (CO), CO detectors should be installed. Obviously, these fire and smoke alarm systems should have audible tones that are easily distinguishable from intrusion alarms. Heat detectors are available for areas in the home where smoke detectors might produce false alarms.
In general, the best plan in case of fire is to evacuate the premises and leave fighting it to the professionals. A family fire plan should, at a minimum, include several evacuation options, and a single “rally point” well away from the building, where a head count can be conducted. When formulating the evacuation plan, provision must be made for family members who have mobility problems. One or two commercially available folding escape ladders can be kept on the upper floors within easy reach of established escape routes, such as windows or balconies, in order to facilitate escape. In addition, every family member should have a commercially available smoke hood stored in or near their sleeping quarters.
The fire plan, like the security plan, must be practiced by residents and any security personnel employed. Each family member should know where to go and what to do in case of a fire. In particular, because of the physical considerations involved, the use of ladders and smoke hoods must be practiced.
When formulating an emergency action plan, it should be kept in mind that the more complex a plan is, the more likely it will fail. Plans must be simple, not only because children often must participate, but because sudden stress impairs memory and thought processes for people of all ages.
CHAPTER 4: Kidnapping
Taking Advantage of Panic
April 5, 2006
Although kidnap-for-ransom schemes, especially those involving high-profile figures, can net huge payoffs in terms of money and media exposure, creative criminals in many parts of the world have devised a way to avoid the risky and labor-intensive work of actually abducting their victims by staging so-called “virtual” kidnappings. This relatively new trend involves no abduction whatsoever. Virtual kidnappers must simply convince a target’s family that a kidnapping has occurred. Though the “victim” most likely is in no danger, the panicked family members will quickly pay the “ransom” — and the virtual kidnappers will be gone before the family comes to its senses.
Virtual kidnappings rely heavily on obtaining — and exploiting — personal information about the target. In one such scheme, the kidnappers position themselves at a mall or other youth hangout claiming to offer young people a chance to enter a contest for prizes such as iPods or X-Boxes. The youths then fill out “entry blanks,” unwittingly offering up personal information such as addresses, home phone numbers and the names of parents. Afterward, the kidnappers follow the potential target until he or she enters a place where cell phones cannot be immediately answered, such as a school or a movie theatre. This provides the kidnappers with a window of opportunity to call the target’s parents, claim that they have abducted their child, describe details of authenticity such as what the person is wearing or where he was going, and demand that a ransom be paid immediately.
This new form of pseudo-abduction is based largely on psychological shock, scaring the victim’s family into making an irrational, impulsive decision such as transferring large sums of money. The advantage to the pseudo-abductor is that none of the traditional infrastructure is required.
Typical kidnappings involve the housing and feeding of the victim, and usually require a gang of accomplices to successfully execute. With increased manpower and infrastructure, the risk grows of a kidnapping going bad. A virtual kidnapping can be pulled off by a single person or small gang, using a cell phone and requesting ransom money be deposited into an anonymous bank account.
This is a very quick process compared to conventional kidnappings, which can take several weeks to negotiate a release. Virtual kidnappings rely on the element of surprise and a demand for ransom within the hour, giving no time for the family to consider their options or contact authorities. In the event virtual kidnappers are caught, they do not face the same punishments as conventional kidnappers. A virtual kidnapping essentially is extortion, with no physical harm coming to anyone.
While virtual kidnappings have not been widely seen in the United States, they have become more common in countries with dense urban populations like Taiwan, Mexico and Brazil. In Taiwan, virtual kidnappers have been known to have a random child screaming in the background to further elevate the parents’ level of panic during the phone call. The distraught parents will proceed to pay the “ransom” without thinking to call their child’s cell phone. In Mexico, virtual kidnappings have become more prevalent in the past two years, with many of the extortion calls coming from inside prisons. In these cases, jailed gang members threaten to kidnap or kill a family member and demand that payments be made to accomplices on the outside.
Because these criminals rely heavily on obtaining personal information about the intended target, knowing when and where to share that sensitive information is vital to preventing a virtual kidnapping. Knowing the whereabouts of family members throughout the day also is essential. Should a caller claim that a child has been taken when the child should be in class, a quick phone call to the school can defuse the situation before it gets out of hand. Virtual kidnappings are based solely on fear and can be foiled simply by knowing the real whereabouts of a “victim” and keeping one’s wits if a ransom call comes in.
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Cleaning Out the Victim’s Bank Account
May 2, 2006
The bodies of two Austrian backpackers were found in shallow graves in La Paz, Bolivia, on April 3. Bolivian media reported that the victims had been abducted by individuals wearing police uniforms and that their bank cards had been used to withdraw cash from several locations around Bolivia.
It appears the two Austrians were victims of an express kidnapping gone wrong. Under normal circumstances, victims of such kidnappings are robbed of their possessions and then forced to empty their accounts from ATMs. In most cases, the victim is held only while the bank account is emptied, though some express kidnappings can last up to several days while the perpetrators clean out large accounts or wait to collect a quick ransom. Like all confrontational crimes, however, express kidnappings can end in the victim’s death.
Express kidnappings are increasingly common in the Third World, particularly in Latin America — and especially in Mexico. Although these kinds of kidnappings commonly start near an outdoor ATM, they can be initiated just as easily during the course of a carjacking, while a traveler is in a taxi operated by a rogue driver or even in a more rural area. Many times the victim has consumed a large amount of alcohol and his inebriation has made him an easy mark.
Because of individual withdrawal limits and other security features regarding the use of debit cards, the perpetrators must hit several ATMs — sometimes as many as five or six in an hour. These multiple withdrawals over a short time, however, can trigger security lockouts of the card, causing the perpetrators to keep their victim for days if the transaction receipt shows a large balance. Some gangs reportedly have kept their victims confined in the trunk of a car for several days while they drain their bank accounts via debit cards. Express kidnappings also can turn into longer-term kidnap-for-ransom abductions if the criminals discover the victim has significant financial assets — usually by the more-exclusive credit cards in his or her wallet or a business card that identifies the person as a top executive of a well-known company.
Express kidnappings are preferred by small-time criminals for several reasons. Unlike long-term kidnap-for-ransom schemes, the perpetrators generally do not need extensive infrastructure such as safe houses and round-the-clock guards, nor do they need to worry about providing meals and restroom facilities. Express kidnappings also offer the perpetrators a rapid return for their efforts, since the debit account can be cleaned out in a few hours or a ransom quickly paid. Also, holding a victim for such a short time reduces the chances for law enforcement to track down and apprehend the perpetrators.
Because express kidnappings often are carried out by inexperienced kidnappers, the victims are at risk of suffering physical harm or being killed almost immediately, especially if something unexpected happens during the abduction that causes the kidnappers to panic. Another danger, although quite rare, is that the kidnappers will kill the victim even after the accounts are emptied or the ransom paid rather than risk being identified later. Female victims also run the risk of being sexually assaulted by their abductors.
To avoid becoming the victim of an express kidnapping, certain precautions should be taken when traveling. Because taxi drivers often are used by express kidnapping gangs to obtain victims, taxis not affiliated with a reputable company or hotel should be avoided. Travelers also should use ATMs in secure locations such as shopping malls, stores and bank or hotel lobbies rather than on the street, where express kidnappings often are initiated. Travelers also should be aware of indications of a carjacking and practice appropriate preventative or defensive measures. Overall, practicing good situational awareness and surveillance awareness is the best way to avoid becoming a victim.
To minimize loss during an express kidnapping, travelers should consider carrying only cash or, if they must carry a debit card, use one that accesses an account with limited funds, rather than one linked to both checking and savings accounts. The theory here is that the sooner the money runs out, the sooner the victim will be released.
It also is important for victims of any type of kidnapping to try to humanize themselves to their abductors. If possible, some attempt should be made to relate to the kidnappers on a human level — showing pictures of loved ones or talking about sports, for example. If the kidnappers see their victim as a human being rather than an object, the less likely the victim will be killed or abandoned.
The victim also must be prepared to hand over valuables at once. Hesitation or refusal to relinquish valuables could cause an already nervous express kidnapper to resort to violence or, in the case of a simple robbery, cause the perpetrator to abduct the victim with the intention of taking the valuables elsewhere.
During any kidnapping, the most dangerous time for the victim is during the initial abduction — when events are unfolding rapidly, weapons are being brandished and tensions are running high. This period, however, also offers the best chance for escape. In debriefings of hostages, most have said they perceived that a threat was developing, but they did not want to believe it was happening to them. In these early minutes of the kidnapping, however, the perpetrators can lose control of the situation, giving the victim a chance to escape. Of course, if they lose control, the kidnappers could panic and kill the victim on the spot.
Once the initial abduction is over and the kidnappers have control of the victim, the immediate escape window is closed. Now, the victim should cooperate with the kidnappers while continuing to look for viable opportunities to escape. At this point, however, the victim could be making a life-or-death decision: Trying to escape can get one killed — but so can staying put.
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High Value Targets: Going for the Big Money
May 3, 2006
In 2003, four gunmen kidnapped U.S. billionaire Eddie Lampert as he left his Connecticut home and held him bound and blindfolded in a bathtub in a cheap motel outside of New Haven. After two days, Lampert succeeded in convincing the increasingly jittery kidnappers to let him go. A short time later, the men ordered a pizza using Lampert’s credit card, leading police right to them.
This case is noteworthy because it demonstrates that even bumbling criminals can abduct a high-value target (HVT) in the United States if proper security precautions are not taken. It also demonstrates the importance of the victim’s role in securing his or her own freedom.
HVT kidnappings, those in which a person of significant personal wealth or status is kidnapped for ransom, are complex — and risky — crimes. These kidnappings are often led by professional criminals and carried out by crews chosen for their specialized skills, such as drivers, gunmen and physical-control specialists. Such kidnappings are also characterized by much more thorough planning than goes into most crimes. In addition to the extensive research of the target, preoperational surveillance and escape plans that might be performed by bank robbers, for example, kidnappers must make arrangements for holding the victim for a prolonged time, making ransom demands and successfully collecting payment.
Because of the complexity of HVT kidnappings — and the high stakes involved — the perpetrators will conduct research on the Internet and use other means to determine the target’s assets, behavioral patterns, security measures and vulnerabilities. Plotters might also attempt to enlist the help of someone close to the target, such as household staff, especially workers with access to restricted areas or with knowledge of the target’s security. Enlisting the help of insiders is important to kidnappers because insiders can provide valuable information about the target, or even give the kidnappers direct access. Moreover, long-term surveillance of the target will enable the kidnappers to determine when and where he or she is most vulnerable — that is, when the kidnapper has the best chance of carrying out a successful abduction.
During the abduction, kidnappers will display an overwhelming show of force to minimize possible resistance. Once the victim is in their control, the kidnappers will take the victim to a safe house, a location out of plain sight where they can control and operate in with relative freedom. In a prolonged kidnapping, the safe house must be stocked with provisions to hold and feed the victim and staffed with personnel who can provide around-the-clock security for the facility and guard the victim.
In addition to the safe house, kidnappers must make elaborate arrangements for communicating among themselves and with the victim’s representatives. These communications are used to negotiate the ransom and arrange for the ransom’s delivery and release of the victim.
Planning for the ransom-victim exchange requires the abductors to make elaborate arrangements to ensure their security and maximize their chances of escape. These arrangements may include surveillance of the area to check for law enforcement and ensure that the victim’s representatives are complying with instructions. In most cases, the kidnappers must also determine a rendezvous point where they will meet after the operation. In the United States, things often go wrong during this delicate exchange, resulting in either the capture of abductors or the abandonment or death of the victim.
Professional criminals prefer HVT kidnappings to the kinds of express and virtual kidnappings carried out by less proficient criminals for several reasons, but primarily because of the potential for a large payoff. They also like the challenge of pulling off a dangerous HVT kidnapping. For career criminals, this challenge is akin to climbing Mount Everest or robbing Fort Knox. Also, unlike armored car heists or bank robberies, kidnappings in the Third World are very rarely reported to the authorities. However, HVT abductions often involve targets with more resources, which allow victims to enlist professional help in tracking the kidnappers. When law enforcement gets involved in HVT cases, police forces in many countries will also devote more resources to capturing the kidnappers. In the United States, the FBI handles kidnapping cases and has highly sophisticated resources to devote to the problem. Because of this, the overwhelming majority of kidnappers who ask for ransoms — between 95 percent and 98 percent — are caught and convicted. Therefore, kidnapping for ransom is rare in the United States, and HVT kidnappings are even rarer. Most kidnappings for ransom in the United States occur within immigrant communities and are perpetrated by other members of the immigrant group (e.g., Chinese Triad gang members kidnapping the children or spouses of Chinese businesspeople).
The real risk for most U.S. HVTs is overseas, especially in countries like Mexico, Colombia and Iraq, where kidnapping is a well-developed cottage industry. In these places, the industry thrives due to the lack of law and order and the presence of corrupt, often complicit, police.
As in any kidnapping situation, danger to the HVT victim is high — and the victim’s ability to respond appropriately is vital. In a well-planned kidnapping, as most HVT abductions are, the rapid execution and seemingly overwhelming force displayed by abductors will leave the victim believing there is little or no choice but to comply. During the initial abduction, resisting the kidnapper sometimes works, but fighting back is probably not worth the risk unless there is a clear way to escape. If the victim notices the threat as it develops — and acts immediately — he or she stands a better chance of escaping. Conversely, if the victim is caught totally off guard, the kidnappers have all the advantages. Potential victims can take precautionary measures to avoid an HVT kidnapping. The most effective and obvious measure is to employ a personal security detail. HVTs with security details are seldom kidnapped, and security details that add route analysis, protective surveillance and variance of routes and schedules to their repertoires seldom lose their charges. Security details and HVTs should maintain a high level of situational awareness about their surroundings, especially near home and work and at any regular appointments or announced public events. On the route itself, attention must be paid to choke points and other stops that would make ideal locations for attack. By being aware of anything unusual or out of place, the security detail and the HVT have a good chance of spotting hostile surveillance or preparations for abduction. In addition to maintaining physical security, other precautions can be taken to make an HVT a more difficult target for kidnappers. The first is privacy protection. By minimizing the amount of personal information available to the public, such as information on the Internet and in newspapers, HVTs can frustrate the planning efforts of potential kidnappers. To this end, household staff and employees should be briefed on the need to protect privacy and educated as to what kind of questions constitute attempts to gather sensitive information. Household staff, as well as contractors and temporary employees, should also be thoroughly vetted. Security directors and HVTs should learn about the personal lives of staff members and be aware of new people in their lives. These measures can mitigate a kidnapper’s ability to infiltrate the household. Keeping the HVT’s car in a secured parking place, concealed if possible, prevents kidnappers from tampering with it or determining whether the HVT is visiting a particular location. HVTs and their drivers should also consider being trained in escape-and-evasion driving. All of these measures should be practiced aggressively in countries where kidnapping is rampant.
HVTs who fall victim to kidnappings have some options to mitigate the risk of death. One useful approach is to humanize themselves to their captors. By appearing more like a person and less like an object, the victim could reduce his or her chances of being killed, or cause the captors to hesitate at the crucial moment. To accomplish this, the victim should establish a rapport with the kidnappers, being careful to avoid undermining captors’ efforts to preserve their anonymity.
Victims should try to maintain physical health and vigor by eating, drinking and exercising whenever possible. It is also important to keep the mind sharp by reading books or performing other kinds of mental exercises. In the event of a rescue or escape attempt, events could unfold very quickly and the victim needs to be lucid enough to react accordingly. Once the escape window has closed, the victim should cooperate with the kidnappers but continue to look for every viable opportunity to escape. During a rescue attempt, the victim should be prepared to assume a position that eliminates the chances of being mistaken for a kidnapper or caught in the crossfire between rescuers and kidnappers.
High-profile individuals, especially those traveling to high-risk countries, should plan for the worst. HVTs should obtain kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance, including negotiation services if they are offered. The professional negotiator — as opposed to family members or friends — will know how far to push the kidnappers without risking the victim’s well-being. However, HVTs should never disclose the fact that they have K&R insurance to anyone. If potential kidnappers know an individual is covered, that person becomes a more attractive target because of the almost-guaranteed payoff.
It is important for the negotiating team to have a clear plan and speak with a single voice. If there is the slightest chance that disputes will arise over how best to deal with the situation, this should be discussed ahead of time. One person should be appointed to make decisions and speak for the family. This is especially important in the period before the ransom delivery and hostage release, when events begin to break rapidly. Additionally, these discussions should include a decision on whether to call the authorities in the event of kidnapping, especially in a foreign country.
Because of corruption and ineptitude among police and security forces in many countries, reporting a kidnapping could get the victim killed. The risks here are that corrupt police officials could be cooperating with kidnappers, or ill-equipped security forces could bungle a rescue attempt. Under such circumstances, it is best for the victim’s family or employer to call the insurance company first — and perhaps consider not involving the local authorities at all.
When the Message or Money is the Motive
May 4, 2006
U.S. journalist Jill Carroll survived nearly three months in captivity following her Jan. 7 abduction in Baghdad, Iraq. Although those holding her made certain political demands, it is possible she was freed following a ransom payment and not because the U.S. government agreed to any concessions. Carroll’s abduction is an example of the role played by kidnappers in modern urban warfare — for motives of politics or greed.
In political kidnappings, a person or people are abducted by a group for the purpose of changing a government’s behavior — or at least getting that government’s attention. Kidnapping or hostage-taking, especially of high-value targets, is a tactic preferred by political groups because it allows the group to gain media attention and compels a government to enter into dialogue. The kidnappers know, however, that the targeted government probably will not meet their demands, and so they hold the victim as a form of pressure. This is why the victims of such kidnappings generally are held for a much longer period than those abducted for ransom. In the kidnappers’ thinking, the longer that pressure lasts, the more their message is heard and the more leverage they have.
The 1979-1981 Iranian hostage crisis, in which militant students overran the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held 52 embassy personnel hostage for more than a year, is an example of a politically motivated kidnapping. The students demanded the return of the exiled Shah and the release of Iranian assets frozen in the United States.
Although some kidnappings appear to be politically motivated, they are in fact carried out for the money. A kidnapping gang that tries to disguise itself as a political group and political groups that kidnap in order to finance their operations are such examples. The guerrilla group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, for example, turned to kidnapping to finance its operations after one of its sources of funding ran out with the fall of the Soviet Union.
In war zones or in areas where anti-government insurgencies are taking place, we see both kinds of kidnappings: those motivated by politics and those motivated by greed. And sometimes the two overlap. During Lebanon’s civil war in the 1980s, various militias and criminal gangs abducted several U.S. citizens and then sold them to another group with a political agenda. This Beirut business model is being seen in Iraq today. In these chaotic conditions, kidnappers can take advantage of the lack of law and order, easy access to weapons and territory that could be denied to government forces.
In war zones or areas controlled by insurgents, it becomes easier to hold victims for long periods because they are held in an area denied to government forces or controlled by a group sympathetic to the kidnappers. This enables the kidnappers to utilize a more-extensive infrastructure of safe houses, lookouts and guards. It also makes a rescue operation extremely difficult — usually beyond the capabilities of local police and requiring military Special Forces units.
The best way to prevent falling victim to a political or war-zone kidnapping is to avoid high-risk situations. Journalists, Western aid workers and employees of other nongovernmental organizations often fail to realize they are just as viable a target as a government or military official. These professionals often believe their noncombatant or observer status will protect them from such kidnappings, though militants and criminal gangs, especially those focused on the profit aspect of a kidnapping, may not share that sentiment. In fact, because these people rarely employ personal protective details, they are easy targets and extremely vulnerable to abduction.
One of the most effective methods of preventing politically motivated kidnappings or kidnappings in war zones is to employ bodyguards. Every Westerner, especially one of considerable wealth or status, should take this precaution while traveling in a war zone such as Iraq or a high-risk area such as Latin America. Bodyguards should be familiar with the local area and adequately trained to deal with ambush situations. In many cases, private protective security firms are hired for this purpose.
Although one of the most dangerous times for any kidnapping victim is during the initial snatch, this is especially true in a war zone, where weapons are ubiquitous and inhabitants might have become desensitized to taking human life. Just as in other kidnappings, however, the only real escape window could open during this time. Many of the same techniques used to increase chances of survival in other types of kidnappings also apply to those motivated by politics, remembering that the escape window will be open only for a brief time, especially for victims held deep in hostile territory. Beyond the basic rules for humanizing oneself with the captors, every kidnapping victim should work in small ways to establish limits and maintain dignity. Victims can indicate, for example, that they will be more cooperative if they are allowed small concessions such as bathing and changing clothes regularly and not being forced to eat off of the floor. In the absence of law and order, or complete government control in high-risk areas, kidnapping for political or financial reasons has become common. Those who travel or work in these areas should take precautions to prevent becoming the victim of a kidnapping — and be prepared should they be abducted.
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When the Battle over Children Turns Desperate
May 5, 2006
A preliminary hearing has been set for May 31 in the case of Mary Jane Byrd, a mother who allegedly abducted her 4-year-old daughter from Washington, D.C., 13 years ago in defiance of a court order giving the child’s father visitation rights. Byrd was arrested in April on a felony charge of kidnapping by a parent in one of the nation’s longest-running missing-child cases. Although the phenomenon of familial kidnappings is not new, attention to the subject in recent years has led to tougher laws to deal with it.
Most familial kidnappings are carried out to contravene a court-ordered custody arrangement, especially when one parent believes he or she has been deprived of rightful custody. In many cases, however, a child is abducted by one parent or other family member because of a perceived dangerous situation, such as sexual or physical abuse of the child, or unsafe behavior exhibited by the custodial parent, such as drug abuse or other criminal activity. The custody dispute is often between the child’s biological parents, although other family members, such as grandparents, aunts and uncles, sometimes are involved.
Children also are abducted by a parent or other family member as a means of controlling or psychologically harming the custodial parent, or as revenge for real or perceived wrongs by one family member against another. In other cases, certain types of mental illnesses suffered by the noncustodial family member, such as paranoid delusions or severe sociopathy, may lead that individual to commit the abduction. This risk can be exacerbated if the noncustodial family member feels court judgments regarding custody are unfair.
The latest statistics from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) show that out of almost 798,000 children reported missing in 2002, more than 200,000 — about one quarter — were believed to have been abducted by family members. Unlike other forms of kidnapping, familial abductions are not carried out for monetary gain, to make a political statement or to gain media attention. In most cases, in fact, the kidnapper aims to completely drop off the radar with the child, perhaps with the help of a religious or community group that supports the move. A strengthening of the law in Washington, D.C., changing parental abductions from a misdemeanor to a potential felony, is one example of efforts to solve these kidnapping cases. One of the best ways to prevent a familial kidnapping is by ensuring that communications between parents, and between parents and children, are healthy and open. Not only can open communications reduce friction, it also can help the children better understand the rules of custody, perhaps making them less willing to go along on an unplanned trip with an unauthorized family member. Parents involved in a joint-custody situation should work together to establish clear, mutually understood and agreed-upon arrangements. These should follow legally binding custody guidelines, but also leave room for legal review should conditions change. Parents are more likely to abduct when they feel they have no legal recourse.
Because of consistent cases of familial abductions from schools, most have enacted measures to guard against these incidents. Custodial parents, therefore, should work with school officials to ensure clear understanding of parental rules about such things as early or unscheduled pickups and identification of individuals authorized to pick up the child.
According to a governmental study cited by the NCMEC, there are risk indicators that can provide some advance warning of a plot to kidnap a minor family member. The greatest risk that such a kidnapping will occur is within the first four or five years after a divorce or separation of households, or when there has been a previous threat or actual abduction. Another indicator is the perception by the noncustodial spouse or family member that the child is being abused or mistreated by the custodial family member. Custodial parents also should be alert to the threat at times when relations are especially strained between them and noncustodial family members.
If a parent who is a citizen of another country loses custody in a U.S. court, he or she might abduct the children and take them back to their home country. Once there, the legal, political and cultural considerations that come into play can make getting the child back extremely complicated, if not impossible.
Parents can take precautions to increase the chances of a favorable resolution to a familial kidnapping. The most effective of these include having good-quality, up-to-date (every six months for children age 6 and under) photos of the children available, as well as photographs of potential abductors. Parents also should know the description and license plate numbers of the other parent’s or family members’ vehicles. In addition, custodial parents should try not to allow alienation from the other parent to become so severe that they know little or nothing about the other’s living arrangements, support systems or circumstances. In many cases, feared abductions turn out to be nothing more than scheduling misunderstandings. However, after taking reasonable steps to resolve the situation on his or her own, the custodial parent should contact police early and report the abduction.
Children, even small ones, also can be educated in this regard. At the very least, they should be asked to memorize their home phone number, including area code, and taught how to use the phone. It also is a good idea, under any circumstances, to have the child’s fingerprints on file, even if done with a home fingerprinting kit.
Sexual-Exploitation: The Risk of Death is High
May 8, 2006
Jackie Barron Wilson was executed in Huntsville, Texas, on May 4 for the 1988 abduction, rape and murder of a 5-year-old girl. Although he proclaimed his innocence until the end, Wilson was convicted of taking Maggie Rhodes from her bedroom in Arlington, Texas, and in the space of a few hours sexually assaulting and killing her. The case illustrates many of the characteristics of sexual-exploitation kidnappings, including the high mortality rate for victims.
According to the U.S. Justice Department’s National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway and Throwaway Children (NISMART), 797,500 children were reported missing in 1999. Of that figure, 203,900 were believed to have been victims of family abductions and 58,200 abducted by nonfamily members. The report also said 115 children were the victims of the most serious, long-term nonfamily abductions called “stereotypical kidnappings.” In these cases, the child is transported a distance of 50 miles or more, and then either killed, held for ransom or held with the abductor’s intent of keeping the child permanently. In nearly half of these cases, the child was exploited sexually, and in at least 40 percent of these cases, the child was killed.
In a sexual-exploitation kidnapping of a child, sexual assault often is the sole motivation. When ransom demands are made — which is rare — they usually are an afterthought, often made after the victim has been killed. In about half of the cases, the victim’s body is concealed rather than left for authorities to find. Therefore, many of the victims of this crime are never found.
According to the Washington State Office of the Attorney General, the majority of sexual-exploitation kidnappings are carried out by males against females. The kidnapper in these cases averages 27 years of age, usually lives alone or with his parents, and holds a low-wage job. Furthermore, two-thirds of those arrested for sexual exploitation kidnapping have been arrested for crimes against children before — mostly of a sexual nature. The offenders in these cases often repeat their previous methods in these crimes, making it easy for law enforcement to determine a pattern and identify the perpetrator, although this can be done only after multiple offenses are committed.
Most of the perpetrators live near their victims or have a legitimate reason for being in proximity to the victim, such as day laborers or other contracted labor. This happened in the case of 14-year-old Elizabeth Smart, who allegedly was abducted from her bedroom in Utah by Brian Mitchell, who had been employed at her home to do roofing work.
In sexual-exploitation kidnappings, unlike for-ransom or political kidnappings, the abductor often has no interest in keeping the victim alive or eventually releasing the victim unharmed. On the contrary, the repetitive nature of the crime means the abductor is more likely to kill the victim in order to cover his tracks, and thus ensure that he can continue his behavior. Most victims in these cases, in fact, are killed within the first three hours of the abduction. Because most kidnappings of this nature occur close to the home and school, parents and children may feel a false sense of security. The best deterrents to this kind of crime, therefore, are close supervision of the children or knowledge of their whereabouts, situational awareness and aggressive reporting of suspicious people. In addition, community situational awareness adds another layer of security. Neighbors and even service personnel such as mail carriers, utility workers and delivery drivers should be aware of unusual behavior in the area and be encouraged to report it.
Starting at an early age, children should be made aware of the threat and taught how to respond to it. Initiatives like the national “Stranger Danger” program, which has been run by local police departments for decades, focus on children from kindergarten to fifth grade. Parents should supplement these programs by discussing the threat frankly and openly with their children.
Children should be taught never to approach an unknown car or individual, and to run from any stranger who approaches. Most children will exhibit submissive behavior when confronted by a threatening situation, which often allows a kidnapper the opportunity, however brief, to strike. In the case of abduction, hesitation can lead to tragedy — as shown in the surveillance tape of the 2004 abduction of 11-year-old Carlie Brucia in Sarasota, Fla.
Parents also should employ an attitude of suspicion when it comes to strangers. Extreme caution should be exercised by parents when allowing unknown individuals access to the home. In the Smart case, the victim’s father hired an unemployed drifter to do roofing work on the house, placing him in close proximity to his daughter.
In the case of any child abduction, the first hours after the crime are critical. Most missing-child reports are made an hour after the child is first noticed missing — and the child may have been abducted long before that. Given the critical three-hour window, this is often far too late. Parents should have up-to-date photographs and fingerprints of their child readily available, and be able to describe what the child was wearing and the places he or she went that day. Although sexual-exploitation kidnappings are rare, the child victims are more likely to be killed than those kidnapped for ransom or in custody disputes. Parents should take steps to minimize their children’s vulnerability to this crime — and act aggressively in reporting the disappearance of a child.
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The Proactive Tool of Protective Intelligence
Nov. 7, 2007
On Nov. 4, 46-year-old Spanish businessman Edelmiro Manuel Pérez Merelles was freed from captivity after being held for nearly two weeks by kidnappers who grabbed him from his vehicle in the Mexico City metropolitan area. The fact that a kidnapping occurred in Mexico is not at all unusual. What is unusual is the enormous press coverage the case received, largely because of the audacity and brutality of the attackers.
Pérez Merelles was snatched from his car Oct. 22 after a gang of heavily armed assailants blocked his vehicle and, in full view of witnesses, killed his bodyguard/driver, delivering a coup de grâce shot to the back of his head. The abductors then shoved the driver’s body into the trunk of Pérez Merelles’ car, which was later found abandoned. After the abduction, when the family balked at the exorbitant amount of ransom demanded, the kidnappers reportedly upped the ante by sending two of Pérez Merelles’ fingers to his family. A ransom finally was paid and Pérez Merelles was released in good health, though sans the fingers.
In a world in which militants and criminals appear increasingly sophisticated and brutal, this case highlights the need for protective intelligence (PI) to augment traditional security measures.
Action vs. Reaction
As any football player knows, action is always faster than reaction. That principle provides offensive players with a slight edge over their opponents on the defense, because the offensive players know the snap count that will signal the beginning of the play. Now, some crafty defensive players will anticipate or jump the snap to get an advantage over the offensive players, but that anticipation is an action in itself and not a true reaction. This same principle of action and reaction is applicable to security operations. For example, when members of an abduction team launch an assault against a target’s vehicle, they have the advantage of tactical surprise over the target and any security personnel protecting the target. This advantage can be magnified significantly if the target lacks the proper mindset and freezes in response to the attack. Even highly trained security officers who have been schooled in attack recognition and in responding under pressure to attacks against their principal are at a disadvantage once an attack is launched. This is because, in addition to having the element of tactical surprise, the assailants also have conducted surveillance and have planned their attack. Therefore, they presumably have come prepared — with the number of assailants and the right weaponry — to overcome any security assets in place. Simply put, the criminals will not attack unless they believe they have the advantage. Not all attacks succeed, of course. Sometimes the attackers will botch the attempt, and sometimes security personnel are good enough — or lucky enough — to regain the initiative and fight off the attack or otherwise escape. In general, however, once an attack is launched, the attackers have the advantage over the defender, who not only is reacting but also is simultaneously trying to identify the source, location and direction of the attack and assess the number of assailants and their armament. Furthermore, if a gang is brazen enough to conduct a serious crime such as a kidnapping for ransom, which carries stiff penalties in most countries, chances are the same group is capable of committing homicide during the crime. So, using the kidnapping example, the gang will account for the presence of any security officers in its planning and will devise a way to neutralize those officers — as the attackers neutralized the bodyguard in the Pérez Merelles abduction.
Even if the target is traveling in an armored vehicle, the attackers will plan a way to immobilize it, breach the armor and get to their victim. In a kidnapping scenario, once the target’s vehicle is stopped or disabled, the assailants can place an explosive device on top of it, forcing the occupants to open the door or risk death — a tactic witnessed several times in Latin America — or they can use hand tools to pry it open like a can of sardines if given enough time. Since most armored vehicles use the car’s factory-installed door-lock system, techniques used by car thieves, such as using master keys or punching out the locks, also can be used effectively against an immobilized armored vehicle. This same principle applies to physical security measures at buildings. Measures such as badge readers, closed-circuit TV coverage, metal detectors, cipher locks and so forth are an important part of any security plan — though they have finite utility. In many cases assailants have mapped out, quantified and then defeated or bypassed physical security devices. Physical security devices require human interaction and a proactive security program to optimize their effectiveness. Armed guards, armored vehicles and physical security devices can all be valuable tools, but they can be defeated by attackers who have planned an attack and then put it into play at the time and place of their choosing. Clearly, a way is needed to deny attackers the advantage of striking when and where they choose or, even better, to stop an attack before it can be launched. In other words, security officers must play on the action side of the action/reaction equation. That is where PI comes in.
Protective Intelligence
In simple terms, PI is the process used to identify and assess threats. A well-designed PI program will have a number of distinct and crucial components or functions, but the most important of these are countersurveillance, investigations and analysis. The first function, countersurveillance, serves as the eyes and ears of the PI team. As noted above, kidnapping gangs conduct extensive preoperational surveillance. But all criminals — stalkers, thieves, lone wolves, militant groups, etc. — engage in some degree of preoperational surveillance, though the length of this surveillance will vary depending on the actor and the circumstances. A purse-snatcher might case a potential target for a few seconds, while a kidnapping gang might conduct surveillance of a potential target for weeks. The degree of surveillance tradecraft — from very clumsy to highly sophisticated — also will widely vary, depending on the operatives’ training and street skills. It is while conducting this surveillance that someone with hostile intentions is most apt to be detected, making this the point in the attack cycle that potential violence can most easily be disrupted or prevented. This is what makes countersurveillance such a valuable proactive tool. Although countersurveillance teams are valuable, they cannot operate in a vacuum. They need to be part of a larger PI program that includes the analytical and investigative functions. Investigation and analysis are two closely related yet distinct components that can help focus the countersurveillance operations on the most likely or most vulnerable targets, analyze the observations of the countersurveillance team and investigate any suspicious individuals observed.
Without an analytical function, it is difficult for countersurveillance operatives to note when the same person or vehicle has been encountered on different shifts or at different sites. In fact, countersurveillance operations are far less valuable when they are conducted without databasing or analyzing what the countersurveillance teams observe over time and distance.
Investigations also are important. Most often, something that appears unusual to a countersurveillance operative has a logical and harmless explanation, though it is difficult to make that determination without an investigative unit to follow-up on red flags.
The investigative and analytical functions also are crucial in assessing communications from mentally disturbed individuals, for tracking the activities of activist or extremist groups and for attempting to identify and assess individuals who make anonymous threats via telephone or mail. Mentally disturbed individuals have long posed a substantial (and still underestimated) threat to both prominent people and average citizens in the United States. In fact, mentally disturbed individuals have killed far more prominent people (including President James Garfield, Bobby Kennedy and John Lennon) than militants have in terrorist attacks. Furthermore, nearly all of those who have committed attacks have self-identified or otherwise come to the attention of authorities before the attack was carried out. Because of this, PI teams ensure that no mentally disturbed person is summarily dismissed as a “harmless nut” until he or she has been thoroughly investigated and his or her communications carefully analyzed and databased. Databasing is crucial because it allows the tenor of correspondence from a mentally disturbed individual to be monitored over time and compared with earlier missives in order to identify signs of a deteriorating mental state or a developing intent to commit violence. PI teams will often consult mental health professionals in such cases to assist with psycholinguistic and psychological evaluations. Not all threats from the mentally disturbed come from outside a company or organization, however. Although the common perception following a workplace incident is that the employee “just snapped,” in most cases the factors leading to the violent outburst have been building up for a long time and the assailant has made detailed plans. Because of this, workplace or school shootings seldom occur randomly. In most cases, the perpetrator has targeted a specific individual or set of individuals who the shooter believes is responsible for his plight. Therefore, PI teams also will work closely with human-resources managers and employee mental health programs to try to identify early on those employees who have the potential to commit acts of workplace violence. In workplace settings as well as other potential threat areas, PI operatives also can aid other security officers by providing them with photographs and descriptions of any person identified as a potential threat. The person identified as the potential target also can be briefed and the information shared with that person’s administrative assistants, family members and household staff.
Another crucial function of a PI team is to “red team,” or to look at the security program from the outside and help identify vulnerabilities. Most security looks from the inside out, but PI provides the ability to look from the outside in. In the executive protection realm, this can include an analysis of the principal’s schedule and transportation routes in order to determine the most vulnerable times and places. Countersurveillance or even overt security assets can then be focused on these crucial locations.
Red teams also sometimes perform cyberstalker research. That is, they study a potential target through a criminal or mentally disturbed person’s eyes — attempting to obtain as much open-source and public-record information on that target as possible in order to begin a surveillance operation. Such a project helps determine what sensitive information is available regarding a particular target and highlights how that information could be used by a criminal planning an attack.
Red teams also will attempt to invade a facility in order to test access control or to conduct surveillance on the operations in an effort to identify vantage points (or “perches”) that would most likely be used by someone surveilling the facility. Once the perches around one’s facility are identified, activities at those sites can be monitored, making it more difficult for assailants to conduct preoperational surveillance at will.
One other advantage to PI operations is that, being amorphous by nature, they are far more difficult for a potential assailant to detect than are traditional security measures. Even if one PI operative is detected — regardless of whether the team has identified its targets — the surveillers’ anxiety will increase because they likely will not know whether the person they encounter is a countersurveillance operative.
This combination of countersurveillance, analysis and investigation can be applied in a number of other creative and proactive ways to help keep potential threats off
balance and deny them the opportunity to take the initiative. Although a large global corporation or government might require a large PI team, these core functions can be performed by a skilled, compact team, or even by one person. For example, a person living in a high-threat environment such as Mexico City can acquire the skills to perform his or her own analysis of route and schedule, and can run surveillance detection routes in order to smoke out hostile operations. The details of the Pérez Merelles kidnapping indicate that it was a professionally planned and well-executed operation. Crimes of this caliber do not occur on the spur of the moment. They require extensive surveillance, intelligence gathering and planning — the very types of activities that are vulnerable to detection through the proactive tool of PI.
CHAPTER 5: Asymmetrical Combat
Dealing With an Armed and Unexpected Assailant
April 23, 2007
As they go about their day, most people in the civilized world give very little thought to the possibility of having to fend off an attacker. When law-abiding citizens who practice good situational awareness are attacked, those attacks will take them by surprise. Even if they are armed, their weapon will most likely be holstered or otherwise unavailable for the critical first seconds of the attack. Hence, all people — armed and unarmed — should consider seeking training in the principles of empty-hand self-defense. Obviously, not having a weapon handy is a distinct disadvantage in modern-day criminal confrontations because most violent criminals use weapons — guns, blades and clubs. Criminal attackers also come in multiples as often as not, although it may not in all cases be necessary for a person who has the right goals in mind — escape and survival — to deal physically with more than one attacker at a time.
In our view, it is not possible to teach self-defense from the printed page, or even with video. Nothing comes even close to in-person, physical training from expert teachers who try their best to provide the student with safe but realistic training scenarios. This report should be taken as guidance, not training — guidance that can be incorporated into the reader’s formal self-defense training.
To advise people on decisions that could affect their survival carries with it grave responsibilities. This is one reason why many martial arts and self-defense teachers and writers shy away from discussing defense against armed assailants, especially those armed with guns. It is one thing to make an error in judgment that can land one in the hospital with a broken bone or two; it is quite another when the same error might get you or a loved one killed. The usual way out is simply to advise compliance with an armed assailant, but, as we shall see, while simulated compliance as a temporary strategy can be useful, total compliance can sometimes be more dangerous than resistance.
The facts won’t alter themselves simply because we’d rather not face them. In a confrontation with an armed or with multiple assailants, we are already in a potentially life-threatening situation. Any course we take, including doing nothing at all, can be fatal if things go the wrong way. Thus, there are no guarantees in such situations, only better or worse courses of action.
Handguns: Machines with Limitations
By far the most common firearms used in violent criminal confrontations are handguns, i.e., semiautomatic pistols and double-action revolvers. STRATFOR recommends that students of self-defense seek training in the use of firearms, even if they don’t contemplate carrying one. One reason for this recommendation is that it is useful to have a general understanding of how guns work, what they can and cannot do, and to get some feel for the skill level needed to use one effectively. And if one is fortunate enough to find self-defense instructors who can teach reliable methods for disarming a gun-wielding attacker, it would be wise to understand how the gun — now in your hands — operates.
Guns kill thousands of people every year. They are deadly and must be treated with respect. However, a few facts may help put this into realistic perspective. Guns are machines and, like all machines, they have their limitations. With modern guns, the greatest limitation of all is the operator. Shooting a handgun accurately, even under the controlled conditions of a firing range, is a perishable skill that requires initial training and a great deal of subsequent practice.
It is a mathematical fact that an error of a millimeter in aiming a handgun is multiplied geometrically, the farther the target is from the muzzle of the gun. Because guns are held in fallible human hands, there is always a certain degree of error. For the self-defense student, the important lesson in this is that distance means safety, and the more distance the better.
Range (simply expressed as how far the bullet will travel) is not the important factor. Projectiles fired from a handgun can travel much farther than the distances within which they can be fired accurately, even when fired by experts. Depending on the environmental conditions and the skills of the shooter, it might be said that at 50 yards or more, anyone who is hit by a bullet fired from a handgun is a victim of bad luck. The world record for the 50-yard dash is around five seconds. When an unskilled shooter is under stress, in poor environmental conditions and shooting at a moving target, that relatively safe distance becomes much, much less. Indeed, even at very short distances, misses are common. Distance enhances safety.
Equally, because accurate shooting at a distance depends on aligning the weapon’s sights correctly on the target, shooting a handgun at a moving target is in itself a special skill, not easily acquired, and certainly not commonly found. Motion enhances safety.
Anything the target does that forces the shooter to realign his shooting stance and re-acquire his target in the gun’s sight picture affects his accuracy. This can be accomplished by moving at an angle to the imaginary line that emanates from the gun. Think of it as a laser beam. (People are sometimes taught to run from a shooter in a zig-zag pattern. This may not be the best choice, if the pattern repeatedly brings one across the imaginary laser beam emanating from the gun.) Changing the angle enhances safety.
Accurate shooting depends on good visibility of the target. A shooter who cannot see his target is just guessing. Even factors that partially obscure the target, such as dim light, an advertisement-covered store window rendered partially opaque by reflections or a thin screen of shrubbery, affects accuracy. This is technically called concealment, and even partial concealment enhances safety.
Handguns are not all-powerful, although some are more powerful than others. The velocity of bullets of a given weight fired from any gun depends mostly on the power of the powder charge that propels it out of the barrel (technically not an explosion, but a contained “burn” generating a rapid expansion of gases). The energy with which a bullet hits its target depends on the bullet’s speed and its weight. Because handguns are held in the hands, then, their designed “power” is limited by simple Newtonian physics, i.e., for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. In the case of guns, this is known as recoil, and too much recoil limits the shooter’s ability to control — or even hold onto — the gun and take a second shot. Handguns are by design necessity less “powerful” than other kinds of guns.
What all this means is that bullets fired from a handgun are limited in what they can penetrate, and in the degree of damage they can inflict on the human body. Anything that will stop a bullet is called “cover,” and there are a great many objects in the environment that will stop most handgun bullets cold: e.g., a masonry wall, the trunk of a tree, the wheel assembly and engine block of a truck or car. Even partial cover is better than none at all; anything a bullet strikes or penetrates on its way to its intended target is likely to deflect it or possibly fragment it. Even if it is partial, cover enhances safety.
Obviously, given a choice between mere concealment and cover, it is best to choose cover; in escaping, however, take whatever comes first and look for opportunities for improvement.
In tactical order, these principles — motion, distance, angle, concealment and cover (MDACC) — should be kept in mind when attempting to escape from a shooter.
Shoulder and Automatic Weapons
Because they are more difficult to conceal than handguns, shoulder weapons and automatic weapons (the latter defined as guns that keep firing as long as you hold down the trigger or until the magazine is empty) are less often seen in violent criminal confrontations. This is fortunate, because these guns, in general, are more dangerous. Rifles are easier to shoot with accuracy at greater distances than handguns, and most of them are more powerful; shotguns fire a large number of projectiles at one time, thus increasing the chances of being hit. The same is true for automatic weapons, which fire a great many projectiles at the target in a short time.
Nevertheless, the MDACC principles still apply, since under the conditions for their deployment (which we will explore later) there is no other viable option.
Collateral Damage: When You Are Not the Target
Random shots from violent criminal encounters kill a few people every year in this country. In some cases, one hears gunfire nearby but cannot immediately tell what direction it is coming from. Taking a leaf from the combat soldier’s book, if this happens and you are caught in the open, drop to the ground without hesitation. This provides you with partial concealment and partial cover. If you are on a sidewalk and traffic permits, consider rolling into the gutter: The masonry curb will improve your cover. Begin looking and listening to determine where the fire is coming from. Once you can answer this question, start looking around for better cover. However, do not move until you know where the shots are coming from, unless bullet strikes near you force you to move. When you do move, use the guidance MDACC to make a safe escape.
Blades, Short and Long
People — especially people brought up in developed Western countries — fear blades. This has not always been the case. There are Americans still alive today who will tell you that as little boys in grammar school, they were encouraged, if not required, to carry a pocketknife to sharpen their pencils.
Our very recent ancestors carried and used blades as secondary weapons of war and defense. We use knives every day in our kitchens and push lawn mowers — motorized blades traveling at high speeds — on our lawns. Given this, our almost visceral fear of blades used as weapons is puzzling. In a self-defense scenario, this attitude is also not useful.
Blades are sharp extensions of the arms. As such, their reach at any moment only extends to the length of the attacker’s arm, plus the length of the blade. Statistically, we can forget about thrown knives; the number of people living on the earth at any one time who can throw a knife with force and accuracy without first pacing off the distance and practicing would not fill a small auditorium.
Thus, outside a circle of about three feet for knives and five feet at most, perhaps, for longer blades (excepting swords), a blade-wielding attacker is harmless. What professional self-defense instructors should also teach is that in the right circumstances, being inside that circle of sharpness — very close to the attacker — can be a momentary safe haven as well. Again, we have no intention of teaching specific self-defense moves here, but would encourage readers to take up this guidance with their professional instructors. Blade attacks also can be defended against — momentarily, to facilitate escape and survival — using items found in a normal environment. A good self-defense course should incorporate training in identifying and using these items. One example is a light chair, which can be easily wielded and can deflect an attacker’s blade.
Readers should accept, however, that any violent encounter at close quarters with a blade-wielding attacker is likely to result in injury — perhaps more likely even than an encounter with someone wielding a gun. The good news is that such injuries are often not life-threatening or even incapacitating, as long as the victim keeps his or her head and acts decisively to escape and survive.
The Good Old Louisville Slugger
Clubs — which include sticks, lengths of pipe and baseball bats — are almost exclusively used as striking (versus thrusting) weapons by untrained persons. The physics of these attacks is easy enough to understand. Safety lies completely outside, and momentarily close inside, their circle of effective impact. Think of a bunt, in baseball, versus
a full swing of the bat. Self-defense courses should include training in these concepts.
A word of caution about heavy striking weapons: Strikes with them are intended to and often do break bones, and broken bones can quickly render one immediately incapacitated — more so than knife wounds or even most gunshot wounds. Unconsciousness or the inability to use one’s legs makes escape impossible.
Analysis of Armed Confrontations
STRATFOR does not believe in creating educational scenarios for their own sake. For every possible set of circumstances, good or bad, there are a great many outcomes, not all of them predictable. Nonetheless, sometimes a notional scenario can focus the inquiry.
Here is one: Let’s say you have worked late and, on your way home, remember that you need milk. Your favorite convenience store is on the way and you pull into the parking lot right in front of the door. You are tired, and although your security awareness training will have told you that you should scan such places visually through the windows before entering them late at night, you don’t. We are all human. You walk right in. As you enter, the first thing you see is that the store clerks are standing together behind the counter, their eyes wide with fear. A man is standing in front of them with his back to you, and as he hears you come in, he starts to turn his body in your direction. As he turns, you see the pistol in his hands, raised at shoulder level. He is saying something as the muzzle of the pistol comes around to bear on you. You are one step inside the door, holding it open with one hand. The door opens inward. The man is about ten feet away.
What are your options at this moment?
Let’s dissect the situation, adding a few notional facts. The store is located on a busy thoroughfare with street lights. Directly across this street is an all-night self-service gas station, brightly lit, with several cars at the pumps. Directly behind the convenience store is a large residential subdivision. The store is a brick building with a plate glass front, partially plastered with posters. The door by which you entered is centered in the plate glass storefront. The front parking area of the store is bathed in light, which is dimmer at the sides and fades to relative darkness toward the back. There is no fencing around the store, only a narrow roadway around the back for deliveries and the front street of the first row of houses in the subdivision.
You also know three more things at that moment: The gun is not yet pointed at you; the man is talking, not shooting; and his solid, two-handed grip on the gun suggests that he may have had some training and is at least physically ready to shoot.
Should you escape at that moment? Given the circumstances, probably yes. Imagine for a moment that the man is already shooting at you, which would of course obviate the need to choose. If you step quickly out the door, there will be partial concealment and partial cover between you and the shooter, before the muzzle of the gun can track you. If you make a sharp right or left and run parallel to the window (versus straight across the street to the well-lit gas station), you present a target moving at right angles to the shooter’s stance. The farther you go along that path, the better cover the store’s plate glass will present, since bullets fired at it will hit it at increasingly acute angles, degrading their accuracy. Once you reach the end of the plate glass (perhaps three running steps) and turn sharply behind the brick side wall, you have attained complete cover and concealment. You can disappear into the dimly lit housing complex before the shooter can get out the door and follow you. Will he follow you, risking exposure to more witnesses and 911 calls from alarmed residents? Probably not. Using the formula MDACC, you have escaped and survived.
Emergency survival situations often come about as the cascade effect of a series of small errors. So, continuing our scenario to the next step, let’s say that instead of escaping as described above, you come all the way inside, the door closing behind you. Your eyes fix hypnotically on the muzzle of the gun, which by now is pointed directly at you. In your shocked state, you struggle to understand what the man is telling you. Part of you knows that understanding and following his orders is critical: If you make him repeat them, he may shoot instead of talk. You are in more trouble at this moment than ever before in your life. You just walked into the zone of combat.
When to Comply and When to Resist
However, the man is talking, not shooting, and this is an important fact. There are two reasons why someone deploys a weapon in a situation such as this: first, to harm or kill. If he is already shooting, MDACC comes immediately into play. The second reason is to intimidate for compliance, which is what is now happening. These dynamics can change from one to the other in an instant, but for the moment the most important thing for us to understand is what the man’s intentions are.
He tells you to do exactly as he says, or he will shoot you. In that moment, you should be thinking, “If I do comply, he won’t shoot me.” Your course of action at this point is to comply, see what happens next, and look for opportunities. Remember, you have already observed that this person appears to have had some training and is calm and in control of himself and, therefore, of you. He keeps his distance from you and maintains his shooting stance and sight alignment. You, in turn, are careful to send him only messages of compliance — verbal ones, if necessary. You don’t look into his eyes — this can be challenging — but keep a general focus on his whole body. You force yourself to stop looking down the gun barrel, because “gun muzzle hypnosis” can paralyze your thought processes.
The man tells you to move behind the counter next to the store clerks, and to put your purse or wallet on the counter. That’s easy enough: He has demanded something that is not worth your life. You comply. He takes the money from the store, plus your wallet, and leaves. You have survived.
Change the scenario a bit: The moment you get inside the store, you realize immediately that, far from being in control of himself, this person is nervous and jumpy. Perhaps he is mentally disturbed or under the effect of drugs, or perhaps something happened just before you came in that angered and frightened him. He is under irresistible time pressure; he doesn’t know how long it will be before more witnesses come into the store, or even whether a police patrol will happen along. He is shouting, brandishing the gun in one hand, and he comes up to you and puts the gun right in your face. Because you have no choice at this moment, you are looking at the gun and his hand. You see that his grip is tightening and loosening nervously, and you know he is on the verge of shooting you as he works himself up into a rage. He is out of control.
If you have had some firearms training, you may even be able to judge the condition of the gun. Is the hammer back? If so, whether pistol or revolver, the gun can fire very easily, even by accident. This man, at this moment, is more dangerous by far than the one we described above. Death or serious injury is imminent, and the gun is so close that even an untrained person cannot miss. You need to move, and you need distance, quickly. Although this is the moment when most people freeze, it is, in fact, the time to resist. You have nothing whatsoever to lose.
The good news is that this shooter has given you an opportunity, however risky. If you have been lucky enough to have gotten some high-quality self-defense training, you know that if you can get a shooter to come within arm’s length, you can at least momentarily get yourself out of the line of fire by acting quickly. You may even have training in disarming a shooter, but if you don’t, you still understand that action is always faster than reaction: If you move quickly enough, without telegraphing your motion, you can position your body to the side of and behind the muzzle of the gun before even the most alert shooter can pull the trigger. Raised hands and verbalization are helpful distractions as well.
What happens next depends on your training. You can control the gun (easier than it sounds if you have been taught how) or simply use all the force you have to push the shooter off balance, long enough for you to gain some distance. Again, this is risky, but you have no viable choice: You must resist in order to escape and survive.
Resistance, then, is wise and appropriate when death or serious injury is imminent, when the shooter is not talking or intimidating for compliance. He is already shooting, or is about to shoot at very close range at you or someone you care about.
There is a second circumstance that argues strongly in favor of resistance and against compliance. Crime statistics show overwhelmingly that when a victim is moved from the place of original encounter to a second location — sometimes called the “secondary crime scene” — his or her chances of survival are dramatically reduced. The secondary crime scene is always going to be a place of less safety for the victim and greater safety for the predator to do as he pleases. Victims are well-advised to do everything possible to avoid being taken from the place of initial encounter.
This non-compliance and resistance need not be declared and telegraphed to the criminal, however. In our notional scenario, just suppose that as the criminal leaves the store, he orders you at gunpoint to accompany him to your car, which is parked just outside. You should give every appearance of complying, because as the two of you move to a different environment the situation becomes fluid. There will be two moments when it may be possible to escape during this short journey: when you go through the door, and when the two of you get into the car. Unless the criminal is very calm, experienced and has rehearsed things carefully at least in his mind, these two moments will present him with difficult tactical challenges, challenges that will compromise his ability to keep you always in his gun sights. These are the moments to look for and exploit. A good self-defense course will identify and re-create them in drilled scenarios.
Summing up, you should comply when:
You should resist and escape when:
Multiple Attackers
In some kinds of violent confrontations, multiple attackers are more common than otherwise. Except in the case of military-style ambush configurations (which attempt to put their targets in a crossfire), multiple shooters are best treated the same way as a single shooter armed with a shotgun or automatic weapon: The formula MDACC still applies, with the caveat that there is a lot more lead flying around.
Multiple attackers, either empty-handed or with hand weapons other than firearms, present special problems and an enhanced danger of serious injury.
Unless the attacking group has previously coordinated and is experienced in this type of attack, not all of its members will be equally committed to the attack. Someone will take the point, and it is important to identify this person as quickly as possible. Move away from him and toward members of the group who seem less committed. If the attack begins immediately without verbalization, you can assume you are dealing with people who have done this before.
Generally speaking, the greatest number of attackers that can simultaneously reach you while you are on your feet are four: one each, back and front, and one on each side. Any more than that will be getting in each others’ way.
When you are down, the number of attackers who now can reach you with their feet more than doubles; thus, the first goal should be to stay on your feet. This is not easy. If you are down, unless you are well-trained in fighting from the ground, it’s best to concentrate on protecting yourself against the most serious injuries: to the head, spine and vital organs.
Assuming you are still upright, the second goal is to quickly reduce the number of attackers who can reach you simultaneously. Getting your back to a wall or a large object such as a car will reduce that number to three, and the two at your sides will have their fighting space reduced by half. Try to pick a wall that ends in a door and fight your way toward it, but avoid telegraphing your intentions by turning your head toward it: Someone will be sure to anticipate and block your way.
The better self-defense courses will teach students how to change their own positioning so that attackers “stack up” one behind the other, somewhat like a “pick” in basketball. This technique cannot be sustained for more than a few seconds before attackers figure it out, but it can buy the time needed to get one’s back to a wall or to get through a door.
Finally, we will end this analysis as we began it, with caveats. The guidance we give here should never have to be used by people who practice good security awareness. It should be considered as guidance, and perhaps incorporated into one’s formal, professional self-defense training scenarios. And, again, resistance against armed attackers must only be considered when there is no viable alternative — when death or severe injury is imminent or highly likely.
INTRODUCTIONThe terrorist attacks against the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the way Americans viewed personal security. Literally out of the blue, fuel- and passenger-laden airliners struck business and governmental landmarks in New York City and Washington, D.C., like guided missiles, killing thousands of Americans. The threat of crime was one thing; most law-abiding Americans believed it could be mitigated by sensible precaution. A spectacular attack by a non-state actor against the World Trade Center and Pentagon was quite another. How does one defend against that?As the United States assumed a war footing, creating the Department of Homeland Security and invading Afghanistan and Iraq, STRATFOR began covering these developments with keen interest. Our interest was not only at the geopolitical level. The 9/11 attacks were a stark reminder that the world is a dangerous place and that individuals as well as nation-states need to be prepared to defend themselves. Clearly, no government can possibly protect every one of its citizens against every conceivable type of attack. Therefore, people need to assume primary responsibility for their own security. This is even more important when a person is traveling or working in a foreign country where the central government is highly corrupt or incompetent.To help our readers become more aware of existing and emerging threats and attain some useful level of self-protection, STRATFOR’s security team began analyzing risks at home and abroad and issuing advisories on how best to deal with them. This book is a collection of those advisories, going all the way back to Jan. 27, 2004 (“The Militant Threat to Hotels,” page 45). In the years since, a lot has changed in the world — and in the so-called “Global War on Terror.” The Bush administration’s military offensive, although stalled in Iraq, did succeed in isolating al Qaeda’s core leadership in the mountains of northwestern Pakistan and limiting its reach. A major effort remains under a new administration to further reduce that threat, stabilize Iraq and Pakistan and roll back the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. At the same time, Mexico’s increasingly violent campaign against the drug cartels has transformed life along the U.S.-Mexican border and has begun bleeding into the southwestern United States — and beyond.While the threat of another terrorist attack against the United States may seem more distant now than it was in the aftermath of 9/11, it is clear — almost eight years after the fact — that the world is still a dangerous place and individual self-protection may be more important now than ever. It remains a question of when rather than if another terrorist attack will occur on U.S. soil, and the terrorist threat overseas is still very real. The threat of crime in the United States, spawned by current economic conditions as well as the drug trade in Mexico, is growing, and the need for security at home and abroad is an issue that will be with us for some time.With those thoughts in mind, STRATFOR presents the following security reports, most of which originally appeared on our subscription Web site. They are organized under chapter headings and presented in the order in which they were published. There is some overlap from piece to piece and chapter to chapter, since most of the articles were written as individual analyses. Also, some of the information may seem dated, which it is by necessity. These pieces represent some of our best tutorials on personal security since January 2004, less than a year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Naturally, some observations are linked to a specific time or event years removed from today’s security environment, which continues to evolve. Nevertheless, most of the recommendations and principles are every bit as relevant today as they were when they were written, and none should be considered misleading or counterproductive.In any case, we hope this collection will provide useful guidance, context and perspective on ways to stay safe in a dangerous world.STRATFORAustin, TexasApril 13, 2009CHAPTER 1: PlanningThe Importance of Knowing the Risks in AdvanceJan. 13, 2006In today’s world, international travel presents certain risks for Westerners, especially in areas of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the former Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Europe where governments have less control, and law and order is not as formally established as in other countries. Certainly, the best chance of remaining out of harm’s way while traveling or working abroad is to know and understand — in advance — some of the idiosyncrasies of each country’s bureaucracy and the security risks that have been identified. Armed with this knowledge, then, the traveler can take proper precautions.To that end, the U.S. State Department’s Web site (www.travel.state.gov) is an excellent place to begin. The site lists travel warnings issued for countries in which potentially dangerous conditions have been identified. It also provides the current Consular Information Sheets for every foreign country, which contain information on visa requirements, health conditions, crime, unusual currency or entry requirements, any areas of instability and contact information for the U.S. Embassy and consulates. In addition, the site provides a link to a page where travelers can register their personal information with the State Department at no cost, which can make it easier for the government to help during an emergency.The British and Australian governments have similar Web sites that also are excellent sources of information for their citizens traveling abroad. These sites have similar information as found on the U.S. government’s site, but may contain additional information that can be useful to U.S. citizens as well. In addition to government Web sites, private security consulting firms can provide more customized information tailored to a specific location or client.Common street crime presents the most prevalent risk to travelers abroad — although that by no means is the extent of the threat in many areas. The cardinal rule for travelers is that they should never take anything along they are not prepared to part with. This includes items of extreme value — as well as those of sentimental value. For the business traveler who carries a personal computer, this means leaving back-up discs of all important documents at home.Large sums of money should not be carried. Cash and credit cards should not all be carried in one wallet or pocket, but dispersed in various pockets. Identification and other important documents should be separate from money. Furthermore, it is important to make copies of passports and other important documents, and leave the originals in a safe location, such as a hotel safe. It also is a good idea to keep a copy of the front page of the passport with the relevant identification information at home with relatives in case of an emergency. Relatives and/or co-workers should be provided a full itinerary before the traveler leaves home, so they can provide at least the basic information to the home office or to the appropriate government agency in case of emergency.Some countries will react negatively or deny entry if the traveler’s passport contains a stamp from certain other countries. Many travelers maintain multiple passports — or request that the visa stamp for a particular country be placed on a separate sheet of paper — in order to keep offending stamps separate. Keep in mind that visa and passport information is primarily used by many host governments to collect intelligence, especially in places such as China, India and Russia. There really is little the law-abiding traveler can do to prevent revealing such information to a foreign government, as traveling with a fake passport is the only alternative and that is never a good idea.__________________Assessing Threats and VulnerabilitiesMay 31, 2006Personal security services are thriving in the post-Sept. 11 world as more and more top executives seek expert protection. The fact remains, however, that many executives — including those whose work location or professional status would seem to warrant them protection — either prefer not to employ security details or are not afforded them by their employers. With some professional help and a fair amount of work, however, it is possible to create a self-protection system that will greatly enhance one’s safety and that of one’s family.Professional security details range from a trained, perhaps armed, driver to full-blown, Secret Service- or Diplomatic Security Service-style arrangements involving numbers of agents, armored cars, a communications system and perhaps other high-tech equipment. A few of the more sophisticated corporate executive protection teams operate “black,” blending into the background and relying on keen observation and surprise rather than an overwhelming show of force.Many executives, however, tend to view some types of protective operations as potentially bad for business, fraught with potential liability exposure and not in keeping with the corporate image they wish to project to the world. Those whose only exposure to protective details is to have witnessed the antics of some details operating in the entertainment business also might find the idea of being surrounded by such protectors personally distasteful.Having a protective detail can have consequences for one’s personal life as well. Privacy and spontaneity are inevitably lost when one is surrounded by people who legitimately need advance knowledge of one’s every move. A well-known executive once told a host who asked him to stay on at a party: “I’d love to, but the truth is, if I stay late there are 10 people outside who have to stay late with me.”Moreover, the decision to hire protection implies acceptance of the existence of danger, a tough psychological hurdle for many people to overcome — at least, until something bad happens. For all these reasons, many key executives continue to say “no” to protection, regardless of advice and indications to the contrary.Equally bereft of professional protection are midlevel corporate employees, many of whom are serving lengthy tours as expatriate executives in foreign cities. The economic realities of globalization mean some of those cities are the most crime-ridden in the world, including such places as Mexico City, Bogotá, Sao Paulo and Moscow. As a result, employees who in the United States would spend their lives under the radar of professional criminals are now prime targets for kidnapping, home invasion, burglary and carjacking. Corporations take responsibility for keeping their people safe in such environments, but full-time professional protection for every employee and family member is expensive. Few expatriate executives, therefore, can be afforded it, absent a specific threat.In the United States and elsewhere, midlevel managers of banks and other cash repositories are also potential targets for extortion/robbery operations. The $43 million Securitas heist in the English county of Kent in February is a case in point. In that heist — only the latest of many — a gang stopped a Securitas manager as he was driving and forced him to provide access to the money. The facts suggest the gang engaged in careful investigation and long-term surveillance of its target. Though the threat against such victims is high, they typically are afforded neither protection nor in-depth training.For all of these types of executives and for all of these reasons, a viable alternative is self-protection. An effective plan will include most of the same elements that a professional security manager would employ, with the exception that the necessary training and actual practice must be undertaken by the principal. The four elements of a self-protection plan are: assessment, analysis and planning, training, and practice and drilling.The first step on the road to devising a personal protection system is making a realistic baseline assessment of threats and vulnerabilities. Although one can do this on his or her own, it is best done by professionals, and it should be updated annually or when circumstances warrant. Regardless of who does the assessment, it should start with general research of crime history and current statistics for the area, concentrating especially on the areas around the home and workplace, and the travel corridors between them. The potential for natural disasters, for civil unrest and riots and, in some cases, the likelihood of war should all be considered.Following STRATFOR’s philosophy of assessing from the outside in, the next step should be to determine the specifics by studying the environment and performing certain analyses and diagnostics. Professionals should be consulted for some of this work:
October 2, 2003 Todd Masse Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism Domestic Social Policy Division William Krouse Analyst in Social Legislation Domestic Social Policy Division Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress The FBI: Past, Present, and Future Summary The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the Nation's premier law enforcement organization responsible for gathering and reporting facts and compiling evidence in cases involving federal jurisdiction. It has broad jurisdiction in federal law enforcement and in national security, and is a statutory member of the U.S. Intelligence Community. From its official inception in 1908, the FBI's mission, jurisdiction, and resources have grown substantially in parallel with the real or perceived threats to American society, culture, political institutions, and overall security. In FY2003 the organization has approximately 26,000 employees, about 12,000 of whom are Special Agents. The FBI has had many successes in countering criminal and hostile foreign intelligence and terrorist activity in its storied history. However, in its zeal to protect U.S. national security, the FBI occasionally exceeded its mandate and infringed upon the protected rights of U.S. citizens. Currently, the FBI is undergoing a massive reorganization to shift its culture from reaction to crimes already committed to detection, deterrence and prevention of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. The FBI continues to be a major domestic and international force in the war against terrorism. The FBI, one element of the U.S. Department of Justice, is led by a Director appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director is appointed for a single 10-year term to insulate the investigative agency from tacit or perceived political pressures. The FBI Director is not a member of the President's Cabinet, although he reports to one the U.S. Attorney General. The current organizational schema of the FBI has three main elements: Headquarters, 56 Field Offices, and 45 Legal Attaches overseas. The degree of autonomy with which field offices have operated with respect to Headquarters has oscillated over time. Currently, Headquarters is assuming a more assertive role in directing field activities and demanding accountability, particularly with respect to the FBI's national security responsibilities. While the FBI has long had counterterrorism as a top tier priority, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were a catalyst for developing a definitive list of ranked priorities. On May 29, 2002, counterterrorism became the FBI's sole number one priority. Other major priorities include countering foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States, countering cybercrime, and working against public corruption. The FBI's priorities continue to reflect its traditional law enforcement mission, but the FBI's national security mission has assumed an unprecedented degree of prominence. In order to successfully implement its mission, the FBI has extensive relationships with other federal executive agencies, including other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. It also has an important network of relationships with state and local law enforcement, and overseas law enforcement agencies and security services. Relevant pending bills include H.R. 1157, H.R. 2867, S. 410, S. 1158, S. 1440, S. 1507, and S. 1520. Issues for the Congress involve whether: (1) the FBI can sufficiently adapt its law enforcement culture to deter, detect, and prevent terrorism; (2) some of the FBI's criminal jurisdiction should be devolved to state and local law enforcement; (3) a statutory charter for the FBI should be developed; and (4) the planned co-location of the FBI's operational Counterterrorism Division with the newly formed Terrorist Threat Integration Center provides an opportunity for foreign intelligence entities to engage in domestic intelligence activities. Contents Brief History and Program Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Domestic Security and Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Organized Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Domestic Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 FBI Organization and Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Organization and Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 FBI Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 International Presence and Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Current Major Investigative Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 FBI Counterterrorism Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 The Wake Up Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 U.S. Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Catalyst for a War of Indeterminate Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 FBI Counterintelligence Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Imbalances Between Dissent and Subversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The Pendulum Swings Back: Oversight and Regulation . . . . . . . 26 Year of the Spy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Post Cold War Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 FBI Criminal Enterprises, White Collar, Cyber and Other Federal Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Organized Criminal Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 White Collar Crime and Public Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Cybercrime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Other Significant Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 FBI Security Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Pertinent Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Investigative Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Congressional Oversight Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 The FBI in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Appendix I: FBI Field Offices (By City Location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Appendix II: FBI Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Appendix III: FBI Legal Attache Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 List of Figures Figure 1. FBI Appropriations FY1940-2004* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Figure 2. Total Number of FBI Positions FY1940-2004* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Figure 3. FBI Headquarters Organizational Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The FBI: Past, Present, and Future Brief History and Program Development The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency in the Department of Justice (DOJ) which has the dual mission of protecting U.S. national security and combating criminal activities. As a statutory member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, it is charged with maintaining domestic security by investigating foreign intelligence agents/officers and terrorists who pose a threat to U.S. national security. The Bureau's criminal investigative priorities include organized crime and drug trafficking, public corruption, white collar crime, and civil rights violations. In addition, the Bureau investigates significant federal crimes including, but not limited to, kidnaping, extortion, bank robberies, child exploitation and pornography, and international child abduction. The FBI also provides training and operational assistance to state, local, and international law enforcement agencies. The FBI's expertise in national and international law enforcement may be taken for granted today.1 Because the organization had relatively little jurisdiction in its early years (a result of nascent federal criminal law development), the organization demonstrated substantial creativity in using its existing authority to combat criminal behavior. For example, in its infamous investigations into the organized crime and gangster activities of John Dillinger (and others) in the early 20th Century, the FBI (then known as the Bureau of Investigation) and Department of Justice relied on jurisdiction in more discrete areas of crime such as fugitive status and interstate motor vehicle theft to arrest and prosecute organized crime cases. More recently, the FBI has developed into a national investigative agency and established a national identification system, a uniform crime reporting system, as well as a forensic science program that are heavily relied upon by state and local law enforcement. Some would argue that by instituting rigorous law enforcement training and employment qualifications, the FBI ushered in an era of unprecedented professionalism in law enforcement. Moreover, as the forces of globalization became prominent in the late 20th Century, the FBI expanded its international influence by developing important relationships with overseas law enforcement and security services. These relationships continue to pay dividends in the war against terrorism2 today. The 1 An official history of the FBI can be found at [http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/historymain.htm]. See also Athan Theoharis, The FBI: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide (1994). 2 The term "terrorism," as used in this report, means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant (continued...) CRS-2 FBI's recent arrest of a British national alleged to be smuggling shoulder fired missiles into the United States is an example of how its national and international cooperation with intelligence and law enforcement organizations is paying dividends.3 As an organization that has been at the forefront of law enforcement and domestic security in turbulent times, however, the FBI has also been through its share of difficult times. While the Bureau is considered one of the world's premier investigative agencies and has had numerous successes implementing its criminal and national security missions, in recent years it has been criticized for its handling of a number of cases. These cases include the Waco and Ruby Ridge sieges, the Oklahoma City bombing documents, the Los Alamos National Laboratory espionage investigation, the Atlanta Olympic Park bombing investigation, the Robert Hanssen spy case,4 the degradation of the FBI crime lab, the improper use of confidential informants, and the failure to secure and upgrade the agency's computer systems. The September 11, 2001 attacks, moreover, are widely viewed as a systemic intelligence failure of the U.S. Intelligence Community, of which the FBI is one component. Some Members of Congress have called for increased oversight and explored proposals to reform or, perhaps, dismantle elements of the FBI, transferring the agency's domestic security functions to another agency that could possibly resemble Britain's MI-5.5 2 (...continued) subgroups which practice, international terrorism. See Title 22, U.S. Code, §2656f(d). There are numerous definitions of terrorism found in U.S. law statutes and regulations. See CRS Report RS21021, "Terrorism" and Related Terms in Statute and Regulation: Selected Language, Sept. 26, 2001, by Elizabeth Martin. 3 See "FBI Arrests British Man in Alleged Missile Plot," New York Times, Aug. 12, 2003. As early as May of last year, the FBI was alerting law enforcement to be on the lookout for potential terrorist activities involving shoulder-fired missiles. See "FBI Warns of Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat," May 31, 2002, at [http:www.cnn.com]. In Nov. 2002 in Mombasa, Kenya, a chartered Israeli passenger plane was targeted with a man portable air defense (MANPAD) system. The rocket missed its target. See Thom Shanker, "Terror in Africa: Security Concerns, Ideal Terror Weapons Portable, Deadly, Plentiful Missiles," New York Times, Nov. 29, 2002, p. A32. The indictment of Hemant Lakhani can be found at [http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/uslakhani81103cmp.pdf]. 4 See A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report, Aug. 14, 2003. The unclassified executive summary of this report can be found at [http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/03-08/final.pdf]. 5 See the "Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003," (S. 410). See also CRS Report RL 31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: The Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, May 19, 2003, by Todd Masse. S. 1520, the "9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act," proposes that the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence (a proposed position), and the Secretary of Homeland Security provide a report to Congress which, among other factors, assesses the advisability of establishing a new domestic intelligence agency, and the experiences of other democratic nations in conducting domestic intelligence programs and activities. Similar recommendations were made in the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on (continued...) CRS-3 The FBI's investigative jurisdiction has grown significantly over time, and it is governed by multiple congressional statutes.6 As this jurisdiction expanded, so too did the organization's budget and employees. From 1940 until FY2003, the FBI's total numbers of employees increased from roughly 2,400 to about 26,000, as its budget increased from $9 million to more than $4 billion.7 Figures 1 and 2 below depict the extent to which the FBI budget and numbers of employees increased over time. Figure 1. FBI Appropriations FY1940-2004* 5,000 4,000 3,000 $ Million 2,000 1,000 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Current $ Cons tant 03 $ * Fiscal Year 2004 is a requested amount. 5 (...continued) Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Dec. 2002. 6 For general information on FBI jurisdiction see U.S. Code, Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), §3052; U.S. Code Title 28, (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure),§533; and Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations, §0.85. 7 The FBI's request for FY2004 is $4,639,569.00. See FBI Budget Submission: Estimates for Fiscal Year 2004. CRS-4 Figure 2. Total Number of FBI Positions FY1940-2004* 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 * 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 01 02 03 04 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 Source: Annual appropriations, and Athan G. Theoharis, et al., FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide. Gross Domestic Product Deflators for current (FY2003 = 1.00) dollar adjustments were derived from Budget of the U.S. Government: Fiscal Year 2004, Historical Tables, Office of Management and Budget. * Fiscal Year 2004 is a requested amount. What follows in this section is a functional and chronological summary of the major elements in the historical development of the FBI. Domestic Security and Counterintelligence. Since its inception in 1908,8 the Bureau's domestic security and counterintelligence missions have expanded and contracted to meet internal and external exigencies. At times, maintaining a proper balance between national security and preserving constitutional rights particularly those guaranteed under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments (freedom of speech and assembly, protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and due process) has been a difficult proposition for the FBI in particular and for the federal government as a whole. Toward the end of the First World War, civil unrest and a series of bombings prompted the Department of Justice, and its Bureau of Investigation (BI), to monitor and arrest persons suspected of being anarchists, Bolsheviks, socialists, or of other radical political beliefs under the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918 Immigration Act. The Bureau participated in round ups of draft dodgers ("slackers") as well. In the 8 Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte established the Bureau of Investigation in 1908, when the Department of Justice hired 10 investigators who had previously worked as U.S. Secret Service agents. Bonaparte was prompted to hire the investigators, because a rider in an appropriations bill prohibited Justice from borrowing Secret Service agents from Treasury for investigations. See S.Rept. 94-755, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports of Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, (Washington, Apr. 23, 1976), 989 p. (Hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report) CRS-5 1920s, roundups of non-citizens suspected of subversion, known as "Palmer raids" (named after former Attorney General Alexander Mitchell Palmer [1919-1921]) enjoyed public approval in the popular press, but later proved controversial with revelations of civil rights violations and wrongful deportations. As a Justice Department Attorney, J. Edgar Hoover headed the Department's General Intelligence Division, and played an integral role in these roundups and deportations.9 As the tide of public opinion turned against the federal government's anti-Red tactics, Hoover successfully distanced himself from these policies. Incoming Attorney General, Harlan Fiske Stone, appointed Hoover acting and, then, permanent Bureau Director in 1924. Hoover approached his new job with zeal and is largely credited with remaking the Bureau by, among other factors, standardizing some facets of BI operations and basing appointments and promotions on merit, rather than political connections. Moreover, Hoover promoted the Bureau's public image by pursuing high-profile "public enemies" depression era bank robbers and gangsters. In 1933, the Bureau of Investigation was renamed the Division of Investigation. In 1935, it was renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 1936, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt charged the FBI with investigating subversive activities as political unrest in Europe spilled over into America.10 Such operations were aimed at not only fascist organizations like the pro-Nazi German American Bund, but at the Communist Party USA and other leftist organizations as well.11 The end of the Second World War did not bring about a reduction in FBI domestic security investigations. Instead, they increased as U.S.-Soviet tensions mounted with revelations that U.S. atom bomb secrets were betrayed to the Soviets and allegations that high-ranking U.S. officials may have been communist agents.12 As a result, wartime domestic security operations were carried 9 Numerous books have been written about Director Hoover. A select few include: Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (1987), and Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Streets, 1991. 10 Among other legal authorities, the FBI's jurisdiction to conduct such investigations was included in appropriations act language that allowed the Secretary of State to request such investigations. Then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, consented. See Church Committee Report. 11 In addition, President Roosevelt accepted a proposal from Director Hoover to station FBI agents in Latin America as intelligence operatives as part of the FBI's Special Intelligence Service in 1939. About 360 FBI agents were stationed in Latin America during the Second World War as intelligence operatives. Such postings, however, exacerbated the growing rivalry between Hoover and William J. Donovan, the founder of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI pulled out of Latin America at the end of the war, and foreign intelligence and espionage matters were ultimately given to the Central Intelligence Agency, when that agency was established in 1947. See Athan G. Theoharis, with Tony G. Poveda, Susan Rosenfeld, and Richard Powers, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (2000). 12 For an historical perspective on this era, see Ellen Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents (1994), Walter Goodman, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (1968), and (continued...) CRS-6 over into peacetime. The FBI investigated "atomic spies" Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, and the trial subsequently took place in 1950-1951. The trial resulted in the execution of both Julius and Ethel for committing espionage against the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union. Director Hoover opposed the execution of Ethel Rosenberg warning that the public would be averse to taking the life of a woman and a mother.13 From 1956 through 1971, the FBI conducted an intensive and largely successful domestic security operation to neutralize, among other groups, the Communist Party USA. Since the Party was viewed by many to be under direction of Soviet agents, the FBI considered such investigations to fall under the rubric of the Bureau's counterintelligence program (hence COINTELPRO). During COINTELPRO, the FBI used wire taps, listening devices, break ins, and other means of covert surveillance investigative techniques considered legitimate for "national security" purposes. Other techniques were more questionable, among those used against civil rights leaders, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. the leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The FBI also monitored a wide range of anti- Vietnam war activists. As the line between dissent and sedition blurred, the American public was alarmed by allegations that the FBI was violating the constitutional rights of citizens. Former FBI Director Hoover died on May 2, 1972, on the eve of the Watergate scandal. The Watergate hearings, along with the COINTELPRO revelations, focused attention on FBI abuses of power. Following two acting directors, Clarence Kelley, a former FBI Agent and Kansas City, Missouri police chief, was appointed FBI Director (1973-1978). A career law enforcement professional, Kelly is credited with restoring public faith in the FBI by instilling greater discipline in its ranks and providing enhanced operational oversight. Following Watergate, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations and the House Select Committee on Intelligence, known respectively as the Church and Pike Committees for their Chairs Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis Pike held a series of hearings examining the operations of U.S. intelligence agencies, including FBI domestic security and counterintelligence investigations.14 At the time of the hearings, (1976), Attorney General Levi promulgated new domestic security guidelines which established parameters within which it would be permissible for the FBI to conduct investigations into the "...use of force or violence in violation of federal law to overthrow the government or interfere with the activities of a foreign governments within the United States, to substantially impair the federal government in order to influence its policies, or to deprive others of their civil rights."15 Watergate and other intelligence community 12 (...continued) Howard Zinn, A People's History of the World: 1492 to Present (2003). 13 Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover, p. 304. 14 For Church Committee findings regarding the FBI, see the Church Committee Report. 15 U.S. Congress FBI Domestic Security Guidelines: Oversight Hearings Before the (continued...) CRS-7 abuses led to increased congressional oversight through the establishment of House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence and development of executive guidelines and legislation for electronic surveillance.16 Notwithstanding the abuses of the 1960s, the FBI had many successes in countering espionage activities conducted by U.S. citizens on behalf of the Soviet Union. Some of the higher profile Soviet espionage cases during this decade involved William Kampiles (a CIA employee), Christopher Boyce (an employee of defense contractor TRW, Inc.), and Edwin G. Moore, II (a retired CIA employee).17 During the 1980s, foreign intelligence agencies still aggressively engaged in espionage against the United States, despite the fact that much of their support in the guise of Communist and Socialist movements in the United States had been greatly diminished. In 1985, known as the "Year of the Spy," U.S. officials uncovered several spies most of whom were motivated by greed rather than ideology. In the 1990s both the FBI and the CIA again found themselves penetrated by employees working on behalf of the Soviet Union, and the successor Russian Federation. Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hanssen (FBI), both of whom worked at one point in Soviet counterintelligence, committed espionage and did substantial damage to U.S. national security. Their activities even led to the death of agents working on behalf of the U.S. Government against the Soviet Union and Russia. In the late1990s, the FBI was criticized for its handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) investigation, a case involving Wen Ho Lee, a cleared employee of LANL's sensitive "X" Division. After an embarrassing government case in which 58 of 59 counts18 of an indictment alleging espionage and inappropriate treatment of classified information were dropped, Wen Ho Lee pled guilty to one count of unlawfully collecting and storing classified information related to national defense for which he was sentenced to time already served during pretrial detention and released. Organized Crime. In the late 1920s and 1930s the United States economy went from boom to bust, as a period of relative wealth gave way to the great depression. As the depression took hold, and joblessness soared to 25%, lawlessness that had begun in the era of Prohibition swept across the country. Gangsters notorious for bank robbing, kidnaping and other illegal activities became the FBI's primary focus. As mentioned above, because the FBI did not have broad jurisdiction to combat organized crime at the time, it effectively and efficiently used those 15 (...continued) Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, April 27, 1983, p.60. 16 The two primary legal authorities governing electronic surveillance are Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 USC, §2510 et seq.) for criminal authorities, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 USC, §1801 et seq) for foreign intelligence authorities. 17 For a summary of espionage cases, see CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on Charges of Espionage Against the United States Government: 1966-1993, Revised May 27, 1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available from the authors of this report). 18 The indictment can be located at [http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel99/indictmenta.pdf]. CRS-8 statutes that were available to it, such as the Federal Kidnaping Act passed by Congress in response to the famous Lindbergh kidnaping case in 1932 and the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, which made it a federal crime to transport a stolen car across state lines, to combat gangsterism. In what some consider the heyday for the FBI, the organization successfully neutralized the activities of such infamous criminals as Bonnie and Clyde, John Dillinger, Charles Arthur ("Pretty Boy") Floyd, and George ("Machine Gun") Kelly during this turbulent era.19 During the late 1950s and 1960s, the FBI conducted a series of high profile investigations to combat organized crime. For many years, Director Hoover discounted the existence of organized crime national criminal syndicates, and avoided narcotics investigations.20 Congressional hearings, however, confirmed the existence of the Mafia and other organized crime syndicates. In the 1960s, at the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the FBI investigated Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamsters for alleged mob ties. In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (P.L. 91-452), giving the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies new statutory laws by which they could prosecute professional criminals. RICO enlarged the range of civil and criminal penalties which may result from commission of federal and state crimes.21 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter appointed Judge William H. Webster as FBI Director. Judge Webster successfully employed the RICO provisions to combat New York City's entrenched mob families. In the "Pizza Connection" case, the Gambino family was prosecuted successfully. In another operation, the FBI investigated and supported the successful prosecution of the Raymond Patriarca, Jr. family in New England. The FBI also initiated undercover operations during which they used middlemen to lure public figures into taking bribes. These investigations, known as ABSCAM, were controversial, even though they eventually led to the successful prosecution of one Senator and six Members of the House of Representatives, among others. Domestic Extremism. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies encountered an assorted array of groups opposed to the federal government and mainstream American society. These groups ranged from the militia movement to white supremacists inspired by the racial doctrines of the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. Among others, they included the Posse Comitatus, the Aryan Nations, the Silent Brotherhood, the Order, and the Christian Identity Movement. As white supremacists, some of these groups anticipated a race war in the United States as portrayed in William Pierce's novel, The Turner Diaries. Yet 19 For a summary of various high profile cases, see [www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/famcases.htm]. 20 It is reputed that J.Edgar Hoover shunned drug investigations, because he feared the corrupting effects that narcotics, like alcohol during Prohibition, might have on FBI Special Agents. In part, this led to the formation of the Drug Enforcement Agency as a separate agency for drug control within the Department of Justice. Drug control did not become a priority for the FBI until 1987. See Ronald Kessler, The FBI, 1993. 21 See CRS Report RS 20376, RICO: An Abridged Sketch, updated May 6, 2002, by Charles Doyle. CRS-9 another group, the Branch Davidians anticipated the apocalypse, though they were not white supremacists. The FBI adopted special tactics designed to overcome these groups with overwhelming force, but minimum violence, so that there would be little injury and loss of life.22 In two cases, however, violence escalated dramatically, leading to the sieges at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas.23 Some critics assert that the Ruby Ridge and Waco sieges fueled anti-government sentiment that led to the Oklahoma City and Atlanta Centennial Park bombings. For various reasons, the FBI was criticized for its handling of each of these cases. In 1996, however, the FBI and other federal law enforcement services were able to defuse successfully another potential domestic extremist group The Montana Freeman without any loss of life. Through patient negotiation and gradual increases in pressure, to include cutting power provided to the Freeman compound in Montana, the FBI and other law enforcement services brought the crisis to an end. Counterterrorism. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the United States increasingly became the target of Islamic radicals and terrorists. In February 26, 1993, a bomb was detonated in the basement parking garage of the World Trade Center. The FBI-led investigation revealed a conspiracy centered around a small group of Islamic radicals, who were followers of a Muslim extremist, the blind Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.24 Ramzi Yousef, considered to have been the mastermind of the bombing, escaped, but, in a major success for the FBI and its Intelligence Community partners, he was captured in Pakistan in 1995. Following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, President Clinton appointed Louis Freeh as FBI Director. A former judge and FBI Special Agent, Director Freeh enjoyed working cases and was personally engaged in the investigations of the Oklahoma City and Atlanta Centennial Park bombings. He also increased the number of FBI Special Agents deployed abroad at foreign legations to cope with the growing globalization of crime and to enforce U.S. extraterritoriality laws.25 Director Freeh's tenure saw a marked increase in the number of terrorist attacks overseas on U.S. interests by Islamic radicals. Most, if not all, of these attacks have been linked to al-Qaeda (The Base), a radical Islamic terrorist network 22 Danny O. Coulson and Elaine Shannon, No Heroes, Inside the FBI's Secret Counter- Terror Force, (New York, 1999), p. 595. 23 Other federal law enforcement agencies were involved in both incidents. For assessments of Ruby Ridge, see The Department of Justice Ruby Ridge Report at [http://web3.foxinternet.net/djf/ruby001.htm#tab]. The Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas can be located at [http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/waco/wacothree.html]. See also hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Oct. 19, 1995. 24 In 1994, Rahman and several followers were convicted for a conspiracy to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge and Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New York City. 25 Extraterritoriality is defined as U.S. laws which provide federal jurisdiction over some crimes committed outside the United States. See CRS Report 94-166-A, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, updated Sept. 2, 2002, by Charles Doyle. See also, CRS Report RL 31557, Terrorism and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases: Recent Developments, Sept. 2, 2002, by Charles Doyle. CRS-10 founded by Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi national and former heir to a multi-million dollar fortune and construction company. As early as 1993, Bin Laden issued fatwahs26 against U.S. troops in Somalia and Saudi Arabia. The FBI opened an investigation into his activities in October 1995.27 On February 23, 1998, Bin Laden and his lieutenant, Ayman Al Zawahiri, issued a fatwah declaring that it was "the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans including civilians anywhere in the world where they could be found."28 President George W. Bush nominated Robert Mueller, III as FBI Director, and he was sworn in on September 4, 2001. On September 11, 2001, Bin Laden's followers carried out the largest terrorist attack against the United States in its history. Compounding this crisis, an unknown person or persons delivered anthrax to several locations in the United States, including the Senate and House office buildings, through the U.S. mail. Director Mueller, a former U.S. Attorney in San Francisco, California, and U.S. Marine Corps officer, redeployed FBI Special Agents to more effectively counter terrorism and foreign espionage. In addition, Director Mueller has sought to strengthen the FBI's capacity to counter cyber-based attacks and other high-technology crime against the United States, and has worked to revamp the FBI's information technology infrastructure and security programs. FBI Organization and Culture How an entity organizes to implement its mission is critical to the organization's ultimate success. At the most general level, the FBI has three organizational elements its headquarters, field components, and Legal Attache offices. FBI Headquarters establishes organizational direction and priorities, while overseeing and managing the field's implementation of priorities through investigations and operations. With respect to its national security responsibilities, FBI Headquarters is working to centralize and integrate accountability and authority. More important than simple organizational flow charts, however, are the relationships and communication between entities and hierarchical levels within an organization. The culture and ethos of an organization also speaks to its inherent focus and mission- based flexibility. What follows is an assessment of these issues with respect to the FBI. Organization and Jurisdiction. Since its creation in 1908, like many other organizations of similar longevity, the FBI has been through numerous restructuring initiatives. As outlined above, these organizational changes coupled with increased federal criminal jurisdiction reflected an increase in real or perceived criminal and 26 A fatwah is a legal statement in Islam issued by a mufti (religious leader) or a religious lawyer on a specific issue. 27 John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed To Stop It, (New York: Hyperion, 2002), p. 148. 28 This fatwah can be located at [http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm]. See also U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Congressional Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, Al-Qaeda International, by J.T. Caruso, Acting Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, (Washington: Dec. 18, 2001), p. 3. CRS-11 national security threats to the United States. The FBI's jurisdiction and responsibilities are guided by a broad range of statutes and regulations that have developed since its inception. Although prior Congresses have discussed the development of a legislative charter for the FBI, no such single authoritative document outlining FBI jurisdiction and responsibilities exists.29 Figure 3 below reflects the current structure of the FBI. 29 The FBI Charter Act of 1979 was developed in the wake of revelations in the 1960s and early 1970s that the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies were investigating U.S. citizen activity deemed then to be "subversive." Subsequent investigation found many of the government's activities during this tumultuous period of U.S. history were indeed illegal. For a summary of the FBI Charter Act, see "FBI Charter Act of 1979 (S. 1612)," Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Congress, Aug., Sept., Oct. 1979. Although the FBI Charter Act was referred to the Judiciary Committee and hearings were held, it was not reported out of the Committee. For a summary of historical abuses committed by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, see the Church Committee Report. CRS-12 Figure 3. FBI Headquarters Organizational Chart Director Chief of Staff SAC Advisory Committee Deputy Director Inspection Division Office of Public Affairs Office of Congressional Affairs Office of the Ombudsman Office of General Counsel Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Chief Information Officer Office of Professional Responsibility Executive Assistant Executive Assistant Executive Assistant Executive Assistant Director for Director for Law Director for Director for Counter-Terrorism/ Enforcement Intelligence Administration Counter-Intelligence Services Counter- Counter- Criminal Office of Office of Office of Cyber Law Strategic Terrorism Intelligence Investigation Intelligence Division Enforcement Planning Division Division Division Coordination Office of Records Administrative International Management Services Operations Division Division Critical Incident Response Group Training Laboratory Security Finance Division Division Division Division Investigative Criminal Information Technologies Justice Division Resources Information Division Services Division Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation. Current as of July 1, 2003. CRS-13 As Figure 3 illustrates, the FBI currently has four main directorates under which all of its activities are organized. Each of the 56 field offices is engaged in investigative and operational activities that support the programs around which FBI Headquarters is organized. One recent major organizational and managerial change is the conversion of the Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Criminal Investigations into an EAD for Intelligence.30 Responsibility and program management for both the Criminal Investigative Programs and the Cyber Program will be assumed by the the FBI Deputy Director. This issue is somewhat contentious from a managerial and functional perspective.31 Functionally, at a time when there is a general perception among some in law enforcement that the national security mission is drawing resources from the FBI's traditional criminal mission, the organization dissolved an EAD for Criminal Investigations. One of the four existing directorates is investigative and operational (Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence), with the other three (Law Enforcement Services, Administration, and Intelligence) focusing on information sharing with state and local law enforcement, organizational support activities, and intelligence infrastructure development, respectively. Responsibility for criminal and cyber investigations, the FBI's other investigative/operational role, is now directed from the Deputy Director's office, as indicated above. The FBI, an organization in the midst of a reorganization aimed at improving its ability to detect, deter, and prevent another terrorist attack has 14 divisions (as illustrated in Figure 3 above). Nationwide, the FBI conducts its investigations and operations through 56 Field Offices and over 400 "resident agencies," smaller offices geographically dispersed around the country which report to one of the larger 56 field offices.32 With the exception of the largest field offices in Washington (D.C.), New 30 See testimony of FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller III on the FBI reorganization before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003. The FBI has recently appointed an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence. This position is responsible for the FBI's Office of Intelligence, the primary mission of which is to establish a formal intelligence program within the FBI's national security and criminal programs. Substantial reorganizations require congressional approval, particularly if there are proposed changes in how previously authorized and/or appropriated resources are allocated. 31 There are different viewpoints on this initiative. From a management perspective, it could be argued that the agency's second official is in essence its chief operating officer (COO) responsible for the daily operations of the FBI. The existence of a COO allows the Director the time to engage and inform national level policymakers and congressional oversight committees, and to develop broad strategy for the organization. Some may argue that burdening a COO with specific programmatic responsibilities may force the executive to focus undue time and emphasis on those programs to the potential detriment of the broader organizational mission. However, it could also be argued that notwithstanding the dissolution of the EAD for Criminal Investigations, the FBI has indeed increased its focus on these matters by elevating them to the Deputy Director's level. 32 See Appendix I for a list of the 56 field offices by city location. See also testimony of FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller, III on the FBI reorganization before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003. As part of its ongoing reorganization, the (continued...) CRS-14 York and Los Angeles, which are led by Assistant Directors-In-Charge (ADICs), each of the 56 field offices is led by a Special Agent-In-Charge (SAC). Offices led by ADICs generally have program-oriented SACs who report to the ADICs. ADICs and SACs report directly to the FBI Director and periodic (generally quarterly) meetings are held during which all SACs and ADICs join with the Director to discuss ongoing activities and FBI strategies. FBI Leadership. The FBI is led by a Director, who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The Director is appointed for a single 10-year term. The 10-year appointment was passed by Congress in 1968 to take effect after the tenure of the sixth FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, who led the agency for nearly 48 years (1924-1972). The 10-year term was approved in an effort to balance the independence necessary for an investigative agency with protection against the accumulation of excessive power by one agency or individual. Historically, no FBI director following Hoover (See Appendix II for a chronological list) has served the full 10-year term. The median tenure for an FBI Director is six years (including the anomalous nearly 48-year Hoover tenure and excluding six acting directors). Culture. The FBI has a rich culture that is dominated by the interests of law enforcement and has developed over many years. "Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity" are integrated in much of the training FBI employees receive. It is the preeminent national, and arguably international, law enforcement entity. No other U.S.-based organization has the same national and international law enforcement reach, power and influence. Critics have argued, however, that notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, this reactive law enforcement culture the FBI may not be well-equipped for the preventative counterterrorism mission which is now its number one priority.33 The FBI and its supporters recognize the need for substantial change that builds on existing strengths, but substantially redirects FBI activities from a reactive posture to crimes already committed toward a proactive posture with a clear focus on preventing terrorist attacks on U.S. interests. Some have observed that the outcome of the ongoing reorganization activities at the FBI hinge largely on the extent to which this cultural shift can be made, and on the establishment of an effective and efficient intelligence program.34 32 (...continued) FBI is reconsidering its field office structure to determine if it reflects the Nation's criminal and national security priorities. According to Director Mueller, changes, such as the shifting of population and crime patterns, are factors causing this reassessment of field structure. 33 See the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the "Gilmore" Commission), and Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age (a report of the Markle Foundation Task Force). See also William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for More Secure America, Yale University Press, 2003; and Senator John Edwards, "Iraq, Terrorism and U.S. Global Leadership," speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Oct. 7, 2002. See also Robert Bryant, et al., "America Needs More Spies," The Economist, July 10, 2003. 34 The FBI has been a statutory member of the U.S. Intelligence Community since 1947 with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. Code, §401), as amended. Some (continued...) CRS-15 The culture of intelligence driven organizations differs from those of pure law enforcement organizations.35 While (foreign) intelligence36 organizations are interested in long-term infiltration, active and passive monitoring, and deterrence, the law enforcement bias is to arrest and prosecute. The primary goal of a (foreign) intelligence organization is to: (1) determine what intelligence should be collected to advance national interests; (2) systematically collect that raw intelligence; (3) apply analytical tools to the raw information in the development of informed judgements; and (4) to share that finished intelligence with national level policymakers and other officials with a demonstrated need to know. "Tradecraft" or the how, where and why intelligence gathering takes place, is of utmost importance.37 Recruitment of sources and penetration of groups operating in United States is highly valued.38 There are fewer legal restrictions on overseas U.S. Intelligence Community agency operations. By contrast, the primary goal of a (pure) law enforcement agency is to respond to criminal activities, and to deter future crimes. In general, this goal is achieved by rigorous investigation of criminal activities and close cooperation with prosecution. Discrete cases are the driving factor in a law enforcement organization, while broader trends and relationships among social variables, such as political, economic, and military factors, drive intelligence organizations. When law 34 (...continued) would argue, however, that historically its criminal responsibilities eclipsed its intelligence mission. 35 For a brief assessment of the cultural differences between intelligence and law enforcement see Siobhan Gorman, "FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart," Government Executive, Aug. 1, 2003. See also CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., updated Dec. 3, 2001, by Richard A. Best, Jr. See also Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA, (Knopf, 1994). 36 Foreign Intelligence is defined as information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons. See the National Security Act of 1947, (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, §401a). Gathering of foreign intelligence within the United States is governed by, among other sources, the classified U.S. Department of Justice's Foreign Counterintelligence Manual, and, for electronic surveillance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S. Code, §1861), as amended. Gathering of foreign intelligence within the United States is governed by, among other sources, the classified U.S. Department of Justice Foreign Counterintelligence Manual, and, for electronic surveillance; physical searches; pen registers and trap and trace devices; and access to "business records," including any tangible things to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person, or to protect against international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S. Code, §1801 et. seq.), as amended. 37 For a brief discussion of how foreign intelligence tradecraft differs from Homeland Security tradecraft, see Bruce Berkowitz, "A Fresh Start Against Terror," New York Times, Aug. 4, 2003, p. A17. 38 Some have argued a sound metric for assessing performance of an intelligence driven organization is the number of trusted penetrations the agency has recruited. In general, foreign intelligence organizations tend to perform better than pure law enforcement agencies in human asset recruitment. S. 1520, the "9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act," proposes the FBI enhance its efforts to penetrate terrorist organizations operating in the United States through "all available means" of collection. CRS-16 enforcement entities operate within the United States, civil liberties and the rights of U.S. citizens are of paramount concern. As a result, the domestic environment, and any intelligence gathering which takes place in the United States, is governed by a complex range of investigative guidelines and statutes and constitutional limits. As a hybrid law enforcement and intelligence organization, the FBI collects criminal intelligence in support of its law enforcement mission, and foreign intelligence in support of its national security mission. As such, it has a set of unique advantages (familiarity with treating terrorism as both a crime and potential threat to U.S. national security, awareness of the need to protect civil liberties) and challenges (largely cultural) as it attempts to change the balance between these two missions. The FBI's membership in the U.S. Intelligence Community makes it responsible for collecting, analyzing, exploiting and disseminating foreign intelligence. Its primary national security mission areas have been and remain counterterrorism and counterintelligence. As a result of this focus, and its prominent law enforcement mission, the FBI has not historically been a substantial producer of foreign intelligence. Moreover, because of its unique (domestic) law enforcement and intelligence mission, the organization was, for the most part, the primary consumer of its own raw and finished intelligence. Informing national policymakers about pressing national security matters when action may not be immediately necessary has historically not been a high FBI priority. Rather, the primary impetus for gathering intelligence was to support a case. However, according to Director Mueller, the FBI is now moving from thinking about "intelligence as a case," to finding the "intelligence in the case."39 While some argue that intelligence is the more effective discipline in countering terrorists who operate clandestinely, all elements of national power (intelligence, law enforcement, military, diplomatic, economic) have a role to play in combating terrorism. An important element of an organization's culture is not only the ethos of the entity itself, but how its employees define themselves and interact with internal and external stakeholders. As mentioned above, the FBI employs a broad range of professionals that fall into two basic categories: Special Agents and professional support. Generally, two professional support staff support each Agent.40 Agents are sworn law enforcement officers who carry a badge and weapon and are authorized to make arrests for many federal crimes, including recently added authority to make arrests based on immigration violations.41 While the FBI continues to recruit lawyers and accountants as Agents, it has diversified its recruitments to include linguists, chemists and biologists, and international affairs experts, among others. New 39 See "Combating Terrorism," a Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, July 23, 2003. 40 See P.L. 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003. The FBI has approximately 26,000 total employees, out of which about 12,000 are Agents. 41 This authority was recently provided to the FBI when, in Feb. 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft signed an order extending this power to the FBI. This power had heretofore been reserved for Immigration and Naturalization Service Agents, some U.S. Customs Service officials, and a small amount of Southern Florida law enforcement officers. See Dan Eggen, "Rules on Detention Widened: FBI, Marshals Can Hold Foreigners," Washington Post, Mar. 20, 2003, p. A11. CRS-17 Agents are required to pass 16 weeks of academic and practical training at the FBI Academy located at the Quantico Marine Base in Quantico, Virginia. Program- specific training follows the 16 week program and continues throughout an Agent's career. Professional support personnel cover myriad functions ranging from financial and human resources support to physical surveillance, foreign language, and intelligence analytical support. All-source intelligence analysts work closely with Agents to provide tactical analytical support to ongoing national security and criminal cases. They also provide strategic level analyses, such as criminal, terrorism or foreign intelligence patterns of activity and/or trend analyses, and programmatic analyses, to FBI executives and U.S. Intelligence Community policymakers. Training for professional support varies depending on the position. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the FBI has substantially increased training for new and existing intelligence analysts at the FBI, to include an invigorated College of Analytical Studies, an FBI program which leverages some Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analytical training methodologies.42 International Presence and Role. Internationally, in the last decade the FBI has significantly expanded its presence to 45 Legal Attache (LEGAT) offices.43 Legal Attaches are located within the U.S. Embassy overseas and report to the U.S. Ambassador.44 Legats are integrated into the U.S. Embassy and serve the primary role of developing and nurturing reciprocal relationships with foreign law enforcement and security services in the mutual interest of investigating international crime and terrorism. Legats gather information through overt liaison, but are not engaged in clandestine intelligence collection. FBI officials project that by the end of 2003 there will be approximately 133 Special Agents and 83 support personnel stationed overseas in support of the international mission.45 Legats played a prominent role in coordinating with overseas law enforcement and security services during the investigation into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (FBI case name PENTTBOMB).46 Legats are also responsible for facilitating the placement of 42 See Robert S. Mueller III, FBI Director, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "The War Against Terrorism: Working Together to Protect America," Mar. 4, 2003. 43 See Appendix III for an international map of the FBI's Legal Attaches. There are 45 overseas Legal Attache offices and one domestic Legal Attache liaison office (Miami, Florida). 44 The FBI has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. State Department regarding the placement of Legats in U.S. Embassies. See John S. Pistole, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Diplomacy and the War Against Terrorism," Mar. 18, 2003. 45 See testimony of Roderick L. Beverly, Special Agent-in-Charge, FBI Office of International Operations, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, May 13, 2003. 46 The nomenclature of the PENTTBOMB case is as follows: "PENT" for Pentagon, and "TT" for twin towers. CRS-18 foreign law enforcement officers into annual FBI National Academy classes.47 Through this program, foreign law enforcement officers are trained in a broad range of criminal procedures, with the attendant benefit of building a cadre of international contacts the FBI leverages to mutual advantage in international criminal and related investigations. Current Major Investigative Programs Robert S. Mueller, III became Director of the FBI on September 4, 2001, only one week prior to the infamous terrorist attacks of September 11. Up until that point, the FBI had national security responsibilities, including counterterrorism, in Tier I of its (1998-2003) Strategic Plan's Investigative Priorities. Tier I combined national security responsibilities with other issues such as deterring criminal conspiracy;48 therefore, the clarity and focus of FBI priorities, arguably, remained nebulous. Nor was it generally perceived within the FBI that working national security accounts (counterterrorism and counterintelligence) was a career-enhancing endeavor. The events of September 11 only made more stark the need to develop a definitive and clarified list of new priorities for the FBI. Moreover, the recent Robert Hanssen espionage case49 and the espionage investigation at Los Alamos National Laboratory, also contributed to a perceived need for reprioritization, particularly of national security-related issues at the FBI. As a result, on May 29, 2002, the FBI Director announced the following 10 priorities: ! Protect the United States from terrorist attack. ! Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage. ! Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes. ! Combat public corruption at all levels. ! Protect civil rights. ! Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises. ! Combat major white-collar crime. 47 Since its inception in 1935, over 2,000 foreign law enforcement officers from over 140 countries have participated in the National Academy. For additional information on the National Academy see [http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/academy/na/na.htm]. The FBI National Academy should not be confused with the FBI Academy, established in 1920s, which has as its primary purpose the training of new FBI Special Agents. In 1972, the FBI opened a facility to train new Special Agents on the United States Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Virginia. 48 See Thomas J. Pickard, former Acting Director and Deputy Director FBI, testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, "Re-authorization of the FBI," May 3, 2001. 49 Robert Hanssen was an FBI Special Agent who had substantial expertise in counterintelligence matters and had access to some of the most highly classified intelligence in the U.S. government. Mr. Hanssen betrayed the trust put in him by the U.S. government by committing espionage on behalf of the former Soviet Union and then Russia. For more information on this case, see the U.S. Department of Justice's indictment at [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/hanssen_indict.html]. CRS-19 ! Combat significant violent crime. ! Support federal, state, local and international partners. ! Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission. As this prioritized list makes clear, while the FBI continues to dedicate a majority of its time and resources to combating crime, its national security mission has been dramatically elevated in stature and importance within the organization.50 What follows then is a brief description of the top four FBI investigative programs: Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Criminal and Cybercrime (including public corruption), and Security. FBI Counterterrorism Program.51 At the most generic level, there are two types of terrorism that the FBI, and other U.S. governmental agencies, seek to counter domestic terrorism and international terrorism. The domestic terrorist threat can be categorized as coming from extremists on polar opposites of the political spectrum. That is, there are domestic groups that do not believe in the legitimacy of the U.S. government, including its laws, currency and sovereignty and others that are motivated by hatred of certain ethnic groups (generally referred to as "right wing" extremists), while others are primarily oriented toward violent activities to advance preferred social causes, such as liberation of the earth or animals from perceived exploitation (generally referred to as "left wing" extremists). International terrorists and terrorist groups are generally categorized as State Sponsors of Terrorism or Foreign Terrorist Organizations.52 In FY2002, the FBI worked 12,512 50 According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), from FY2002 to FY2003, the FBI increased the allocation of FBI positions in the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber areas from 26% to 36%. See FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, June 18, 2003. Although the FBI's number one and two priorities are national security oriented, it does not necessarily follow that these two priorities should consume a majority of FBI resources. The quality of the (human) resources, targeting of these resources against greatest threats, and close collaboration between these resources and other Intelligence Community assets, as well as state and local law enforcement partners, may be better indicators of success in this area than raw financial data. 51 The FBI treats terrorism as both a federal crime and as a national security issue. Not all terrorism is a grave threat to national security, but all terrorism, or activity in support of terrorism, is criminal. This reflects the reality of the issue, that is, some prima facie criminal activities, such as fraud and other illegal fund-raising techniques, are engaged in domestically by those supporting terrorist activities at home or abroad. The fact that the proceeds of these illegal activities may be used for violent or coercive activities directed against U.S. citizens to achieve a desired political outcome, makes the activity inimical to U.S. values and interests. Terrorism has the capacity to undermine national public and private institutions and values and negatively affect national quality of life. As such, multiple tools of statecraft, including law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and military force are used to counter terrorism. 52 Two other "lists" have been created by the U.S. government as counterterrorism tools the Terrorism Exclusion List (TEL) which has immigration consequences for any aliens (continued...) CRS-20 counterterrorism investigations.53 An abbreviated version of the history of the FBI's Counterterrorism Program is illustrative. The Wake Up Call. The FBI's organization for countering terrorism has shifted over time as the relative importance of terrorism as a national security and criminal issue has changed. There have been three major periods in the development of the existing Counterterrorism Program. The first period occurred in the early-to- mid 1980s. During this period, the FBI's counterterrorism program employed fewer than 500 people.54 In the aftermath of the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy (April 63 dead, 17 of whom were Americans) and then the U.S. Marine Corps (October 241 Marine personnel dead) barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, the FBI established a Terrorism Section within its Criminal Investigative Division. Although the FBI has long had the authority to investigate federal crimes not assigned to other U.S. law enforcement entities, the passage of the Hostage Taking Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1986 granted it the explicit authority for extraterritorial investigation of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and citizens overseas.55 U.S. Vulnerability. The second major period includes the early-to-mid 1990s. During this period, the United States not only was attacked overseas, but perhaps more importantly there were successful and significant terrorist attacks within the United States. The two most prominent attacks during this period involved the bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993 (an incident of international terrorism in which six Americans died), and the April 1995 domestic terrorism attack on the Alfred P. Murrah office building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (168 52 (...continued) "...who provide material assistance to, or solicit it for, designated organizations." Executive Order 13224, Terrorist Financing allows the U.S. government "... to block designees' assets in any financial institution in the United States, or held by any U.S. person." See U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. The second set of lists is what is referred to as "Watch Lists." These lists, of which there are approximately 12, were established and are implemented by various executive agencies with intelligence, counterterrorism, and law enforcement responsibilities. See GAO Report 03-322, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, Apr. 2003. S. 1520, the "9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act," proposes the establishment of a National Terrorist Watchlist Center, which would has as its primary function the coordination and integration of all terrorist watchlists. On Sept. 16, 2003, the Department of Justice announced the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center, "...a multi-agency center anchored by the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State, and the Intelligence Community, and administered by the FBI..." to "consolidate terrorist watchlists and provide 24/7 operational support for thousands of federal screeners across the country and around the world." See Department of Justice News Release, Sept. 16, 2003. 53 See FY2004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-6. 54 By contrast, in early 2003, the FBI dedicated approximately 3,000 field Agents to counterterrorism. See Walker, June 18, 2003. See also Robert M. Blitzer, "Domestic Intelligence Challenges in the 21st Century," prepared for the Lexington Institute's February 2003 conference Progress Towards Homeland Security: An Interim Report Card. 55 Extraterritorial jurisdiction for acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries is granted to the Attorney General pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Chapter 113B, §2332b. CRS-21 Americans perished). In part as a response, in 1996, the FBI established, with the support of the Congress, its own Counterterrorism Center and devoted additional international terrorism and domestic terrorism experts to combating terrorism. It was also during this period that the FBI transferred responsibility for terrorism from its Criminal Investigative Division to its National Security Division. Catalyst for a War of Indeterminate Duration. The third period is the late 1990s to 2001. It was during this period that loosely affiliated terrorist organizations became more active and attacks became more deadly and asymmetrical. The August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (224 killed, 12 of whom were American) are largely attributed in part to an increasingly aggressive al-Qaeda. In 1999, to provide enhanced focus on counterterrorism, the FBI transferred its counterterrorism program from the National Security Division to a newly established Counterterrorism Division. In October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked (17 servicemen dead) by al-Qaeda operatives as it was in the Yemen's Aden Harbor for refueling.56 Then, on September 11, 2001, acts of violence directed against the United States were carried out with near simultaneous attacks (an al-Qaeda hallmark) on the Pentagon, the World Trade Center and a third target that was averted with a scuttling of the hijacked United Flight 93 in rural Pennsylvania. As a result of the events of September 11, 2001 (approximately 3,000 dead, the majority of whom were American), many changes have taken place and continue to be implemented, to shift the FBI from a reactive to a proactive posture. On May 22, 2002, FBI Director Mueller outlined a reorganization initiative at the FBI. A primary theme of this reorganization is program centralization and the establishment of a national intelligence program which rebalances the relationship between FBI Headquarters and field offices. S. 1520, a bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 (short title "the 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act") proposes that the FBI take a number of actions to enhance its counterterrorism capabilities, including clearly designating priorities for national terrorism and enforcement of adherence by FBI field offices to such priorities, establishing and maintaining a counterterrorism career track and formal training programs for Special Agents and Analysts and improving its ability to penetrate terrorist organizations operating in the United States. Some of these changes are in process. In addition to those changes already outlined above, other major elements of this reorganization are as follows: ! FBI Headquarters Organizational Changes. The Director established a new EAD for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, among three other EADs. Subsequently, the FBI Director has established an EAD for Intelligence whose primary function will be to establish and implement a formal and systematic Intelligence Program throughout the FBI. The extent to which this initiative will be successful is largely dependent on whether the FBI's strong law enforcement culture accepts and adopts this new approach to intelligence. 56 See CRS Report RS 20721, Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, updated Jan. 30, 2001, by Ronald O'Rourke, and Raphael Perl. CRS-22 ! Analytical Enhancements. In order to immediately meet the surge in demand for real-time tactical and strategic counterterrorism analysis, the FBI requested and received 25 analysts on temporary detail from the CIA. According to the FBI, since September 11, 2001, it has increased the number of its Intelligence Operations Specialists from 65 to 345 and increased the number of Intelligence Research Specialists from 41 to 130.57 To meet the sustained long-term need for counterterrorism analysis, for FY2004, the FBI has requested 214 additional counterterrorism analysts, a number that would quadruple the pre-September 11 number of counterterrorism analysts.58 These analysts will be part of the newly formed Analysis Branch of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. Perhaps most importantly, analysis of foreign threat intelligence gathered overseas and in the United States on terrorism will be integrated in the newly established Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as the leader of the U.S. Intelligence Community.59 The Director of the TTIC is a CIA employee detailed to the TTIC, while the Deputy Director is an FBI employee detailed to the TTIC.60 57 Until just recently, the FBI has had two categories of professional support employees who engage in analysis. While Intelligence Research Specialists are all-source intelligence analysts who engage in a full range of tactical, strategic and programmatic analysis, Intelligence Operations Specialists are more tactically oriented and provide direct case and operational support. The FBI is currently in the process of merging these two categories of employees into one - intelligence analysts. The newly created Reports Officers generally do not engage in traditional all source analysis; their focus is reviewing raw information in a timely manner and understanding to whom (internally and externally) that information must be disseminated. 58 See Statement by FBI Director Robert Mueller regarding the Joint Intelligence Committee Report into the Terrorist Attack of September 11, 2001, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Press Release, July 24, 2003. 59 Currently, the Director of Central Intelligence serves as both the leader of the Central Intelligence Agency, and as Director of the broader U.S. Intelligence Community. The pending 9/11 Intelligence Memorial Reform Act (S. 1520) would create a Director of National Intelligence, and that individual would be precluded from simultaneous service as the Director of the CIA and Director of National Intelligence. Some have argued this proposal would undermine the DCI's power base. See Robert M. Gates, "How Not to Reform Intelligence," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 2003. Finally, while the TTIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence as leader of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the organization has been categorized as a "joint venture" of U.S. Intelligence Community participants. 60 While there is widespread agreement on the need to have more integrated foreign and domestic counterterrorism analytical effort, some observers are skeptical of the placement of an intelligence analytical "fusion" center within the U.S. Intelligence Community. Some believe placement of such a center within the U.S. Intelligence Community will undermine intelligence sharing with state and local law enforcement. Moreover, according to the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) an Undersecretary of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) was to be established within the newly created Department to, inter alia, (1) assess the nature and scope of the terrorist threat to the Homeland; (2) understand threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the Homeland; and (3) (continued...) CRS-23 ! Investigative Enhancements. With respect to field Agents dedicated to the FBI's three highest priorities (counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber- crime), the FBI has increased this number from approximately 2,376 Agents in FY02 to 3,308 Agents in FY03, a 39% increase in 1 year.61 Intelligence squads, including supporting Reports Officers, also have been established at FBI field offices to ensure that this important function is given appropriate attention. ! Re-engineering Projects. The FBI Director has about 40 ongoing or completed re-engineering projects designed to improve the focus, information technology,62 and business practices at the organization. Six projects have been completed, eight additional projects are in the final stages of completion, and work continues on the remainder.63 Counterterrorism and counterintelligence share the same basic discipline, that is, efforts in both areas are supported by clandestine intelligence activity and may or may not be state sponsored. FBI Counterintelligence Program. The FBI's Counterintelligence 64 Program developed largely as a response to real or perceived threats to U.S. national 60 (...continued) integrate relevant information, analyses and vulnerability assessments to identify priorities for protective measures. IAIP is a member of the TTIC and the U.S. Intelligence Community. For additional information on TTIC, see CRS Report RS 21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support, updated June 23, 2003, by Richard A. Best, Jr. See also, Joint Hearing on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, House Select Committee on Homeland Security and the House Judiciary Committee, July 22, 2003. 61 See General Accounting Office (GAO), FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, testimony of David Walker before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003. 62 The Trilogy project is the FBI's overarching initiative to improve its antiquated information technology infrastructure. Broadly speaking, the goals are to improve information connectivity between and among national and international FBI entities, the U.S. Intelligence Community and, where appropriate, state and local law enforcement agencies. Another important element of this program is to re-engineer FBI information systems so that information can be readily captured and retrieved for timely analytical exploitation. For additional information see, Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of Information Technology Investments, Report No. 03-09, Dec. 2002, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. 63 For a list of these projects see, Dick Thornburgh, Chairman, National Academy of Public Administration Panel of FBI Reorganization, testimony before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, June 18, 2003. 64 Counterintelligence is defined as information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs. See Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, Dec. 4, 1981. See also (continued...) CRS-24 security as a result of the clandestine foreign intelligence activities directed against the United States. The goal of counterintelligence is to neutralize, deter, detect and prevent, where possible, foreign intelligence activity directed against U.S. interests. Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, counterintelligence remains a vital U.S. national security function, as nation states and sub-national actors continue to act in their own parochial self interest.65 Moreover, as the world's dominant economic and military power, the United States remains a target for foreign intelligence activity from a broad range of countries. Although espionage66 cases are the very public face of counterintelligence, the majority of counterintelligence cases never reach prosecution. History. The FBI's history illustrates that during times of national crisis its domestic intelligence activities have occasionally circumvented constitutional norms. On balance, however, enhanced Attorney General Guidelines covering a broad range of issues such as legal predicates for initiating counterintelligence investigations, the establishment of congressional intelligence committees, as well as the passage of statutes governing electronic surveillance,67 have strengthened the legal, regulatory and oversight environment in which the FBI must operate. Imbalances Between Dissent and Subversion. As alluded to above, historically, the FBI (and other intelligence agencies) have been engaged in intelligence activities directed against individuals based solely on their exercising First Amendment constitutional rights.68 The "Palmer Raids" took place in 1919- 1921, as the FBI's "Radical Division" (later renamed the General Intelligence Division) sought to round up "anarchist" and "revolutionary" aliens. It was alleged that these individuals, some of whom belonged to the Communist Party of America, were actively engaged in supporting the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. In fact, although many of the individuals subject to the raids may have had political beliefs that were inconsistent with those of contemporary governing authorities, subsequent investigation revealed that many of the so-called radicals were U.S. 64 (...continued) National Security Act of 1947, (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, §401a). 65 See David Szady, Assistant FBI Director Counterintelligence Division, "Changes the FBI is Making to the Counterintelligence Program," statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Apr. 9, 2002. 66 In general, there are two categories of espionage that which involves the unlawful transfer of classified national defense information to an unauthorized third party (see 18 U.S. Code, Chapter 37, §§793, 794, and 798), and that which involves theft of commercial trade secret information which is categorized as "economic espionage." Economic espionage was codified in 1996 (see 18 U.S. Code, Chapter 90, §1831). 67 The landmark statute in this case is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by P.L. 107-56, which stipulates that a court order must be granted prior to collecting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. 68 See Tony Poveda, Lawlessness and Reform: The FBI in Transition, Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1990. CRS-25 citizens who were not actively engaged in any Communist activity to overthrow the U.S. government.69 Throughout the Cold War as the FBI fought an intense counterintelligence battle against the hostile intelligence activities of the Soviet Union and its client states, the FBI occasionally would become involved in domestic intelligence activities inappropriately and in contravention of the basic tenets of an open democracy. Some of these activities included: ! COINTELPRO. During the 1956-1971 era, the FBI developed and implemented its infamous Counterintelligence program or COINTELPRO. Through this program, the FBI investigated those involved in vaguely defined "subversive" activities, including U.S. citizens engaged in legitimate political discourse and advocacy, such as civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.70 In March 1971, antiwar activists broke into the FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania and stole about 1,000 classified documents that chronicled the FBI's surreptitious surveillance of anti-Vietnam War activists. These documents were incrementally leaked to the press. ! CISPES. In the early 1980s, the FBI investigated the domestic activities of a group know as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), a group engaged in fund-raising activity in the United States with remittance payments to El Salvador. The purpose of the initial investigation was to determine if CISPES had violated the Foreign Agent Registration Act.71 Subsequently, in 1983 the FBI opened a broader investigation to determine if the organization was engaged in international terrorist activity. Although a congressional investigation concluded that the FBI's investigation did not reflect "significant FBI political or ideological bias...," its activities "resulted in the investigation of domestic political activities protected by the First Amendment that should not have come under governmental scrutiny."72 ! Library Awareness Program. In late 1980s, the New York Office of the FBI Counterintelligence Program initiated what became known as the Library Awareness Program. Through this program FBI Agents visited certain libraries within the New York area to make librarians aware that Intelligence Officers of the (former) Soviet Union, may attempt to spot, assess, and recruit librarians and/or students as intelligence agents of the Soviet Union. This FBI initiative was predicated on prior Soviet hostile intelligence activity which demonstrated that known intelligence officers sought to fulfill Soviet intelligence collection requirements regarding U.S. high technology before it became classified or restricted by tasking librarians or students at technical 69 See Edwin Hoyt Palmer, The Palmer Raids,1919-1921: An Attempt to Suppress Dissent, Seabury Press, 1969. 70 For further information on the history of COINTELPRO, see Church Committee Report. 71 The Foreign Agent Registration Act requires that persons acting as foreign agents (as defined by the Act) register with the U.S. Department of Justice for among other reasons, transparency (see 22 U.S. Code, §611). 72 See "The FBI and CISPES," a report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. (S. Prt. 101-46, July 1989). CRS-26 libraries. Some civil libertarians and other library groups believed that even though this program was not national in scope, it risked undermining the democratic ideal of openness, particularly because it might impinge on the sharing of open, unclassified information.73 These FBI activities and those of other intelligence agencies in the Watergate era, a time characterized by general mistrust of the government, led to increased oversight of the FBI. The Pendulum Swings Back: Oversight and Regulation. In the wake of these and other scandals, both the executive and legislative branches of government took action to protect the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Former Attorney General Edward Hirsch Levi (1975-1977) issued "Domestic Security Investigations" Guidelines (also known as the "Levi" Guidelines) which clarified FBI authorities in this area. Nearly six years later, in 1983, these Guidelines were updated and incorporated into the Attorney General Guidelines on "General Crimes, Racketeering, Enterprises, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations."74 In the mid-1970s the Congress established two permanent select committees to conduct oversight of U.S. intelligence activities. Later, in 1978, the Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA [P.L.95-511]) to establish legal standards and criteria for electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence activities in the United States.75 Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, signed in 1981, also prevents members of the U.S. Intelligence Community from conducting, inter alia, electronic surveillance in the United States, unless expressly 73 The USA PATRIOT ACT (P.L. 107-56) §215 amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S. Code §1861) to allow the Director of the FBI (or a designee) to make an application for an order requiring the production of "...any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)..." for an authorized international terrorism or counterintelligence investigation. This remains contentious today, and there are at least three bills pending in the108th Congress (S. 1158, S. 1507, and H.R.1157) which would either exempt bookstores and libraries from orders requiring the production of any tangible things for certain foreign intelligence investigations, or amend the standards for such orders. Recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and six Muslim groups sued the U.S. government arguing that these elements of the PATRIOT Act are unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the privacy, due process, and free speech rights of Americans. See Eric Lichblau, "Suit Challenges Constitutionality of Powers in Antiterrorism Law," New York Times, July 31, 2003. 74 See "FBI Domestic Security Guidelines," Oversight hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary, House Representatives, Apr. 27, 1983. The 1976 and 1983 versions of the domestic security guidelines were subsequently updated and modified by both Attorneys General Richard Thornburgh (1989) and Janet Reno (1994). 75 Some elements of FISA were recently amended in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L.107-108), and in the Homeland Security Act of 202 (P.L. 107-296). See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions, updated Mar. 31, 2003, by Elizabeth Bazan. See also CRS Report RL 31200, Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, updated Dec. 10, 2001, by Charles Doyle. CRS-27 authorized by the Attorney General and subject to probable cause legal standards.76 It was within this newly regulated environment that the FBI's Counterintelligence program would have some of its highest profile successes investigations and prosecutions of espionage. Year of the Spy. In comparison to the early 1950s when the only executions for the crime of espionage took place in the United States, the period of the late 1960s through the mid-1970s can be aptly characterized as relatively quiescent from a counterespionage perspective. During the 1966-1975 period there were five arrests for espionage and related charges. It was not until the late 1970s that the Justice Department, under former Attorney General Griffin Bell (1977-1979), assumed a more aggressive posture against espionage. As implemented by Judge William Webster, FBI Director from 1978 to1987, the FBI's Counterintelligence program was invigorated. As counterintelligence cases can be relatively slow in pace due to their intelligence nature and relatively high legal thresholds for successful conviction, the FBI's aggressive investigation bore significant fruit in the mid -1980s. In 1985 alone, the FBI arrested 11 individuals for espionage; and the year was dubbed the "Year of the Spy." The John Walker espionage ring alone accounted for the indictment of four individuals who were either convicted of or pleaded guilty to charges of espionage. John Walker was a U.S. Navy warrant officer with a top secret clearance and access to cryptography codes, a position which allowed him access to some of the most important national security secrets the nation had. He committed espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union from the late 1960s until he was arrested. Other espionage arrests in 1985 included Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA employee (on behalf of the People's Republic of China), Jonathan Pollard, an intelligence analyst with the Naval Investigative Service (on behalf of Israel), and Ronald Pelton, a former National Security Agency communications specialist (on behalf of the Soviet Union).77 Post Cold War Counterintelligence. When the former Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the FBI, like many agencies in the federal bureaucracy that were targeted, staffed and trained to contain the Soviet threat, had to reassess its approach and priorities for counterintelligence. The Department of Justice led an effort to reassess the new international environment and target its counterintelligence resources accordingly. The bipolar world had dissolved with the passing of the Soviet Union and was replaced with a multipolar world. The new world was far less certain and far more complex than the well tested boundaries of international behavior that had evolved since 1945. The end result of the Department of Justice/FBI counterintelligence review was a concept known as the National Security Threat List (NSTL).78 Flexible enough to incorporate a broader array of "non-traditional" threats (that is, those foreign powers that did not traditionally target 76 See Executive Order 12333, §§2.4 and 2.5. 77 See CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on Charges of Espionage Against the United States Government: 1966-1993, Revised May 27, 1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available from the authors of this report). For a compilation of espionage cases through 1999, see [http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage]. 78 See Pat Watson, "The FBI's Changing Mission in the 1990s," Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Mar. 24, 1992. CRS-28 the United States with their foreign intelligence resources), the NSTL is composed of two elements: (1) a classified list of countries whose demonstrated level of activity directed against the United States warrants special attention and monitoring, and (2) an unclassified "Issues List," which provides the predicate for opening an investigation on any foreign power engaged in activity outlined by the eight issues.79 Some of the higher profile cases during this era include: ! Aldrich Hazen Ames. Aldrich Ames was a CIA, Directorate of Operations Officer who worked on intelligence matters relating to the Soviet Union. In his later career he had responsibilities related to Soviet counterintelligence, which afforded him access to the identities of some of the Soviet sources who had been recruited and operated by U.S. intelligence agencies. From 1985 to 1994, Ames committed espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and then Russia. He was arrested in 1994, and was convicted of one count of espionage under 18 U.S. Code §794(c). ! Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). LANL is one of the world's preeminent nuclear weapons design and testing facilities. In the late 1990s, DOE intelligence and counterintelligence officials alleged that highly classified documents concerning the design of the W-88 nuclear warhead may have been made available to China.80 Wen Ho Lee was a naturalized U.S. citizen of Taiwanese origin who worked at LANL's Applied Physics or "X" Division, which has expertise involving all aspects of nuclear weapons physics and a lead role in assessing the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Based on a DOE Administrative Inquiry, and subsequent FBI full foreign counterintelligence investigation, in December 1999, Lee was indicted on 59 counts of violating the Atomic Energy Act and committing espionage (42 U.S. Code §2276 and 18 U.S. Code, §§793(c) and 793 (e), respectively). Based on FBI testimony to a federal judge that Lee posed a flight risk, he was arrested and placed in solitary confinement for 9 months. The case became contentious and public, as it was alleged by Lee's defense attorneys that racial profiling played a role in his indictment. Moreover, investigative agencies never located tapes onto which the indictment alleged that Lee downloaded classified information and removed it from Los Alamos National Laboratory. In the end, he pled guilty to one count of unlawfully collecting and keeping classified information relating to the national defense and was sentenced to time served during his pretrial detention. The remaining 58 of 59 counts were dropped. 79 These issues are: Terrorism, Espionage, Proliferation, Economic Espionage, Targeting the National Information Infrastructure, Targeting the U.S. Government, Perception Management, and Foreign Intelligence Activities. See [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/ansir.htm]. 80 See U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (the "Cox" report), which can be accessed through http://hillsource.house.gov/CoxReport/cont/gncont.html. For a critical review of the handling of this case see The Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation ("Bellows" report), May 2000. Much of this report is classified, but a redacted version can be viewed at [http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows.htm]. CRS-29 ! Robert Hanssen. As mentioned above, former FBI Agent Robert Hanssen was convicted of committing espionage on behalf of the former Soviet Union and then Russia in the late 1980s, and then again in the late 1990s. Like Aldrich Ames, Hanssen's insider access through his FBI position allowed him to be a valuable Russian agent. Tipped off that the FBI had a "mole" in its ranks by a U.S. Intelligence Community-controlled double agent, Hanssen's espionage career was halted in February 2001. He is now serving a life sentence without parole, the result of a plea bargain with the U.S. Department of Justice. In early 2003, the FBI's Counterintelligence program developed a Strategic Plan outlining the FBI's perception of top foreign intelligence threats, and therefore, its top counterintelligence priorities. According to Director Mueller, these threats and resultant counterintelligence priorities include: (1) the potential for an agent of a hostile group to enhance its capability to produce or use a weapon of mass destruction; (2) the potential for a foreign agent to penetrate the U.S. Intelligence Community (for espionage purposes); (3) targeting of government supported research and development; and (4) compromise of U.S. Critical National Assets.81 Other important recent changes in the Counterintelligence program include the establishment of a Counterespionage Section to manage classic (national defense information) and economic espionage cases, and a centralization of the program, with FBI Headquarters taking a more direct role in setting priorities and allowing FBI field offices some degree of autonomy in how they implement these national priorities. FBI Criminal Enterprises, White Collar, Cyber and Other Federal Crimes. The FBI's major criminal responsibilities include investigating organized criminal enterprises, white collar crime, public corruption, civil rights violations, and a host of other crimes that often fall within the jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement, but are either committed across state borders or are so complex in nature that federal involvement is appropriate. Such crimes include kidnaping, extortion, bank robberies, child exploitation and pornography, and international child abduction. In FY2002, out of a $5.1 billion budget and 28,277 funded positions,82 the FBI obligated over half of its funding and positions to combat criminal enterprises, and other federal crimes.83 81 See Robert S. Mueller III, "FBI's Fiscal Year 2004 Budget," testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Mar. 27, 2003. A Critical National Asset is defined as those "... persons, information, assets, activity, research and development technology, infrastructure, economic or security interests whose compromise would do damage to the survival of the United States." 82 The number of "funded positions" an agency has does not always correlate directly to the number of on board employees an agency has, as hiring and attrition are fluid and ongoing processes. 83 U.S. Department of Justice, 2004 Congressional Authorization and Budget Submission, Volume II, Federal Bureau of Investigation, (Washington, Feb. 2003), pp. 1-7 and pp. 1-9. CRS-30 Organized Criminal Enterprises. The FBI defines "organized criminal enterprises" as continuing and self-perpetuating criminal conspiracies by groups that are hierarchical in structure, and employ the use and threat of violence to maintain their power base. Through investigation and prosecution, the FBI's Organized Crime program seeks to disrupt the largest criminal enterprises. In FY2002, the FBI worked nearly 4,087 organized crime cases, of which 956 ended in a conviction or a pre-trial diversion.84 It is noteworthy that as part of every major crime law Congress passed, the FBI received enhanced capacity to combat organized crime. Specifically, two laws passed by Congress gave the Department of Justice and the FBI the tools to more effectively combat organized crime. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351). Title III of this Act defined for the first time parameters within which federal law enforcement could engage in electronic surveillance during criminal investigations.85 In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeering-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (P.L. 91-452), giving federal law enforcement new statutory laws by which they could prosecute professional criminals, who are linked to a pattern of criminal activity.86 Crimes covered by RICO include, but are not limited to, sports bribery, counterfeiting, embezzlement of union funds, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, obstruction of justice, murder for hire, drug trafficking, prostitution, sexual exploitation of children, alien smuggling, trafficking in counterfeit goods, theft from interstate shipments, and interstate transportation of stolen property. State crimes covered by RICO include murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, and drug trafficking. Factors that perpetuate organized crime include social and economic instability in the newly emerging post-Soviet nation states; increased cross-border commerce; the development of the Internet; widespread use of electronic banking; increased ease and frequency of international travel; the continuing profitability of international drug trafficking; and the possible proliferation of nuclear, chemical. and biological weapons of mass destruction. According to the FBI, the principal organized crime groupsthat are not primarily involved in drug trafficking include: (1) La Cosa Nostra and other Italian organized crime groups; (2) Russian and Eastern European crime groups; and (3) East Asian crime groups. While these groups are identified with ethnic groups, their associates are often of other backgrounds. Some observers note that increasingly these groups are specializing in order to carve out market niches. For example, the Russian mob is known to produce high quality forged 84 2004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-11. Pre-trial diversions usually include cases where the U.S. Attorney decides to postpone prosecution depending upon the offender agreeing to testify, or agreeing to accept certain probation-like conditions, or both. 85 For further information, see CRS Report 98-327, Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by Gina Stevens and Charles Doyle. 86 For further information, see CRS Report RS20376, RICO: An Abridged Sketch, by Charles Doyle. CRS-31 documents. They are also cooperating with one another to a greater degree than in the past.87 A brief summary of these groups and others follow. La Cosa Nostra (LCN) emerged as a national criminal threat in the 1950s and 1960s. These groups are involved in a wide variety of on-going criminal enterprises that include illegal gambling, prostitution, drug trafficking, theft, fraud, extortion, public corruption, and the infiltration of labor unions. Russian and Eastern European criminal enterprises emerged following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. These groups are sophisticated and specialize in international money laundering, bank fraud, and forgery. They conduct the bulk of their activities in the former Soviet Union, but they are also highly mobile and have been active in the United States.88 East Asian criminal enterprises include the Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuza. They also includes smaller, but often more violent, gangs from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Their criminal activities include narcotics trafficking, financial crimes, prostitution, public corruption, and alien smuggling. Drug trafficking organizations. There are several major Mexican, Colombian, Jamaican, and Dominican drug trafficking organizations. According to GAO, since September 11, 2001, about 40% of FBI Special Agent positions dedicated to drug enforcement have been shifted to either the national security or counterterrorism programs. At the end of FY2002, the FBI had 1,379 agents positions allocated to drug cases, by the second quarter of FY2003, it only had 823 agents working these matters.89 The number of newly opened drug cases is expected to drop sharply in FY2003 to just over 300, as compared to 944 cases in FY2002, 1,413 in FY2001, and 1,825 in FY2000.90 In FY2002, the FBI worked 10,132 open drug cases, of which nearly 3,906 ended in convictions or pre-trial diversions.91 Other Violent Gangs. In recent decades, law enforcement agencies have noted a rise in violent street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. Los Angeles is the center of gang phenomenon, but there has been significant migration of street gangs from larger to smaller urban areas. Such street gangs would include the Bloods, the Crips, Folk Nation, the People Nation, the18th Street Gang, and the Mara Salvatrucha. Many of these street gangs are run by prison gangs, as older gang members are incarcerated but continue to run gang operations from prison. Outlaw 87 Jeffrey Robinson, The Merger: How Organized Crime is Taking Over Canada and the World, 1999. 88 For a description of gasoline bootlegging scams carried out by Russian organized crime groups, see Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America, (New York: Mar. 2000), 266 p. 89 U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, (Washington, June 18, 2003), p. 16. 90 Ibid., pp. 18. 91 2004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-11. CRS-32 motorcycle gangs continue to pose a threat as well. They include, among others, the Hells Angels, the Bandidos, the Pagans, and the Warlocks. Since motorcycle gangs often engage in interstate narcotics trafficking particularly methamphetamine and prostitution, they have been the target of major FBI investigations. In FY2002, the FBI worked 1,832 gang-related cases, of which 956 ended in convictions or pre-trial diversions.92 White Collar Crime and Public Corruption. White collar crime refers to non-violent fraudulent enterprises committed by persons while engaged in legitimate occupations. Such crimes range from small-time embezzlements to corporate malfeasance, and are committed in every major sector of the economy. They include health care fraud, public corruption, financial institution fraud, insurance fraud, securities and commodities fraud, telemarketing fraud, bankruptcy fraud, environmental crimes, money laundering, and intellectual property rights. There is a widespread public perception, moreover, that high-level white collar and public corruption crimes go unpunished.93 Three areas of "white collar" crime present the greatest challenge to the FBI. They include health care fraud, public corruption, and corporate and securities fraud. In FY2002, the FBI worked 42,738 white collar crime cases, of which 6,918 resulted in convictions or pre-trial diversions.94 Health Care Fraud. In Calendar Year (CY) 2000, fraud in the burgeoning $1.3 trillion health care sector had become so lucrative that law enforcement agencies95 documented the migration of some crime groups from drug trafficking and other criminal enterprises to health care fraud. Health care fraud involves making false claims to health care insurers, including Medicare and Medicaid. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) estimate that health care expenditures will exceed $2 trillion by CY2006.96 A recent audit of the Medicare fee-for-services program reported that out of $192 billion in claims paid in CY2001, over $12 billion in claims, or 6% were paid in error, without proper documentation, or were fraudulent.97 The National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association estimates that at least 3% of health care outlays, or $39 billion was lost to outright fraud in CY2000.98 92 Ibid., pp. 2-11. 93 David Burnham, "The FBI: A Special Report," The Nation, (Aug. 11-18, 1997), p. 12. 94 2004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-10, 2-11. 95 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, including its Office of Inspector General, participates in combating healthcare fraud. 96 Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Care Expenditures Projections Tables, Table 1, click on [http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-2001/t1.asp]. 97 Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Improper Fiscal Year 2001 Medicare Fee-For-Service Payments, Report A-17-01-02002, (Washington, February 21, 2002), click on [http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/cms/a0102002.pdf], cited in National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, Health Care Fraud: A Serious and Costly Reality for All Americans, p. 2, click on [http://www.nhcaa.org/pdf/all_about_hcf.pdf]. 98 National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, Health Care Fraud, p. 2, click on (continued...) CRS-33 Other estimates place the losses in the 10% range, or $130 billion per year.99 Health care fraud includes the following scams: ! billing for services never provided; ! billing for higher reimbursed services than actually performed (upcoding); ! performing unnecessary services simply to generate billings; ! misrepresenting treatments as medically necessary to obtain coverage; and ! referring patients to ancillary providers in return for a kickback. Congress included provisions to combat fraud in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191; HIPAA). Beside making health care fraud a federal crime, the Act established a dedicated funding stream, which is used to fund FBI efforts to detect and investigate fraud in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Prior to the Act, funding for health care fraud investigations were directly appropriated. For 2003, the FBI anticipated that it would receive $114 million from HIPAA, supporting 878 positions (507 agents).100 Public Corruption. The FBI is responsible for investigating public corruption cases that involve federal, state and local public servants entrusted with the safety and protection of the citizenry and public property. In addition to independent inspectors general at federal agencies, the FBI is perhaps the only agency that is positioned to investigate pervasive corruption and restore the public's faith in public institutions. Its role, however, in policing such corruption has been controversial. When such investigations are ill conceived, poorly managed, or perceived as politically motivated, they actually undermine the public's faith in the federal government's ability to effectively police the Nation. Perhaps the most well known public corruption investigation was ABSCAM, an undercover operation in which the FBI used middlemen to lure public figures into taking bribes. While controversial, ABSCAM led to the successful prosecution of one Senator and six Members of the House of Representatives, among others. More recently, an FBI investigation resulted in the conviction of Congressman James A. Traficant on multiple counts, including bribery, tax evasion, and racketeering. In FY2002, the FBI worked 2,344 public corruption cases, of which 631 resulted in convictions or pre-trial diversions.101 Corporate Fraud and Securities. In July 2002, the FBI established a corporate fraud task force and, since that date, 45 of 56 FBI field offices have participated in some part of task force operations. As of February 2003, the FBI had opened more than 50 corporate fraud investigations. Among others, the FBI is currently investigating Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, Rite Aid, Qwest Communications, Peregrine Systems, K-Mart, ImClone Systems, Global Crossing, 98 (...continued) [http://www.nhcaa.org/pdf/all_about_hcf.pdf]. 99 Ibid., p. 2. 100 2003 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 3-4. 101 2004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-10. CRS-34 Dynegy, Duke Power, and CMS Energy Corporation.102 Of these investigations, 13 involve estimated losses to investors that exceed $100 million.103 In the wake of these corporate scandals, Congress increased penalties for certain types of securities- related fraud in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (P.L. 107-204).104 To address corporate crime, the FBI has formulated a four-part plan. First, the FBI is working to increase liaisons with other agencies that work corporate and security fraud. Such agencies would include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Postal Service, State Attorney General offices, and other state agencies. Second, the Bureau is increasing training for Agents and Analysts in the areas of corporate fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering. Third, the Bureau is establishing a corporate fraud "reserve team,"consisting of 304 agents and over 300 financial analysts with investigative expertise in the area of corporate and securities fraud. This team will be available to be deployed as needed in the case of large and complex investigations on the scale of Enron or WorldCom. Fourth, the FBI intends to hire additional agents and analysts who can be dedicated to the corporate fraud reserve team.105 Cybercrime. Cyberspace has been described as the "nervous system" of our Nation's critical infrastructures. Cyberspace essentially consists of hundreds of thousands of computers, networks, and routers that are linked together in a massive telecommunications grid known as the Internet. Enemies of the United States can conduct espionage and prepare for cyber strikes against the United States through the Internet.106 Criminals, moreover, have exploited computers and the Internet to engage in identity theft and other types of fraud. Consequently, cyber security has become a national priority and the Executive Branch has formulated a National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.107 To reduce threats and vulnerabilities, the National Strategy calls for enhancing law enforcement's capabilities to prevent and prosecute cyberspace attacks. The FBI has a prominent role to play in this area. Following September 11th, the reorganization of the FBI included the creation of Cyber Division, as the Bureau prioritized cybercrime. Within the Cyber Division, the FBI established a Computer Investigation Threat Assessment Center (CITAC) to conduct and coordinate all investigations involving foreign terrorists or powers that threaten or attack the integrity of our Nation's information systems. While the newly created Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting the Nation's 102 For further information, see CRS Report RS21269, Accounting Problems Reported in Major Companies Since Enron, by Mark Jickling. 103 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Corporate Fraud Hotline Press Release, (Washington, Feb. 5, 2003) 1 p. [http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/mueller022503.htm]. 104 For further information, see CRS Report RL31554, Corporate Accountability: Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-204), by Michael V. Seitzinger and Elizabeth B. Bazan. 105 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 5-12. 106 For information on one international dimension of this issue, see Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Internet Dreams Turn to Crime: Russian Start-Up Firm Targeted U.S. Companies," a three- part series of articles in the Washington Post, beginning May 18, 2003. 107 The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (Washington, Feb. 2003), 60 p. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf]. CRS-35 cyber infrastructure,108 the FBI's Cyber Division is responsible for investigating federal crimes that have a cyber nexus.109 Cyber-related investigations could include: ! violations of intellectual property rights, including theft of trade and signal secrets; ! software copyright infringements; ! Internet and online credit/debit card fraud; ! Internet and online identity theft and fraud; and ! online child pornography. Since investigations handled by the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Criminal Investigations Divisions could also involve cyber-related elements, the Cyber Division supports these divisions with technical assistance. Besides conducting cybercrime investigations, the Cyber Division is working to maintain the necessary public/private alliances, provide education and training, and stay abreast of the emerging technologies. In partnership with the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), the FBI also established the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) in 1999. The IFCC is a collection point of valuable cybercrime intelligence. Complaints include computer intrusions, identity theft, intellectual property rights violations, economic espionage, credit card fraud, child pornography, and online extortion. In CY2002, the FBI received more than 75,000 fraud complaints. Of these complaints, more that 48,000 were referred to other law enforcement agencies for follow up triple the referral rate in CY2001. A recent IFCC report estimated that cyber-related fraud from referred cases amounted to $54 million in losses in CY2001, as compared to $17 million in CY2000. The most frequently reported complaints involved Internet auction fraud (46%), non-delivery of merchandise and non-payment (31%), and credit/debit card fraud (12%). In FY2003, the FBI and the Office of Management and Budget is conducting a performance and analysis review test on the cybercrime program. Performance measures for this program will be incorporated into the FY2005 budget submission. Other Significant Crime. Other crime areas of significant concern for the FBI include civil rights/hate crimes; crimes against children, including abduction cases, sexual exploitation, and child pornography; and Indian country law enforcement. Civil Rights/Hate Crimes. The FBI is also responsible for investigating certain civil rights violations, which for operational purposes are divided into four 108 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) transferred the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), to the Department of Homeland Security. NIPC was formed to detect, deter, assess, and warn computer users as to cyber threats and to investigate and prosecute unlawful computer intrusions. According to the DOJ FY2004 Budget Summary, NIPC's transfer to DHS's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate included about $51 million and 307 positions. 109 For further information, see CRS Report RS20830, Cybercrime: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws, by Charles Doyle. CRS-36 categories: hate crimes, color of law/police misconduct, freedom of access to clinic entrances, and involuntary servitude/slavery.110 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322) defines a "hate crime" as: a crime in which the defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of property crime, the property that is the object of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person (§280003). In FY2002, the FBI worked 3,485 civil rights or hate crime cases, of which 186 resulted in convictions or pre-trial diversions.111 Crimes Against Children. The FBI launched the Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI) to lead multi-agency undercover operations to identify child pornographers and others that use the Internet to lure children into sexually abusive situations. Under Director Louis Freeh, as has been continued under Director Robert Mueller, it became a matter of policy for the FBI to lend immediate assistance to state and local authorities in cases of child abduction particularly those 12 years old or younger, since it is extremely critical to resolve such cases within the first 24 hours. In FY1996, the FBI pursued about 113 child pornography cases. In FY2002, the Bureau worked 2,704 Innocent Images cases and 1,775 other child exploitation cases. Of these cases, 660 Innocent Images and 194 other child exploitation cases ended in convictions or pre-trial diversions.112 FBI Security Program. As the Nation's lead counterintelligence organization, the FBI is an obvious target for foreign intelligence agencies and others seeking to compromise U.S. national security. Efforts to assess the FBI security program were initiated in the Fall of 1999. These efforts were intensified following the arrest of Robert Hanssen in February 2001 and the September 11th attacks. By April 2001, a FBI task force concluded that a single executive should be responsible for the FBI Security program. At that time, the security function was diffused and scattered in several Bureau divisions, and no single Bureau executive was responsible for security. In March 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft established a Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs. Former FBI and CIA Director, Judge William Webster headed the Commission. In March 2002, Judge Webster's Commission issued its findings. Among other findings, the Commission found that Robert Hanssen had exploited his access to the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) system to breach most security fire walls and compiled highly sensitive information regarding FBI counterintelligence operations. He later sold this information to the Soviets and, then, the Russians. In addition, Judge Webster testified that in the days immediately following September 11 the FBI 110 A "color of law" investigation involves instances when persons operating under the "color of law," e.g., police officers, willfully deprive, or cause to be deprived, any person of their rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or other U.S. laws. 111 2004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-11. 112 Ibid., pp. 2-11. CRS-37 had dropped all ACS fire walls in the interest of sharing all relevant leads. In so doing, any FBI employee with access to the ACS could have accessed all the FBI foreign intelligence case files an alarming vulnerability. The Webster Commission's Review of FBI Security Programs included recommendations regarding systems, personnel, and document security.113 In addition, the Commission recommended that the FBI security programs should be integrated into a single office that reports to the Director. Two measures, S. 1440 and its pending companion bill, H.R. 2867, the "FBI Reform Act of 2003" would adopt some of the changes recommended in the Webster Commission, including the establishment of a counterintelligence screening polygraph program.114 In response to the Webster Commission recommendations, the FBI has enhanced computer audit procedures, expanded the use of polygraphs, and increased the frequency of employee reinvestigations for sensitive positions. As part of the recent FBI reorganization, a stand-alone Security Division has been established under the Executive Assistant Director for Administration. This Division is currently headed by a CIA intelligence executive. Observers note, however, that no security program can guarantee against a "trusted insider" who, for whatever motivation, might compromise the FBI or the Nation's security. Notwithstanding these limitations, the Assistant Director for Security recently testified that the FBI is committed to changing its security culture to more quickly detect those who may compromise sensitive information.115 Pertinent Relationships Notwithstanding the 10-year appointment of the FBI Director, the FBI does not operate in a vacuum. In order to most effectively and efficiently implement its mission, the FBI must have sound relationships with a broad range of national and international agencies and organizations. The first of these is its parent organization, the U.S. Department of Justice. As one element of the Department of Justice, at the policy level the FBI's requested budget is set by the Department and approved by the Office of Management and Budget. The Director of the FBI reports to the Attorney General. While the Attorney General is a member of the president's cabinet, the FBI Director is not. Therefore, policymaking on matters concerning the FBI's mission areas is developed by the Attorney General with substantial input from the Director. At the operational level, FBI Agents work closely with U.S. Attorneys to provide evidence and facts in support of potential prosecutions. Investigative Relationships. From a counterterrorism perspective, the FBI also works closely with a broad range of national and international organizations, including important relationships with other elements of the U.S. Intelligence 113 U.S. Department of Justice, A Review of FBI Security Programs, (Washington: Mar. 2002), p. 25. [http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/websterreport.pdf]. 114 Other matters included in this proposed legislation include protection for FBI whistle blowers, establishment of career paths for FBI security professionals, and allowing the disciplinary suspension of FBI Senior Executive Service Members for 14 days or less. 115 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Testimony by Kenneth H. Senser before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Review of the FBI Security Program and Its Transformation, (Washington: July 18, 2001). CRS-38 Community. The FBI has substantial interaction with the CIA, NSA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Since the mid-1990s, the FBI and CIA have exchanged senior level management, as well as Agents and Analysts in both the Counterterrorist and Counterintelligence Centers housed at the CIA. Certain entities within the FBI, including the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FBI Agents work closely with DHS immigration and customs professionals on matters pertaining to national security. From a counterterrorism analytical perspective, the FBI works closely with DHS, among other agencies, through participation in the aforementioned Terrorist Threat Integration Center. Conceptually, the FBI conducts all-source counterterrorism analysis, while the DHS- Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate's analysis is designed to contribute to these threat assessments while building upon them to conduct (internal infrastructure) vulnerability assessments. State and local law enforcement are another important FBI relationship in the War Against Terrorism and in complex criminal cases in which the FBI has jurisdiction. While the FBI has a reputation for being reluctant to share information, it is now working to integrate state and local law enforcement personnel into its 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).116 Moreover, it has established a separate office, the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, to ensure a two-way flow of germane information to state and local law enforcement officials. Counterterrorism threat and vulnerability assessment data are shared by FBI and DHS personnel with state and local law enforcement and private sector entities as appropriate. Finally, as mentioned above, the FBI has many close international law enforcement and security service relationships developed through its Legal Attache program. Congressional Oversight Relationships. From a congressional perspective, the FBI and its activities are subject to extensive oversight from a variety of committees and subcommittees. In the last 5 years, the FBI has provided official testimony to congressional committee hearings open to the public on over 100 occasions. Unofficial briefings to Members of Congress and their staff, as well as responses to congressional inquiries made directly to the FBI Director far surpass the numbers of official statements at congressional hearings. These oversight committees include, but are not limited to, House and Senate Judiciary Committees, 116 Joint Terrorism Task Forces are mechanisms used by the FBI to integrate federal, state and local law enforcement efforts in the prevention of terrorism. According to the FBI, these task forces "...are important `force multipliers' in the war on terror, pooling multi- agency expertise...." They are also the primary conduit through which intelligence sharing is coordinated. State and local law enforcement officials are required to have a top secret security clearance to be a member of the JTTFs. See testimony of Larry A. Mefford, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, September 23, 2003. For a state and local perspective on the effectiveness of JTTFs, see Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement - Volume 1 - Local-Federal Partnerships, Police Executive Research Forum, supported by a Cooperative Agreement with the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, at [http://policeforum.mn-8.net/default.asp?link=]. CRS-39 Appropriations, Armed Services, Select Committees on Intelligence, as well as House Governmental Reform, Senate Governmental Affairs, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, House International Relations Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Given the FBI's law enforcement and national security mission, in general, the committees with the greatest amount of interaction with the FBI tend to be the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. The FBI in Transition As domestic and international criminal and national security trends have changed and the FBI's jurisdiction expanded over time, the organization has been through multiple periods of transition. One could argue, however, that the current period of transition is at least as portentous as those which the FBI has experienced before. Some have argued that the FBI's reactive law enforcement culture, with its alleged predilection for information collection, but not sharing, may be so resistant to change that the organization may ultimately prove itself incapable of adapting to a preventative counterterrorism and intelligence mission.117 Others have argued that the FBI's case orientation and culture is not in need of changing; indeed, the culture and ability to build complex cases that withstand legal and constitutional scrutiny is an unassailable asset in the War Against Terrorism.118 While the changes that the FBI has made thus far have generally been received positively by groups which have reviewed them,119 the extent to which the organization can reform itself to effectively and efficiently advance the preventative counterterrorism mission is an open question.120 In addition to the question of whether the FBI can succeed in making the 117 See, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the "Gilmore" Commission), and Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age (a report of the Markle Foundation Task Force). See also William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for More Secure America, Yale University Press 2003, and Senator John Edwards, "Iraq, Terrorism and U.S. Global Leadership," speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Oct. 7, 2002. 118 See testimony of Nancy L. Savage, President, Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents Association, before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003. 119 See Dick Thornburgh, Chairman National Academy of Public Administration Panel of FBI Reorganization, testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003. 120 In a recent article in The Economist, six senior experts in intelligence and law enforcement, including a recent former Deputy Director of the FBI who also previously served as Assistant Director for both the FBI's Criminal Investigative and National Security Divisions stated that while FBI's preliminary (reorganization) steps are "...welcome, they are nonetheless very modest." The article continues "The FBI should be regarded as having been granted a last chance to succeed before the (counterterrorism and counterintelligence) mission should be permanently removed and its jurisdiction given to a new domestic security service." The authors state that the adoption of the British model of conducting domestic intelligence, as implemented by the British Security Service (MI-5), is not appropriate "... not for now at least." See Robert Bryant, et al., "America Needs More Spies," in The Economist, July 10, 2003. See CRS Report RL 31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, May 19, 2003, (continued...) CRS-40 transformation from reactive to proactive bias in the national security realm, there is the issue of the extent to which the FBI should balance its national security responsibilities with its traditional criminal pursuit mission. As mentioned above, there is some concern that the movement of investigative resources from the FBI's traditional criminal mission to the counterterrorism and counterintelligence mission may undermine the agency's ability to aggressively counter crime.121 Issues for Congress ! Is the FBI the appropriate agency to fight terrorism against U.S. interests? Can an organization with a strong and proud law enforcement culture be retrained to engage in the more subtle discipline of gathering and exploiting foreign intelligence domestically, where the end goal may not necessarily be prosecution, but preemption as well as continued collection and exploitation? Can the relatively autonomous relationships between FBI Headquarters and the 56 field offices be successfully rebalanced so centralized priorities established at HQ, are vigorously and successfully implemented locally? The ongoing reformation of the FBI presents multiple opportunities for oversight. ! Are there some federal crimes for which the FBI has jurisdiction that should be devolved to state and local law enforcement? If so, should additional resources be provided to the federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to support training? If not, does the FBI need additional criminal resources given that it may be unlikely that the reprogramming of resources from the criminal to the national security divisions of the FBI in the wake of September 11 will be reversed? ! Given the expansive mosaic of FBI jurisdiction in criminal and national security realms, would a legislative charter clarify and more centrally codify the organization's roles/responsibilities and jurisdiction? ! If the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, which has operational responsibilities within the United States, is eventually to be "co-located" with the existing TTIC, what implications, if any, does this have for the potential of U.S. foreign intelligence organizations becoming involved in domestic intelligence activities precluded pursuant to Executive Order 12333?122 120 (...continued) by Todd Masse. See also Gregory F. Treverton, "Time to Spy in America," Government Executive, Sept. 2003. 121 See Gary Fields and John R. Wilke, "FBI's New Focus Places Burden on Local Police," Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2003, p. A1. 122 Executive Order 12333 and other guidelines and statutes prevent federal agencies authorized to conduct foreign intelligence overseas from operating in the United States. However, the FBI, a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, is primarily charged with domestic intelligence operations. If an entire operational division of the FBI is "co- located"with what is largely a foreign threat intelligence entity (the TTIC), it is not inconceivable that cooperation in foreign and domestic intelligence activities may exceed (continued...) CRS-41 Appendix I: FBI Field Offices (By City Location) A FBI Birmingham http://chicago.fbi.gov FBI Albany Room 1400 (312) 431-1333 200 McCarty Avenue 2121 8th. Avenue N. Albany, New York 12209 Birmingham, Alabama FBI Cincinnati http://albany.fbi.gov 35203-2396 Room 9000 (518) 465-7551 http://birmingham.fbi.gov 550 Main Street (205) 326-6166 Cincinnati, Ohio FBI Albuquerque 45202-8501 Suite 300 FBI Boston http://cincinnati.fbi.gov 415 Silver Avenue, Suite 600 (513) 421-4310 Southwest One Center Plaza Albuquerque, New Mexico Boston, Massachusetts FBI Cleveland 87102 02108 Federal Office Building http://albuquerque.fbi.gov http://boston.fbi.gov 1501 Lakeside Avenue (505) 224-2000 (617) 742-5533 Cleveland, Ohio 44114 http://cleveland.fbi.gov FBI Anchorage FBI Buffalo (216) 522-1400 101 East Sixth Avenue One FBI Plaza Anchorage, Alaska Buffalo, New York FBI Columbia 99501-2524 14202-2698 151 Westpark Blvd http://anchorage.fbi.gov http://buffalo.fbi.gov Columbia, South Carolina (907) 258-5322 (716) 856-7800 29210-3857 http://columbia.fbi.gov FBI Atlanta C (803) 551-4200 Suite 400 FBI Charlotte 2635 Century Parkway, Suite 900, Wachovia D Northeast Building FBI Dallas Atlanta, Georgia 400 South Tyron Street One Justice Way 30345-3112 Charlotte, North Carolina Dallas, Texas 75220 http://atlanta.fbi.gov 28285-0001 http://dallas.fbi.gov (404) 679-9000 http://charlotte.fbi.gov (972) 559-5000 (704) 377-9200 B FBI Denver FBI Baltimore FBI Chicago Federal Office Building, 7142 Ambassador Road Room 905 Room 1823 B a l t i m o r e , M a r yl a n d E.M. Dirksen Federal Office 1961 Stout St. 18th. Floor 21244-2754 Building Denver, Colorado http://baltimore.fbi.gov 219 South Dearborn Street 80294-1823 (410) 265-8080 Chicago, Illinois http://denver.fbi.gov 60604-1702 (303) 629-7171 122 (...continued) analysis and bleed into joint intelligence operations within the United States. While these types of joint operations may well be warranted given the nature of the terrorist threat facing the Nation, an explicit and statutory authorization of such joint operations would increase transparency and jurisdictional clarity, as well as guard against potential abuses or excesses domestically. CRS-42 FBI Detroit FBI Jacksonville Los Angeles, California 26th. Floor, P. V. Suite 200 90024-3672 McNamara FOB 7820 Arlington Expressway http://losangeles.fbi.gov 477 Michigan Avenue J acks o n v i l l e, F l o r i da (310) 477-6565 Detroit, Michigan 48226 32211-7499 http://detroit.fbi.gov http://jacksonville.fbi.gov FBI Louisville (313) 965-2323 (904) 721-1211 Room 500 600 Martin Luther King Jr. E K Place FBI El Paso FBI Kansas City Louisville, Kentu cky 660 S. Mesa Hills Drive 1300 Summit 40202-2231 El Paso, Texas 79912-5533 Kansas City, Missouri http://louisville.fbi.gov http://elpaso.fbi.gov 64105-1362 (502) 583-3941 (915) 832-5000 http://kansascity.fbi.gov (816) 512-8200 M H FBI Memphis FBI Honolulu FBI Knoxville Suite 3000, Eagle Crest Room 4-230, Kalanianaole Suite 600, John J. Duncan Bldg. FOB FOB 225 North Humphreys 300 Ala Moana Boulevard 710 Locust Street Blvd. Honolulu, Hawaii Knoxville, Tennessee Memphis, Tennessee 96850-0053 37902-2537 38120-2107 http://honolulu.fbi.gov http://knoxville.fbi.gov http://memphis.fbi.gov (808) 566-4300 (865) 544-0751 (901) 747-4300 FBI Houston L FBI North Miami Beach 2500 East TC Jester FBI Las Vegas 16320 Northwest Second Houston, Texas 77008-1300 John Lawrence Bailey Avenue http://houston.fbi.gov Building North Miami Beach, (713) 693-5000 700 East Charleston Florida 33169-6508 Boulevard http://miami.fbi.gov I La s V e g a s , N e v a d a (305) 944-9101 FBI Indianapolis 89104-1545 Room 679, FOB http://lasvegas.fbi.gov FBI Milwaukee 575 North Pennsylvania (702) 385-1281 Suite 600 Street 330 East Kilbourn Avenue In d i a n a p o l i s , Indi a n a FBI Little Rock Milwaukee, Wisconsin 46204-1585 Suite 200 53202-6627 http://indianapolis.fbi.gov Two Financial Centre http://milwaukee.fbi.gov (317) 639-3301 10825 Financial Centre (414) 276-4684 Parkway J Little Rock, Arkansas FBI Minneapolis FBI Jackson 72211-3552 Suite 1100 Room 1553, FOB http://littlerock.fbi.gov 111 Washington Avenue, 100 West Capitol Street (501) 221-9100 South Jackson, Mississippi Minneapolis, Minnesota 39269-1601 FBI Los Angeles 55401-2176 http://jackson.fbi.gov Suite 1700, FOB http://minneapolis.fbi.gov (601) 948-5000 11000 Wilshire Boulevard (612) 376-3200 CRS-43 FBI Mobile FBI Omaha Sacramento, California One St. Louis Centre 10755 Burt Street 95841-4205 1 St. Louis Street, 3rd. Floor Omaha, Nebraska http://sacramento.fbi.gov Mobile, Alabama 68114-2000 (916) 481-9110 36602-3930 http://omaha.fbi.gov http://mobile.fbi.gov (402) 493-8688 FBI St. Louis (334) 438-3674 2222 Market Street P S t . Loui s, Missouri N FBI Philadelphia 63103-2516 FBI Newark 8th. Floor http://stlouis.fbi.gov 1 Gateway Center, 22nd. William J. Green Jr. FOB (314) 231-4324 Floor 600 Arch Street Newark, New J ersey Philadelphia, Pennsylvania FBI Salt Lake City 07102-9889 19106 Suite 1200, 257 Towers http://newark.fbi.gov http://philadelphia.fbi.gov Bldg. (973) 792-3000 (215) 418-4000 257 East, 200 South Salt Lake City, Utah FBI New Haven FBI Phoenix 84111-2048 600 State Street Suite 400 http://saltlakecity.fbi.gov New Haven, Connecticut 201 East Indianola Avenue (801) 579-1400 06511-6505 Phoenix, Arizona (203) 777-6311 85012-2080 FBI San Antonio http://phoenix.fbi.gov Suite 200 FBI New Orleans (602) 279-5511 U.S. Post Office 2901 Leon C. Simon Dr. Courthouse Bldg. New Orleans, Louisiana FBI Pittsburgh 615 East Houston Street 70126 3311 East Carson St. San Antonio, Tex as http://neworleans.fbi.gov Pittsburgh, PA 15203 78205-9998 (504) 816-3000 http://pittsburgh.fbi.gov http://sanantonio.fbi.gov (412) 432-4000 (210) 225-6741 FBI New York 26 Federal Plaza, 23rd. Floor FBI Portland FBI San Diego New York, New York Suite 400, Crown Plaza Federal Office Building 10278-0004 Building 9797 Aero Drive http://newyork.fbi.gov 1500 Southwest 1st Avenue San Diego, California Portland, Oregon 92123-1800 FBI Norfolk 97201-5828 http://sandiego.fbi.gov 150 Corporate Boulevard http://portland.fbi.gov (858) 565-1255 Norfolk, Virginia (503) 224-4181 23502-4999 FBI San Francisco http://norfolk.fbi.gov R 450 Golden Gate Avenue, (757) 455-0100 FBI Richmond 13th. Floor 1970 E. Parham Road San Francisco, California O Richmond, Virginia 23228 94102-9523 FBI Oklahoma City http://richmond.fbi.gov http://sanfrancisco.fbi.gov 3301 West Memorial Drive (804) 261-1044 (415) 553-7400 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73134 S http://oklahomacity.fbi.gov FBI Sacramento (405) 290-7770 FBI 4500 Orange Grove Avenue CRS-44 FBI San Juan Room 526, U.S. Federal Bldg. 150 Carlos Chardon Avenue Hato Rey San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918-1716 http://sanjuan.fbi.gov (787) 754-6000 FBI Seattle 1110 Third Avenue Seattle, Washington 98101-2904 http://seattle.fbi.gov (206) 622-0460 FBI Springfield Suite 400 400 West Monroe Street S p r i n gfield, Illi n o i s 62704-1800 http://springfield.fbi.gov (217) 522-9675 T FBI Tampa Room 610, FOB 500 Zack Street Tampa, Florida 33602-3917 http://tampa.fbi.gov (813) 273-4566 W FBI Washington Washington Metropolitan Field Office 601 4th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20535-0002 http://washingtondc.fbi.gov (202) 278-2000 Source: http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm CRS-45 Appendix II: FBI Directors 1. Robert S. Mueller, III, 2001-present 2. Thomas J. Pickard (Acting), 2001 3. Louis J. Freeh, 1993-2001 4. Floyd I. Clarke (Acting), 1993 5. William S. Sessions, 1987-1993 6. John Otto (Acting), 1987 7. William H. Webster, 1978-1987 8. Clarence M. Kelley, 1973-1978 9. William D. Ruckelshaus (Acting), 1973 10. L. Patrick Gray (Acting), 1972-1973 11. J. Edgar Hoover, 1924-1972 12. William J. Burns, 1921-1924 13. William J. Flynn, 1919-1921 14. William E. Allen (Acting), 1919 15. Alexander Bruce Bielaski, 1912-1919 16. Stanley Finch, 1908 - 1912 Source: www.FBI.gov/libref/directors/directmain.htm CRS-46 Appendix III: FBI Legal Attache Offices / ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32095
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